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Abstract 
Beginning with Mason (1939) and then continuing perforce with Bain (1956 and 1968) 
into the early 1970s, research in the mainstream of industrial organisation (10) was 
dominated by the structure-conduct-performance paradigm. The paradigm relates an 
industry's structural characteristics to the conduct patterns of its constituent firms, which 
determines an industry's performance. Specification of the relationships in this area is often 
largely ad hoc and its testing is subject to a number of difficulties. 
Considering an equilibrium oligopoly framework, mainly based on Cowling and 
Waterson (1976) study, the thesis derives short-run equilibrium profit, concentration and 
industry conjectures models. The empirical analysis will consist of two parts. 
Firstly, the above three equilibrium models are tested with different versions both 
in linear and logarithmic functional forms. Empirical testings includes testing the major 
criticisms against structure-conduct-performance studies with the profit model, 
distinguishing consumer-producer goods in explaining the structure-performance 
relationships and comparison of the hypothesised in4dels with ad hoc versions of profits 
and concentration. 
The profit model includes concentration, elasticity of demand, conjectures, product 
differentiation dummy, import intensity and capital intensity as explanatory variables. 
Concentration is determined by number of firms, elasticity of demand, product 
differentiation dummy, cost disadvantage ratio of small firms and conjectures. Industry 
conjectures is determined by levels and stability of concentration, growth in sales, product 
differentiation and import intensity. For each model, both linear and logarithmic functional 
forms (with some intermediate stages) are tested for empirical purposes. 
For the equilibrium profit model, oligopolistic structural and behavioural variables, 
viz, concentration, conjecturess, elasticity of demand and capital intensity are found to be 
significant in most of the cases. For the equilibrium concentration model, number of firms, 
xiv 
elasticity of demand and cost disadvantage ratio of small firms are found to be significant 
in most cases. For the equilibrium conjectures model, none of the above factors, viz. levels 
and stability of concentration, growth in sales, product differentiation and import intensity 
is found to be significant in explaining conjectures. 
The empirical analysis deals with testing the importance of major criticisms against 
the structure-conduct-performance studies in explaining the relationships. These criticisms 
are: i) omission of the relevant explanatory variables, ii) measurement error in the 
variables, and iii) aggregation bias and iv) existence of simultaneous causality among 
variables and v) mis-specification of the functional form of the model. These are tested 
with the profit models. 
The first three criticisms, viz, errors of omitting relevant variables, measurement 
error and aggregation bias are tested with the profit model. Resulting estimates suggest 
the importance of dealing with each of these issues in explaining the structure-performance 
relationship. 
The existence of simultaneous relationships among the variables is tested with two 
systems of equations. The first system of equations consists of equilibrium profit, 
concentration and conjectures models. The second system of equations consists of 
disequilibrium profit and concentration models and the equilibrium conjectures model. 
Profits, concentration and conjecturess among firms are treated as endogenous variables. 
For both systems, the empirical findings support there is a simultaneous relationship 
between the profit and concentration equation. 
The second system of equations deals with the existence of sub-optimal behaviour. 
This is done by specifying disequilibrium models separately for profit and concentration. 
Partial adjustment model is considered with a constant rate of adjustment towards the 
equilibrium level, assuming that any deviation from equilibrium is corrected at the constant 
rate of adjustment. For the profit model, the signs of coefficients of the disequilibrium 
version are found to be same as the equilibrium model with a significant positive sign for 
XV 
initial profit. Also for the concentration model, the signs of the coefficients of the 
disequilibrium version are found to be same as the equilibrium model with a significant 
positive sign for initial concentration. The annual adjustment rate of profit and 
concentration are both found to be slow. 
For the equilibrium profit, concentration and conjectures models, empirical analysis 
is carried out against a sample of 102 Australian manufacturing industries at the Australian 
Standard Industrial Classification (ASIC) at the four-digit level data for 1984/85. For the 
disequilibrium profit and concentration model, the data are used for two periods (1977/78 
and 1984/85), with a seven year lag for the above industries. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 General Introduction 
The structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm has played an important role in industrial 
organisation research since the pioneering work of Mason (1939). He and his colleagues 
examine in depth the relationships between various structure and performance variables for a 
large number of industries. The basic idea is that market structure determines the conduct 
(strategy) of firms which in turn determines the performance of industries. Exogenous basic 
conditions determine market structure and a unidirectional causality exists from structure 
through conduct, to performance. In most cases, a positive relationship is found between 
profit (an index of performance) and concentration (an index of structure). The majority of 
these studies are based on the economies of the U.K., U.S. and Canada. 
In Australia, comparative industry studies are relatively few. In a paper, Round (1974) 
has mentioned, 
"It seems quite safe to conclude that, as far as can be ascertained on the basis of published 
research in the form of journal articles, Australia has indeed experienced a comparative 
vacuum in industrial organisation." (1974, p 178) 
The few Australian cross-section studies relating industry concentration and margins 
have not established a significant and robust positive relationship between concentration and 
profits. This study specifies and tests various structure-conduct-performance relationships for 
Australian manufacturing. 
In this introductory chapter, section 1.2 provides the basic framework within which 
most empirical studies take place in this area. Section 1.3 presents the objective of the study. 
Finally, the outline of the study is considered in section 1.4. 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.2 Basic Framework: The Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) 
Paradigm 
The structure-conduct-performance paradigm is the basis for extensive cross-sectional 
empirical work in industrial economics. Market structure refers to a description of a market in 
terms of the number and the size distribution of the firms and any entry barriers arising from 
the technology of production. Market structure depends on the basic conditions of demand 
and supply. Demand conditions include direct and cross elasticity of demand, market growth 
and the purchasing power of the customers. Supply conditions include location and ownership 
of raw material, technology, unionisation, product durability, industry history and the legal, 
ethical and political framework within which business activities take place. Under the heading 
of market structure the following characteristics can be listed: concentration, diversification, 
product differentiation, barriers to entry and scale economies. 
Firm conduct includes the decision of firms on pricing, the way in which the volume, 
quality and range of products are determined, research and development planning, 
implementation and legal tactics, the decision by the firms whether to collude or compete. One 
effect of the conduct may be to change the industry structure in terms of the market 
concentration or entry barriers. However, the main importance of conduct is that it provides 
the link between structure and performance. 
Industry performance in its most general sense is an evaluation of the contribution of 
the industry as a whole to economic welfare. A typical list of performance indicators include 
allocative efficiency, equity, employment creation, X-efficiency, technological progressiveness 
and quality of output. In practical terms, performance refers primarily to profitability, a 
measure related to allocative efficiency. 
In this structure-conduct-performance paradigm, traditionally, the direction of causality 
is from structure to conduct to performance i.e. market structure determines firm conduct 
which in turn influences industry performance. The estimation of market structure-
performance relationships has been a major activity within the field of industrial economics for 
the last few decades. The conventional approach in cross-sectional studies is to find the 
2 
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relationships between certain characteristics of the industry structure (e.g. concentration, 
barriers to entry) and measures of industry performance, particularly with respect to 
profitability. A structure-conduct-performance schema is shown in Figure 1.1. 
1.3 The Objective 
Manufacturing is a core sector in terms of employment, output, international trade and 
maintaining the standard of living in the Australian economy. The relative importance of the 
manufacturing sector has been declining since the 1970s. Over the last two and half decades, 
the economy has experienced major structural adjustment with emphasis on changes in output 
and employment of the major sectors in the economy. The key objectives of government 
industry policies in this respect are to improve efficiency and international competitiveness in 
the manufacturing sector in the economy. 
Major characteristics of the Australian economy are its isolation and small domestic 
fragmented market. Most of the industries are led by two or three large firms with high 
concentration and there are both natural and artificial trade barriers. Due to its geographic 
isolation from the rest of the world, transport costs are quite high. High level of concentration 
with the presence of anti-competitive practices (before 1974) are quite common and restrain 
efficiency of domestic firms.' 
Research in the mainstream of industrial organisation has tested the relationship between 
profit rates (an index of performance) and concentration (an index of structure), including 
other variables (e.g. capital intensity, advertising intensity, growth, measures for barriers to 
entry, imiiort and export intensity). Whilst overseas literature shows a tendency for 
profitability and concentration to be positively (if weakly) associated, Australian results are 
rather mixed. In most of the Australian studies, a significant positive relationship is not found 
between these two variables. 
Specification of the models for most of the structure-conduct-performance studies (both 
for overseas and Australia) has been largely ad hoc and subject to a number of 
'Detailed discussion is in Chapter 3. 
3 
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STRUCTURE 
Concentration 
Number and Size Distribution of Buyers 
Diversification 
Barriers to Entry 
Product Differentiation 
Scale Economies etc. 
CONDUCT 
Collusion 
Strategic Behaviour 
Advertising / Research and Development 
Implementation and Legal Tactics 
Quality Control etc. 
$ 
PERFORMANCE 
Price-Cost Patterns and Profits 
Production and Allocative Efficiency 
Equity 
Employment Creation 
Technological Progressiveness etc. 
Figure 	1.1: 	The 	Interactive 	Structure-Conduct-Performance 	Relationships 
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conceptual difficulties. According to Parry (1978), the structure-conduct-performance 
relationships can best be explained with an oligopoly framework for a small open economy like 
Australia. In this study models are developed from oligopoly theory to explain the structure-
conduct-performance relationships. 
To specify a structure-performance relationship with other control variables the major 
criticisms against earlier studies should be considered. These are: i) omission of the relevant 
explanatory variables; ii) problems related to the measurement of variables; iii) problems with 
the use of aggregated data sets; iv) estimation problems due to the simultaneous causality 
among variables and v) mis-specification of the functional form of the model. The structure-
performance relationship may be affected due to any of the above factors. The importance of 
each criticism is considered in explaining industry profits. 
Keeping the above points in mind, the specification of the relationships (among the 
structure, conduct and performance variables) are developed in the study with the help of 
oligopoly models from standard literature. The empirical work consists of following steps: 
Firstly, simple short-run equilibrium models are specified with the determinants for 
each focus variable, viz, price-cost margins, concentration and conjectures. Estimations of the 
models include all possible versions. Also some major issues dealt with in the structure-
conduct-performance studies are examined with the final version of each model. 
Secondly, disequilibrium versions of both the profit and concentration models are 
specified with the help of the partial adjustment models. The estimated annual rate of 
adjustment of profits and concentration are calculated for the seven year period, 1977/78 to 
1984/85. 
Finally, estimation of the models as a simultaneous equation system examines the 
simultaneity (if any) that exists among variables. 
In the last section, a brief outline of the study is presented by giving an indication of 
the contents of each chapter. 
5 
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1.4 Outline of the Study 
The presentation of the chapters is as follows. Chapter 2 provides the basic framework of the 
study. In this respect, a literature review of the overseas as well as Australian studies based on 
the structure-conduct-performance paradigm is presented.' Also the major criticisms against 
these studies are identified. 
In Chapter 3, an overview of the Australian manufacturing sector is presented. Firstly, 
a discussion on the role of manufacturing sector in the Australian economy in terms of output, 
employment and trade performance is given. The period between 1970/71 and 1986/87 is 
covered for the discussion.' Secondly, major characteristics of the Australian manufacturing 
sector are identified with some recent structural adjustments. 
Chapters 4 and 5 present the analytical framework adopted in the study and specify the 
models. In Chapter 4, firstly, a short-run equilibrium model of profit is developed theoretically 
following Cowling and Waterson (1976), that explicitly incorporates industry elasticity of 
demand and conjectures. Extensions to the equilibrium profit model include openness and 
heterogeneity of products. Secondly, disequilibrium versions of the profit model are specified, 
including partial adjustment of profits towards the equilibrium level. For both the equilibrium 
and disequilibrium models, linear and logarithmic functional forms are considered. 
Chapter 5 specifies the concentration models (with different versions) and a model of 
conjectures with some structural determinants. After some literature review, the short-run 
equilibrium model of concentration model with different versions are developed. A discussion 
on the empirical studies explaining 'changes in concentration' is included. In this respect, 
disequilibrium versions of the concentration model are specified, including partial adjustment 
of concentration towards the equilibrium level. After reviewing the literature on the 
oligopolistic interdependence among firms ( or conjecturess) in terms of traditional theory and 
game theory, a model of conjectures is specified with some structural determinants. Both for 
2 Here, the structure-conduct-performance studies are covered from a general view point. The specific literature 
is reviewed along with the specification of each model given in Chapters 4 and 5. 
3  This is mainly because the data set for empirical analysis covers 1977/78 to 1984/85. The study focuses on 
the period between late 1970s and mid 1980s approximately. 
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concentration and conjectures, the linear and logarithmic functional forms are specified for 
empirical purposes.' 
Chapter 6 defines the variables of the models developed in Chapters 4 and 5. The data 
base is described in detail. Here, 102 manufacturing industries are considered at the Australian 
Standard Industrial Classification (ASIC) four-digit level for empirical analysis. The 
description of the industries is in Appendix II. The data generally refer to only one period in 
time, predominantly the 1984/85 period, although for disequilibrium versions, the data for 
1977/78 financial year are used.' Finally, the econometric procedures and diagnostic testings 
used are described. For estimation an econometrics package, SHAZAM (1993), Version 7.0 is 
used. 
Chapter 7 presents the fmdings from the profit model with different versions. Firstly, 
for the short-run equilibrium profit model, both the linear and logarithmic functional forms are 
considered. Both theoretically and empirically (at least in terms of signs and significance) the 
logarithmic functional form is found to be superior. Secondly, the major criticisms against the 
structure-conduct-performance studies in explaining the profit-concentration relationship are 
examined with the logarithmic functional form of the profit model. Thirdly, a few issues, viz. 
how the presence of i) aggregation bias (if any) in the data set and consumer/producer 
goods industries may affect the profit-concentration relationship are examined with the profit 
model of the logarithmic functional form. Also, an ad hoc version of the profit model is 
considered here and the results from this model are compared with the oligopoly based profit 
model. Finally, findings from the disequilibrium versions of the profit model are presented with 
estimates of the annual adjustment rate of profit for a seven year period. 
Chapter 8 presents the findings of the concentration model and a version of industry 
conjectures model. Firstly, for short-run equilibrium versions of the concentration model, both 
linear and logarithmic functional forms are specified. Secondly, the fmdings from the 
disequilibrium versions of the concentration model are presented with the annual adjustment 
4  Although, theoretically, logarithmic specification is appropriate for the profit and concentration model, linear 
specification is considered for the profit, concentration and conjecture model to compare the findings from 
other studies. 
5  The selection of period is predominantly due to the availability of funding to purchase this unpublished data 
series. The cost was A$9000 from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS). 
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rate of concentration for the seven year period. Finally, a discussion on the empirical findings 
from the hypothesised model of industry conjectures is presented for both the linear and 
logarithmic functional forms. 
Chapter 9 examines the interdependence among the structure-conduct-performance 
variables. Two systems of equations are considered here. System I includes three equilibrium 
models of profit, concentration and conjectures, while System II includes disequilibrium 
models of profit, concentration and an equilibrium version of industry conjectures model. 
Finally, Chapter 10 summarises the major findings with possible policy implications. 
The limitations of the study are mentioned here with some directions towards future research 
in this area. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE STRUCTURE-CONDUCT-PERFORMANCE PARADIGM 
2.1 	Introduction 
In industrial organisation, the most widely accepted paradigm stems from various concepts of 
interactions among industry structure, firm's conduct and the social and economic 
performance of an industry.' The main theme of the structure-conduct-performance paradigm 
is that exogenous basic conditions determine market structure and there is a unidirectional 
causality from market structure, through conduct, to performance. 
This chapter reviews the literature in this area. In section 2.2, the central hypothesis of 
the structure-conduct-performance paradigm, including different interpretations is presented 
with some overseas evidence. A critical analysis of the existing literature is covered in section 
2.3. To provide a perspective and rationale for the present study, the relevant Australian 
literature is discussed in section 2.4. Finally, in section 2.5, some concluding remarks are 
added. 
2.2 The Central Hypothesis: Concentration Influences Profitability 
The most frequently tested hypothesis in structure-conduct-performance theory is that 
profitability (an index of performance) rises with concentration (an index of structure). Almost 
all studies find a positive (although sometimes weak) association between these two variables. 
However, two different interpretations exist regarding the causality of this relationship, leading 
to opposite recommendations for antitrust policy. 
I The literature developed in this area is quite voluminous, some major issues are considered here. 
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2.2.1 Alternative Explanations to the Profitability-Concentration Relationship 
While structure-conduct-performance analysis is one of the major areas of research in 
Industrial Organisation, there remains different schools of thought regarding the policy 
implications behind a positive profit-concentration relationship. 
2.2.1.1 The Market Power Argument (Differential Collusion Hypothesis) 
In a competitive market, there are a substantial number of firms, with low levels of 
concentration. In the short-run, firms can earn positive or negative profits. In the long run, due 
to the absence of barriers to entry, selling prices are always equal with marginal costs. Each 
firm enjoys normal profit. 
In an imperfect market structure, like competitive market, firms will earn positive or 
negative profits in the short-run. 2 However, firms may raise their selling price above long run 
marginal cost giving rise to super normal profit in the long run. The firms enjoy market power. 
Table 2.1 
Table 2.1: 	A Summary of Market Structure with Profit Outcomes 
Type of Market (P-MC) - is an index of 
market power 
Short-Run Profit Long-Run Profit 
Competitive 0 + 0 
Monopolistically 
Competitive 
+ + 0 
Monopolistic + + + or 0 
Oligopolistic + + + or 0 
summarises profits enjoyed by firms under different market structure both in short-run and 
long-run. In a homogeneous oligopolistic industry, the degree to which price exceeds marginal 
2  Here, mainly oligopolistic market structure is considered as this is more common in real markets. 
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costs depends upon the effectiveness of collusion (either explicit or tacit) among sellers. The 
more concentrated are the firms within an industry, the greater is the opportunity of 
maintaining successful collusion. Perfect collusion leads to joint monopoly price among 
cooperating sellers. 
The traditional concentration (structuralist) doctrine is based on two fundamental 
concepts: Firstly, high seller concentration facilitates explicit and/or tacit collusion, leading to 
higher profitability for the firms.' Secondly, the leading firms in concentrated industries tend to 
be larger than the minimum optimum size dictated by scale economies. The policy implication 
is that antitrust policies could be introduced to reduce prices without a serious loss of 
production efficiency. 
2.2.1.2 The Efficiency Argument (Differential Efficiency Hypothesis) 
Opposed to the structuralist doctrine is what has been called the efficient structure doctrine by 
Demsetz (1973 and 1974). 4 He argues that the positive profit-concentration relationship is not 
due to the collusive behaviour of firms, but due to the efficiency of large firms. This may be 
due to the cost-advantages of larger firms over the rivals (e.g. in the form of the presence of 
scale economies/or lower marginal costs). To quote Demsetz (1974), " A phenomenon... 
likely to generate fairly persistent differences in accounting rates of return is the fact that some 
products are more efficiently produced by firms possessing a large share of the market" (1974, 
p 176) and he concludes, "It would appear that most, if not all, of the positive correlations 
between profit rates and concentration uncovered by some earlier studies can be attributed to 
variations in the size of firms not the degree to which markets are concentrated." (1974, p 
178). 
Stigler (1964), Saving (1970) and Cowling and Waterson (1976) support this argument. Stigler derives a 
relationship between the likelihood of collusion and the Herfindahl index of concentration. On the other hand, 
Saving expresses price-cost margin as a function of concentration ratio using a model of dominant firm price 
leadership. Finally, Cowling-Waterson study relates the price-cost margin to the Herfindahl index of 
concentration using a Cournot model of homogenous oligopoly. 
Brozen (1974) and Peltzman (1977) also support Demsetz's argument. 
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According to the efficiency argument, policies leading to deconcentration may reduce 
efficiency and result in a loss of welfare. 
2.2.2 Overseas Evidence on Concentration-Profitability Relationship 
The positive association between concentration and profitability is established in most of the 
studies using U.S. data. These studies are summarised in Weiss (1974) and more recently in 
Scherer and Ross (1990, Chapter 11). There are a few exceptions for the U.S. studies, e.g. 
Stigler (1963), and Brozen (1970, 1971). 
Stigler using income tax data for internal revenue service (I.R.S) minor industries, for 
the period 1947/54, constitutes an outstanding exception to the general conclusion. He points 
out that the salaries of the owner-managers of small corporations are also a part of their profit. 
In the unconcentrated industries, the percentage of total revenue accounted for the small 
corporations is higher than for the concentrated industries. The observed difference between 
the average profit rates between the two groups vanishes when the profit rate is adjusted for 
these excessive salaries.' 
Brozen (1971) considers the same data source as Bain, with an extended sample of 
industries. For the extended sample of industries he can not establish any relationship between 
concentration and profitability. 
Studies based on the U.K. data have mixed findings. Holtermann (1973) uses eight 
different performance indicators, with concentration, capital-output ratio, growth of industry, 
measures of entry barriers, advertising-intensity and investment/sales as explanatory variables. 
She finds a non-significant negative effect of concentration on price-cost margins.' 
Cowling and Waterson (1976) develop a simple oligopoly equilibrium model 
explaining gross profit margins with concentration, elasticity of demand and firm conjectures. 
Kilpatrick (1968) reports that Stigler's correction for 'entrepreneurial withdrawal' contains statistical bias. 
When the bias is corrected, a positive and significant relationship between concentration and profitability is 
established for a similar sample of industries. 
6 In conclusions, Holtermann (1973) indicates few reasons for this negative relationships, e.g. aggregated data 
set, proxies for concentration and barriers to entry are poor. 
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For empirical purposes, to avoid the problems with omission of relevant explanatory variables, 
they consider inter-industry changes in the profit margin over a time period. Change in 
concentration (both Herfindahl index and four-firm concentration ratio) and change in 
unionisation are treated as independent variables. To capture the cyclical effect on equilibrium, 
industries are divided into durable and non-durable goods. With U.K. Minimum List Heading 
(MLH) data, a significant positive association is established between profit and concentration 
using both the full sample and sub samples.' 
Hart and Morgan (1977), attempt to relate the effects of concentration on margins for 
the U.K. manufacturing sector. Using the levels of variables, a significant positive effect is 
found between the degree of concentration and profits. But using changes in variables, no such 
relationship can be established. 
With a different data set for U.K. manufacturing, Clarke (1984) concludes that there is 
no evidence of a positive relationship between concentration and a profit variable for the 
period 1970/76. However, he mentions that this obscure relationship could be due to the 
presence of existing particular factors (e.g. the tighter controls on price for the large 
companies for the later part of the investigated period). This may affect the concentration-
profitability relationship. 
From the above discussion, it is obvious that the relationships between the structure 
and performance variables are complex.' The strength and direction of the relationships 
between structure and performance variables remain open to question. 
The results arc strongcr with Herfindahl index compared to the four-firm concentration ratio. 
Clarke (1983) and Hart and Morgan (1977) suggest that sophisticated econometric technique is needed to 
explain the complex structure-conduct-performance relationships. 
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2.3 	Common Criticisms against the Structure-Conduct-Performance 
Studies 
In the following sub-sections the common criticisms against the structure-conduct-
performance studies are discussed. 
2.3.1 Omission of Relevant Explanatory Variables 
In the absence of competition, if a relatively few firms control a large proportion of an 
industry's sales or assets, both in short-run and long-run firms may enjoy profits substantially 
above the competitive level. In this respect, the positive association between concentration and 
profitability (due to market power or efficiency) has received considerable attention in 
empirical research. However, concentration as a single explanatory variable may not explain 
the differences in industry profitability fully; the addition of relevant explanatory variables may 
affect the structure-performance relationship. For example, in their paper, Cowling and 
Waterson (1976) develop a profit model which includes the price elasticity of demand and 
firm's conjectures about rivals' responses as important determinants along with concentration.' 
The above two determinants (viz, price elasticity of demand and firms' conjectures) are not 
commonly considered in the literature. They emphasise that the omission of relevant 
explanatory variables may lead to biased results in estimating the coefficients of the variables 
of interest!' In practice, most of the models are based on ad hoc literature search, the problem 
due to the omission of relevant explanatory variables should be kept in mind in explaining 
results. 
Also, in the earlier literature, most of the studies ignore the influence of international 
factors, e.g. export and import intensity. In a closed economy, the dimensions of domestic 
market structure (seller concentration, growth of industry demand, the conditions of entry) 
may be sufficient to explain profitability. However, the international trade factors may affect 
9 Most of the studies implicitly assume market price elasticity of demand and firms' conjectures are identical 
for all industries. This may lead to a serious specification bias in the model. 
" Martin (1979) points out mis-specification due to the omission of relevant explanatory variables in the 
system of simultaneous equations can be an important problem for the identification of the simultaneous 
system. 
14 
Chapter 2: The Structure-Conduct-Performance Paradigm 
industry profitability significantly in an open economy (see, Esposito and Esposito (1971) and 
Pagoulatos and Sorenson (1976)). 
Other dimensions commonly used in literature in explaining the structure-conduct-
performance relationship are barriers to entry ( economies of scale, product differentiation, 
initial capital requirement etc.), industry growth, firm size, foreign-sector variables, e.g. export 
and import intensity, foreign investment and effective protection. Clearly, the factors which 
can explain the relationships logically should be included into the models. 
2.3.2 Measurement Error 
The measurement problems related to some of the important variables in the studies of market 
structure are considered below. 
2.3.2.1 Errors of Measurement in the Dependent Variable (Profit) 
Measurement error in the dependent variable may affect the structure-conduct-performance 
relationships. In Australia, Phillips (1978) finds a positive profit-concentration relationship 
considering profit measures on sales but negative with capital based measures. 
In most of the studies, researchers employ return to assets or equity rather than return 
on sales." In a competitive market equilibrium, with proper allowance for risk, interest and 
depreciation, return on asset or equity (or accounting rate of return) would be zero. In the 
presence of monopoly power (or superior efficiency of large firms) an above competitive rate 
of return emerges. The accounting profit is an imperfect surrogate for economic profit, as any 
income is treated as a return on asset. Monopoly profit would disappear if one capitalised the 
assets properly. It is expected that accounting measures of profits will misstate monopoly 
power.' 
n  The difference between accounting measures of profit and economic measures of profit is discussed in 
Chapter 4. 
12  As mentioned earlier, accounting measures of assets are not capitalised properly. Stigler (1963) argues 
profits of small firms are not reported properly which may cause biased relationship between profit and 
concentration. 
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For constant cost industries, the return on sales is the same as the price-cost margin, a 
performance variable suggested by oligopoly models, e.g. Cowling and Waterson (1976). For 
some studies with price-cost margin, advertising-sales ratio as well as research and 
development intensity variables are added as control variables. The conceptual problem here 
concerns whether these items should be considered as current or capital expenses, which may 
affect rates of return (see Comanor and Wilson (1974), Bloch (1974,1980)). 
It is found that the profit-concentration relationship may differ if profit on value added 
are used instead of profit on sales. Profit rates on sales may be affected by excise taxes and the 
internal accounting procedure of vertically integrated firms. For this reason, some studies, e.g. 
Conyon and Machin (1991), deflate profits with value added instead of sales. 
2.3.2.2 Errors of Measurement in the Explanatory Variables 
Here we mainly focus on measurement error with concentration. Seller concentration is used 
widely as an index of market structure. It should be adjusted for open economy and for 
regional markets (see Utton (1982), Kumar (1985), Dixon (1988) and Phillips (1978)). 
In oligopoly models, like Stigler (1964), Cowling and Waterson (1976), the Herfindahl 
index is preferred to the rather than concentration ratio: 3 Additional to the theoretical 
relevance of choosing between these two indices, Sleuwaegen and Dehandschutter (1986) 
argue the 'horn-shaped' relationship between the Herfindahl index and concentration ratio may 
lead to a bias in the profit-concentration relationship that identifies critical concentration ratio 
incorrectly. Therefore, the choice of concentration measure is not trivial." 
Proxies for entry barriers, e.g. advertising intensity or minimum efficient size plant (or 
firm), are often measured poorly in absence of detailed cost/scale information. 
'This index is not readily available for most of the countries, where this is used better results generally are 
found than with the concentration ratio. 
" This is also supported by Kwoka Jr (1981). 
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2.3.3 Specification Bias 
Under this heading three type of problems can be included. Firstly, there are often 
simultaneous relationships among variables, in that case, single-equation estimation technique 
may yield biased results. Secondly, the studies are often mis-specified in terms of variables as 
mostly these are based on prior belief, not on firm economic theory and finally mis-
specification may arise due to improper functional form. 
2.3.3.1 Simultaneity Problem 
In the structure-conduct-performance paradigm, there is a unidirectional causality between 
structure and performance variables. Some researchers, such as Geroski (1982) and Clarke 
and Davies (1982), argue that concentration and profitability are jointly determined by 
exogenous variables in the system. The argument can be extended for other variables, e.g. 
between the advertising-intensity variable and profitability; between the advertising-intensity 
variable and concentration; between growth and concentration; etc. In the presence of a 
simultaneous relationship, the single equation approach results in inconsistent and biased 
estimates of the relevant parameters. To capture the complex relationships among variables, a 
simultaneous equation approach is required. 
There are considerable differences of opinion among researchers regarding the use of 
the simultaneous equation approach in explaining structure-conduct-performance 
relationships. According to one group of researchers, further effort in modelling industrial 
organisation relations within the framework of simultaneous equations provides more 
appropriate results for the structure-conduct-performance relationships. 
An example of the benefits of the simultaneous equation approach is given in findings 
of a study by Intriligator (1978). In a six-equation simultaneous equation model, he integrates 
previous single equation studies. The following variables are considered as endogenous 
variables: the concentration ratio, the relative change in number of firms, the capital-output 
ratio, the advertising-sales ratio, the relative change in price and the profit rate on net worth. 
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Exogenous variables include minimum efficient scale, the price elasticity of demand, the 
income elasticity of demand, the real wage, the relative change in direct costs and the growth 
in the value of shipments. The results suggest a two-way relationship between some of the 
endogenous variables (e.g. capital-labour ratio and concentration, concentration and 
advertising-sales ratio, profit and concentration, and profit and advertising-sales ratio) of the 
model. Moreover, different results are found using the OLS (ordinary least squares) and the 
2SLS (two-stage least square) estimation techniques for some of the variables ( e.g. the effect 
of advertising on concentration, the effect of profit and concentration on advertising, and the 
effect of minimum efficient scale on profits).' s He concludes, "... the method of estimation 
does have an important effect on the estimated model, and certain of the results of previous 
studies using OLS are called into question." (1978, p 480) 
In a different model, for the U.S. food-processing sector, Pagoulatos and Sorensen 
(1981) explain the inter-relationships and feedback effects among margins, concentration and 
advertising. Advertising has a significant effect on both margins and concentration, 
concentration on margins and advertising, and margins on advertising. Their results also 
support a simultaneous equation approach in explaining the inter-relationships among the 
structure-conduct-performance variables. 
Gupta (1983) considers a five-equation simultaneous system for Canadian 
manufacturing industries. Endogenous variables are concentration, foreign ownership, 
advertising, sub-optimal capacity and the price-cost margin. The positive effect of 
concentration on the price-cost margin for the OLS result is insignificant for the 2SLS and the 
three-stage least squares (3SLS) estimations. For some other structural variables, he 
establishes different results using the OLS and the 2SLS technique. Simultaneity bias is quite 
influential in determining the inter-relationships among the variables. 
According to another group of researchers, simultaneity bias is not important. They 
find simultaneous equation results are more or less consistent with single equation studies. 
15  The ordinary least squares and two-stage least squares estimation techniques are discussed in Chapter 6. 
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An example is a study by Greer (1971), with advertising intensity, concentration and growth 
as endogenous variables. Advertising intensity is determined by concentration and growth. 
Growth is determined by advertising intensity and other exogenous variables. Concentration is 
determined by advertising intensity, growth and some exogenous variables. The simultaneous 
equation approach supports the strong quadratic relationship between the concentration and 
advertising intensity, like the single equation approach. 
Strickland and Weiss (1976) consider the advertising-sales ratio, concentration, and 
price-cost margins as the endogenous variables. The advertising-sales ratio is determined by 
concentration, margin and exogenous factors. Concentration is determined by the advertising-
sales ratio and exogenous factors. Price-cost margin is determined by concentration, 
advertising-sales ratio and exogenous factors. Their study suggests that the 2SLS results are 
consistent with those obtained from the OLS technique. 
In a model using a simultaneous equation approach, Chou (1986) relates the economic 
development of Taiwan to its industrial organisation. For a 'dichotomous market structure' he 
considers price-cost margin, concentration, export, and import intensity as the endogenous 
variables. Concentration is determined by export intensity, import intensity and other 
exogenous factors. Price-cost margin is determined by concentration, export, import intensity 
and other exogenous factors, while export and import intensity are determined by 
concentration, price-cost margin and other exogenous factors. Most of the findings are similar 
for the two estimation techniques. 
2.3.3.2 Mis-specification in the Studies Based on Prior Beliefs 
In empirical analyses, most studies try to relate concentration and other explanatory variables 
with some measures of profitability (an indicator of performance). The variables and equations 
are chosen mostly on the basis of prior literature. In all empirical investigations, uncertainty 
remains about the inclusion or exclusion of variables. Specification uncertainty to a certain 
extent, leads to the incorrect approximation of the estimated parameters of primary interest. 
Sawyer (1982) has made a number of criticisms of the specification of the structure- 
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performance relationships based on prior beliefs. The credibility of the studies of market 
structure and performance can be enhanced if these studies are based on firm economic theory 
rather than on prior beliefs. 
2.3.3.3. 	Mis-specification due to Improper Functional Form 
In most cross-sectional studies, a positive linear relationship has been established between 
concentration and profitability. In some cases, imposition of linearity may be a poor 
representation of data. This has been emphasised by Geroski (1982). With U.K. minimum list 
heading industry data, he establishes a non-linear relationship between these two variables. 
The model should be based on firm economic theory and statistical criteria. He starts with a 
profit equation with concentration, advertising intensity, growth, a diversification index, 
import intensity and export intensity as the explanatory variables. Geroski investigates the 
minimal size of the model explaining the causal relations among the variables. Advertising-
sales ratio, import and export intensity are treated as exogenous. He concludes, 
"... a non-linear profits equation plus two further simultaneous equations involving import and 
export intensity is the minimum-size model necessary to generate consistent unbiased 
estimators. " (1982, p 156) 
Sawyer (1982) also emphasises that the 'coherent approach' of structure-performance 
analysis based on profit maximisation (rather than what he termed as 'literature search 
approach') leads to non-linear relations among structure-performance variables. Sawyer's view 
is that too often alternative and conflicting theories are appealed to in specifying equations. 
In summary, there are many conceptual and measurement problems in structure-
conduct-performance studies which should be remembered in interpreting the findings from 
these studies. 
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2.4 Australian Studies 
There have been relatively few Australian studies of structure-conduct-performance 
relationships. This may be explained by lack of data for the relevant variables (see Round 
(1974)). No unambiguous profits-concentration relationship is found in the studies. The studies 
are summarised below. 
2.4.1 Single Equation Studies 
Unlike overseas studies, the direction of the profits-concentration relationship in Australian 
manufacturing industries is not easily and unambiguously identifiable. This is prominent in a 
paper by Round (1976a). He examines the strength and direction of the relationship between 
profitability (considering both sales-based and fund-based measures) and concentration for 
manufacturing industries at the ASIC three-digit level over the period 1968/9-1972/3. Results 
are sensitive to the profit measure. For the sales-based measures, consistently positive and 
significant relationships are established, while the signs are negative for the capital-based 
measures. 
In another paper, Round (1976b) deals with multiple regression analysis to determine a 
relationship between price-cost margins and several explanatory variables using ASIC three-
digit data. Concentration, plant-size, industry growth, the nature of the industry's product, and 
geographic markets served by the industry are considered as the explanatory variables. The 
effect of concentration on industry margins is indeterminate due to the existence of the 
multicollinearity. The direction of the effects of the other explanatory variables on profitability 
are similar to the findings from the overseas studies. 
For a small economy like Australia, subject to significant import competition in many 
industries, the traditional oligopoly framework has to be reformulated. This is suggested in a 
monograph by Parry (1978). He deals with four-digit ASIC data for the manufacturing sector 
for the period 1972/73. Three measures of performance are considered, viz, labour 
productivity, price-cost margins (both gross margins on sales and return on fixed assets are 
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considered), and trade performance variables (based on export and import series). The profits-
concentration relationship is found to be positive, but neither the concentration nor the other 
structural variables are found to be significant. A number of industry characteristics (e.g. 
labour market factors, inter-industry diversification, multi-plant operation, foreign enterprise 
participation) appear to be significant rather than the traditional structural variables in 
explaining industry performance. 
In an open economy like Australia, foreign competition can be as important as the 
domestic structural factors in determining domestic industry profitability. Round (1978) 
investigates the effects of several structural variables and foreign competition on industry 
performance (measured by the price-cost margin) at the three-digit leveL The explanatory 
variables considered are concentration, plant size, diversification in terms of specialisation, 
capital-output ratio, industry growth, imports, tariffs and foreign ownership. Both 
concentration and foreign ownership are positively and significantly related to the price-cost 
margin. A high proportion of the variation in margins is explained by the foreign competition 
variables. 
Phillips (1978), in his doctoral thesis deals with a screened sample of 99 manufacturing 
industries at the ASIC four-digit level for 1968/9. He considers both sales and capital-based 
measures of profitability as the dependent variables. Besides concentration, a range of 
structural explanatory variables, viz number of firms in industry, absolute size of the firm, 
proxies for barriers to entry, growth and buyers' concentration are introduced sequentially into 
the profit equation. To capture the openness of the Australian economy, some international 
variables, viz, measures for import intensity, effective tariff, export intensity and direct foreign 
investment are added. 
A significant positive relationship is established for the sales-based measure, while the 
profit rate on funds employed shows an inverse relationship with concentration (and for the 
adjusted concentration ratio as well). The findings in respect of the other variables are 
generally consistent with the overseas results. 
In another paper, Round (1980a ) considers both three-digit and four-digit data to find 
the effect of domestic market structure and foreign competition (in terms of tariffs) on profits 
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for the manufacturing sector. In both cases, the concentration-profitability relationship is found 
to be positive, but dis-aggregation at the four-digit level weakens the relationship causing it to 
be statistically insignificant. He concludes, concentration is not an important variable in 
determining the performance across industries, while the effective tariff rate is significant and 
negatively related with profitability. Further dividing his sample into two groups, viz, high-
concentration industries and low-concentration industries, he tests the profit-concentration 
relationship. Even for the subgroups, a significant relationship between concentration and 
profitability can not be established. 
Round (1983b) finds a negative relationship between average profitability and 
concentration at the four-digit level of 147 manufacturing industries over the period 1968/9- 
1976/7. For further investigation the sample is divided into three groups: high, medium and 
low concentration industries. For the sub sample analysis he indicates, "higher concentration is 
progressively, although weakly, associated with higher than average profit margins. 
Accordingly, our results present no clear-cut implications of public policies in Australia 
towards concentrated markets", Round (1983b, page 208). 
Starting from a profit-maximising oligopoly model by Cowling and Waterson (1976), 
Dixon and Gunther (1986) examine the relationships among the margins, concentration, 
elasticity of demand, and 'apparent collusion' for 20 manufacturing industries. They estimate 
the degree of collusion for all industries. In this respect, they indicate that the Cowling-
Waterson model may need to be reformulated under sub-optimal situations. 
2.4.2 Simultaneous Equation Studies 
In the Australian context, studies based on the simultaneous approach are extremely scarce. 
While suggesting the superiority of the simultaneous equation approach compared to the single 
equation approach, Round (1980b) considers only a limited number of endogenous variables 
(profitability and effective rate of protection). Capital-intensity, concentration, advertising-
intensity, diversification, growth, decentralisation, and scale economies are considered as 
exogenous explanatory variables. Four-digit level data for the manufacturing sector are used 
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over the years 1968/9 and 1972/3. The major findings are: firstly, the higher tariff may cause 
inefficiency by increasing costs and thus reducing profits, and secondly, concentration is 
insignificant in determining industry profits. 
A small linear model by Dixon (1987b) estimates the inter-relationship among 
concentration, margins, and advertising. The small sample includes twelve industries selling 
domestic consumer goods. The 'adjusted concentration ratio' (or weighted Herfindahl index, 
weight being the share of large firms in total market sales) is determined by margins, average 
size of large firms, cost-advantage ratio, and advertising-sales ratio. Adjusted concentration, 
advertising-sales ratio, and a variable with partial adjustment of margin (to allow incomplete 
optimisation) are the explanatory variables for profits. Advertising is determined by margins, 
concentration, elasticity of demand, and a variable indicating the proportion of sales to 
consumer demand. With the 3SLS estimation technique, results are similar to overseas studies 
with expected signs. However, the coefficient of the adjusted concentration ratio appears to be 
insignificant with a negative sign in the profit equation. 
Ratnayake (1990), in his doctoral thesis, presents a simultaneous equation model with 
trade, structure, conduct and performance variables using four-digit data for 1984/85. With 
eight endogenous variables, viz, export and import intensity, intra-industry trade, rate of 
protection, foreign ownership, concentration, advertising intensity and profitability, he 
considers both single and simultaneous equation approaches. The results support the positive 
relationship between profits and concentration. He concludes that simultaneity bias may be a 
problem in single equation studies. A summary of Australian literature is given in Table 2.2." 
2.5 Concluding Remarks 
The structure-conduct-performance paradigm plays a major role in industrial organisation and 
in guiding competitive policy in the post-war period. It has produced an impressive body of 
'For Australian manufacturing, Williamson (1990), with pooled cross-section data explains the pricing 
policies of domestic established firms (with product differentiation) in the presence of import competition with 
the OLS and 2SLS estimation. The findings support the key role of differentiated product, while various 
dimensions of industry structure are also important in explaining pricing process. Here the focus is different, 
hence this is not listed in Table (2.1), for detailed discussion, see Williamson (1984 and 1990). 
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empirical results for different countries suggesting that market structure is systematically 
linked with market performance: 7 In this respect, two different views are discussed in 
explaining structure-performance relationships. A number of criticisms have been identified 
and how they may affect the anti-trust policy conclusions and recommendations that emerge 
from the structure-conduct-performance paradigm. 
In summary, the review in this chapter will help to keep in mind the following issues in 
developing the model for the study: 
i) There is a need to develop a structure-conduct-performance model based on theory (if 
possible) not on ad hoc literature survey. In this respect, variables should be added logically. 
ii) Conduct aspects should be taken explicitly to fill the gap between structure and 
performance. Most of the studies neglect this issue. 
iii) There is a need to specify the proper functional form of the model. 
iv) Consideration needs to be given to the effect of conceptual problems (e.g. omitting 
relevant variables, measurement error, simultaneity bias etc.) in explaining the structure - 
conduct performance relationships. 
Therefore, a logical next step is to develop coherent models in explaining the structure-
conduct-performance relationships for the Australian manufacturing industries. Before that, an 
overview of the Australian manufacturing sector is presented in Chapter 3. 
17 In this thesis market and industry will be used synonymously. 
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Table 2.2 : A Summary of Australian Studies 
Author(s) Year & Number 
of Industries 
Focus Variables Estimation 
Technique(s) 
_ 
Major Conclusion(s) 
related to the SCP relationships 
Round (1976)a 1968-69, 1972- 
73, 30 three-digit 
industries 
Profit/Sales; 
Profit/Funds; 
concentration, capital 
output ratio 
OLS Sales-based measures of profits are positively related with 
concentration while fund-based measures are negatively 
related with profits. 
Round (1976)b 1968-69, 
34 three-digit 
industries 
PCM; 	concentration; 
risk; plant size; industry 
growth; 	capital-output 
ratio; 	regional-national 
dummy and consumer-
producers dummy. 
OLS i) The effect of concentration on profit is indeterminate. 
ii) The effects of other variables on profit are similar to those 
in overseas studies. 
Phillips (1978) 1968-69, 
99 four-digit 
industries 
PCM 	(both sales 	and 
capital based measure); 
concentration; 	growth; 
number of firms; 
average firm size; tariff; 
export/import intensity; 
foreign ownership. Each 
is tested individually 
OLS linear, 
log linear 
i) Concentration-profits 	relationship 	depends 	on 	profit 
measures. 
ii) The effect of other variables on profits are more or less 
same as overseas studies. 
Table 2.2 : A Summary of Australian Studies (Contd.) 
Author(s) Year & Number 
of Industries 
Focus Variables Estimation 
Technique(s) 
Major Conclusion(s) 
related to the SCP relationships 
Round (1978) 1968-69 
1972-73, 
38 three-digit 
industries 
PCM; 	concentration; 
average 	plant 	size; 
specialisation 	ratio; 
multi-plant 	operation; 
capital-output 	ratio; 
industry 	growth; 
imports; tariff; 	foreign 
ownership 
OLS i) Positive and significant relationships are found between 
margins, concentration and entry barriers 
ii) Foreign ownership variable is found to be significant in 
explaining profits 
I 
Round (1980a) 1968-69 and 
1972-73, 40 
three-digit and 
four-digit 
industries 
PCM; 	concentration; 
tariff; 	capital 	intensity; 
advertising; growth 
OLS i) Concentration is not a significant determinant for profit for 
dis-aggregated data. 
ii) Tariff protection has led inefficiency in production and 
lower profits. 
Round (1980b) 1968-69 and 
1972-73, 
136 four-digit 
industries 
Profits, 	concentration, 
tariff, 	advertising 
intensity, 	growth, 
diversification, depth of 
processes 	and 	scale 
economies 
OLS, 3SLS i) Single equation studies may yield biased results. 
ii) Concentration is not a significant determinant of profits. 
iii) Tariff levels can be explained by demand and supply 
factors, tariff has a negative impact on profitability 
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Table 2.2 : A Summary of Australian Studies (Contd.) 
Author(s) Year & Number 
of Industries 
Focus Variables Estimation 
Technique(s) 
Major Conclusion(s) 
related to the SCP relationships 
Dixon and 
Gunther (1986) 
1968/69; 1972/73; 
1977/78, 
20 three-digit 
industries 
Profit; 	concentration 
(H-index); 	own 	price 
elasticity; collusion 
Simulation 
type model, 
no estimation 
technique is 
used 
Cowling-Waterson type model needs to be reformulated to 
allow sub-optimisation 
Dixon (1987b) 1968/69; 1972/73; 
1977/78, 1982-83 
12 three-digit and 
four-digit 
industries 
Profits, 	H-index, 
advertising-intensity, 
effective tariff, average 
plant size, lagged profits 
and 	lagged 	H-index, 
proportion of sales on 
consumer goods 
3SLS Concentration has negative and insignificant impact on 
profits 
Ratnayke 
(1990) 
1984-85, 
four-digit 
industries 
PCM, 	concentration, 
export 	and 	import 
intensity, 	intra-industry 
trade, 	proxies 	for 
protection, 	advertising 
intensity, 	foreign 
ownership 	and 	some 
other exogenous factors 
OLS, 2SLS i) Simultaneity exists between structure and performance 
variables 
ii) High concentration leads to higher rates of profits 
iii) International linkages do not influence profits significantly 
CHAPTER 3 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE AUSTRALIAN MANUFACTURING 
SECTOR 
3.1 Introduction 
The manufacturing sector in Australia has an important role in terms of output, employment 
and growth of the economy. Manufacturing is an important supplier of capital equipment and 
other intermediate goods to other sectors. A strong and dynamic manufacturing sector is a 
source of generating income, employment and growth in the economy. 
This chapter reviews key aspects of the Australian manufacturing sector with partiCular 
emphasis on performance since mid 1970s. In this respect, Section 3.2 discusses the major 
characteristics of the Australian manufacturing sector and major policies. Section 3.3 presents 
an overview of the importance of the manufacturing sector in the Australian economy with 
some figures on production, employment and trade shares.' Here, some recent statistics are 
also included. Finally, section 3.4 adds some concluding remarks. 
3.2 Major Characteristics of Australian Manufacturing and Policies 
In the following section, first major characteristics of manufacturing sector are described. 
Secondly, structural adjustments with an overview of major policies undertaken in the 
manufacturing sector are covered. 
'For the history of Australian manufacturing with statistics since the beginning of this century see Year Book 
Australia, Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1301.0 , No 51, Chapter 4, pp 143-282. 
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3.2.1 Major Characteristics 
The Australian manufacturing sector is characterised with high concentration. The domestic 
market is small and protected both naturally and artificially. Here, major characteristics are 
discussed in detail. 
3.2.1.1 	High Concentration 
Due to the small size of the domestic market, the Australian manufacturing sector is 
characterised with a significant level of concentration. 2 Concentration has been historically 
high and continues to be amongst the highest in the world. According to Hunter (1961b), in 
1949/50, most industries have three large firms to serve the entire market. With firm data, 
Karmel and Brunt (1962) argue that Australian manufacturing is highly concentrated, so that 
monopolistic and oligopolistic behaviour are much more common in Australia than in Britain, 
Canada or the U.S. In a later study, Sheridan (1968) finds 61 percent of industries are either 
monopolies or near monopolies in 1961/62. For 120 industries, Caves (1984) shows that the 
four-firm concentration for Australia is at least 78 percent higher than that of U.S. 
counterparts. In a working paper, the Bureau of Industry Economics (BIE, 1989) reports the 
changes in concentration with different measures between 1972/73 and 1986/87. Comparing 
the concentration data for some OECD countries, it concludes that the concentration in 
Australia is higher than most OECD countries except Canada. The data of Table 3.1 are 
adopted from the BIE (1989, working paper 57). For the period between 1958 and 1984, 
aggregate concentration has either decreased or remains steady for U.S., U.K. and Japan. 
While for Canada, West Germany and Australia, it has increased. This is shown in Figure 3.1. 3 
2 Surveys of concentration in Australian industries can be found in Hunter (1961a &b, 1963), Sheridan 
(1968,1974), Norman (1970) and Round (1976c). 
3 Both Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1 present aggregate concentration rather than at the usual four-firm level. 
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Table 3.1: Share of Total Manufacturing Activity held by the 100 Largest Manufacturing 
Firms, Various Countries 
Years Canada(a) 
percent 
West Germany(b) 
percent 
Japan(e) 
percent 
U.S.(a) 
percent 
U.K.(d) 
percent 
Australia(a) 
percent 
1958 23.0 
1963 33.0 
1965 43.6 
1967 37.2 
1968/69 38.0 
1970 39.3 
1972 33.0 41.0 
1972/73 39.0 
1974 46.2 
1976 35.9 
1977 33.0 
1978 36.6 34.3 41.1 39.0(e) 
1980 37.0 33.8 40.5 
1982 47.1 39.5 34.5 33.0 41.1 
1982/83 42.0 
1984 39.5 33.0 38.7 
Sources: Adapted from B1E (1989), Working Paper 57, pp 35 
Notes: (a) Value added 
(b) Sales, including Mining, Construction, Electric Power and Gas 
(c) Assets, corporations only 
(d) Net Output 
(e) 1977/78 
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Figure 3.1: 	Share of Total Manufacturing Activity held by the 100 Largest Manufacturing 
Firms, Various Countries 
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3.2.1.2 	Evidence of Anti-Competitive Behaviour 
Restrictive practices have a long history in Australia. In his pioneering articles Hunter (1961a 
& b, 1963) reviews many restrictive practices involving collusion between sellers in terms of 
price fixing agreements (both horizontal and vertical), agreements to fix market shares, trade 
regulation agreements, exclusive dealing agreements, level or collusive tendering. Descriptions 
of anti-competitive behaviour by Australian firms can be found in Karmel and Brunt (1962), 
Collinge (1970), Nieuwenhuysen (1970, 1976), Nieuwenhuysen and Norman (1976) and 
Walker (1976). 
One common type of price fixing is collusive tendering. Hunter (1961b) reports, 
"Collusive tendering appears to be much more common than in the United Kingdom. 
The volume of complaint from municipal and State government departments is consistently 
high...total prohibition of this particular practice." ( 1961b, p 178). 
The level of merger activity in Australia is a major concern. The implication is that due 
to mergers, concentration and market power may increase and reduce competition. 
3.2.1.3 	Fragmented Domestic Market 
The Australian domestic market is relatively small and fragmented geographically into two 
major areas and a number of important smaller ones. In terms of employment relative to 
population, manufacturing is of greatest importance in Victoria, followed by New South 
Wales, South Australia and Tasmania while of least significance in Queensland and Western 
Australia (Green Paper, Volume 1, 1975, Table 4, p 63). Industrial metals, chemical, domestic 
appliances and machinery are more important in New South Wales; textiles, clothing, vehicles, 
transport equipment, miscellaneous foods in Victoria; food and non-metallic mineral products 
in Queensland; non-metallic mineral products and saw milling in Western Australia; vehicles 
and transport equipment in South Australia; and textiles, saw milling and paper-making and 
industrial metals in Tasmania. 
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Figure 3.2 compares the manufacturing production in different states between 1981/82 
and 1991/92. Manufacturing output in real term has declined in Victoria, the ACT and New 
South Wales over the decade to 1991/92. Over this period, real manufacturing output has 
increased only by 3 percent. 
3.2.1.4 	Highly Protected Small Open Economy 
Australia is a small, relatively open economy. The domestic market is relatively small, external 
trade provides both challenges and opportunities for industries. Some imports are inputs and 
capital equipment for production, others are competing with local products. Exports provide 
opportunity to access wider markets, and economies of scale can be achieved in this way. 
There are many forms of assistance for manufacturing industries (tariffs, sales and 
excise tax, subsidies and bounties). Tariffs are the most important form of assistance for 
protecting the import competing manufacturing industries by raising the price of imports. 
Tariff policies during 1950s and 1960s sheltered the local industries, particularly the export 
sector. A tariff review program was established by the Tariff Board and the Industries 
Assistance Commission. The tariff level was high, providing employment to manufacturing 
sector. By the end of 1980s, the average effective rate of assistance (excluding the passenger 
motor vehicle and textile, clothing and footwear industries) was less than half the rate of mid 
1970s. 
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Figure 3.2: Real Manufacturing Production, 1989 - 90 Prices 
0 	 4000 	 8000 	 12000 	 16000 	 20000 
Srn 
Source - ABS Cat No 5220. 5204 
Note : Adapted from BIE, Occasional Paper 19, State Economic Performance, 1981/82 - 
1991/92 (Figure 3.5, pp 16) 
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3.2.2 Structural Adjustments and Major Policies 
The 1970s was a turbulent period for Australian manufacturing. This was due to: declining 
population growth rate which reduced the growth of the domestic market, increased 
industrialisation of the developing countries, a rapid increase in domestic wages as well as a 
shift in consumers' preferences towards services. 
Prior to 1974, antitrust legislation was less effective. There was little competition 
among the domestic rival firms. In 1974, the Trade Practices Act (TPA) was introduced to 
restrain anti-competitive behaviour (see Conlon (1975) for the detail of the TPA). The current 
Trade Practices Act (TPA) 1974, amended in 1977 is designed to control the monopolies and 
restrictive trade practices nationwide (The TPA of 1965 established a receptive environment 
for the current Act). The Griffiths Committee (1988) examines the merger provisions of the 
TPA. 
Traditionally, the manufacturing sector has focused on import replacement, protected 
by tariffs which have been high by world standard.' By the early 1970s, development in new 
industrial policies emerged. The IAC Act in 1973, introduced a continuous tariff review 
program. 
Various industrial development incentives have been introduced, e.g. export incentive, 
industrial research and development incentives, investment and depreciation allowance, 
improved funding access to small and medium sized firms. The Jackson Committee (1975) and 
the Crawford Committee (1979) were responsible for recommending various incentives. 
Recently, 'the Committee of Inquiry into Government Competition Policy', (1993, led 
by Professor Hilmer) has paid attention to the performance of price fixing agreements and 
non-price agreements (mainly Section 45, 47 and 48 of the TPA 1977). The committee 
recommended some changes to those areas (e.g. removing the distinction between goods and 
service sectors, permitting authorisation of resale price maintenance, where it can be 
4 In recent years, there has been emphasis to improve the international competitiveness of the manufacturing 
sector and to make it more export oriented. 
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demonstrated to offer net public benefits) where the current rules were found to be deficient in 
respect of a nationwide competition policy (for details, see Hilmer, 1993). 
The major objective of the government (at the national, state and local tiers) by 
introducing a national competition policy framework is to develop an open, integrated 
domestic market by removing unnecessary barriers to trade and competition.' It sets out a 
process for the review and reform of regulations and other interventions which impede 
competition throughout the economy. The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
(ACCC) and the National Competition Council (NCC) are responsible for providing an 
institutional framework for advancing competition reforms. 
3.3 The Manufacturing Sector and the Australian Economy 
Prior to the mid 1970s, the postwar rate of growth of demand and output had been 
significantly high and the role and significance of the manufacturing sector to economic and 
industrial development was undoubted. During the 1950s and 1960s economic and industry 
policies encouraged the development of a diversified manufacturing sector to cater to the 
domestic economy by replacing imports. However structural change in the economy has been 
prominent since 1970s with a high level of unemployment, inflation and lower growth. In the 
following years, government industrial policies encouraged structural adjustments to take 
place (see the White Paper on manufacturing industry (1977), the Jackson Committee Report 
(1975) on policies for development in manufacturing industries and the Crawford Committee 
Report (1979) on policies towards structural adjustments). 
Between 1969/70 and 1983/84, GDP (in real terms) has increased by 2.9 percent per 
annum. During the same period, employment has increased by 1.1 percent per annum. By 
comparison manufacturing products has increased 1.3 percent in real terms. The sectors' share 
of GDP has declined from 22.0 percent to 16.8 percent. For the same period, share of 
employment in manufacturing has declined from 24.4 percent to 16.4 percent. Below some 
5 National competition policy incorporates all major sectors in the economy including manufacturing sector. 
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statistics are given for output, employment and trade share for manufacturing over the period 
between 1970/71 and 86/87. 
3.3.1 Output 
In Table 3.2, GDP (at current prices in percentage term) figures for the major sectors in the 
economy are reported for a seventeen year period. In this period, the GDP share for both rural 
and manufacturing sector has declined by 2 and 8 percent, respectively. The GDP share of the 
mining and service sector have increased during this period. Table 3.3 compares the sectoral 
division of the GDP for some selected countries for 1982/84. In the service sector, the GDP 
share of Australia is highest. Except for Italy, the GDP share in agriculture is highest for 
Australia. The GDP share in manufacturing is lower in Australia than in any other country, 
except Canada. 
3.3.2 Employment 
The sectoral contribution towards employment in Australia for the period of 1970/71 and 
1986/87 is reported in Table 3.4. 
The service sector is the largest source of employment, followed by manufacturing for this 
period. Over the period, the percentage of employment by the manufacturing sector has 
declined by 9 percent while the percentage of employment by the service sector has increased 
by 12 percent. The employment for 1973 was 1,382,300 while in 1985 the figure was 
1,109,400. 
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Table 3.2: GDP (at current prices in percentage term), 1970/71 to 1986/87 
Year Mining Manufacturing Services Rural 
1970/71 3 25 66 6 
1971/72 3 24 67 6 
1972/73 4 23 66 7 
1973/74 3 22 66 8 
1974/75 4 22 68 6 
1975/76 4 21 69 5 
1976/77 4 21 70 5 
1977/78 4 20 71 5 
1978/79 5 19 69 6 
1979/80 6 19 68 7 
1980/81 6 19 69 6 
1981/82 6 19 70 5 
1982/83 6 18 72 4 
1983/84 6 18 71 5 
1984/85 6 17 72 4 
1985/86 6 17 73 4 
1986/87 5 17 74 4 
Source: Industries Assistance Commission (1986) 
Note: Data for the last two years are from ABS (1989) 
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Table 3.3: 	The Structure of GDP of Selected Countries, 1982-84 
Agriculture Manufacturing Mining Utilities and Construction Services Government 
Australia 4.5 17.7 6.4 9.3 59.1 4.2 
Belgium 2.5 23.9 0.6 9.1 51.3 14.7 
Canada 3.4 16.0 5.7 8.1 38.6 16.2 
France 4.0 25.3 0.7 8.3 43.3 12.8 
Germany 2.0 25.3 0.7 8.3 47.3 11.7 
Italy 5.7 27.4 0.0 12.6 41.0 14.0 
Japan 3.3 29.3 0.4 11.1 49.2 8.5 
U.K. 1.9 21.6 6.8 7.4 38.8 13.4 
U.S.A. 2.3 21.0 3.9 7.0 53.9 13.0 
Source: OECD (1987, pp 51) 
Notes: The Australian figures are different here (from Table 3.2) due to the differences of definition by the OECD (1987) and the ASIC 
Table 3.4: Employment by Sector, 1970/71 to 1986/87 ( in percentage term) 
Year Mining Manufacturing Services Rural 
1970/71 2 24 66 8 
1971/72 2 25 66 7 
1972/73 1 24 67 8 
1973/74 1 24 68 7 
1974/75 1 23 68 7 
1975/76 1 22 70 7 
1976/77 1 22 70 7 
1977/78 1 21 71 7 
1978/79 1 20 73 6 
1979/80 1 20 72 7 
1980/81 1 20 72 6 
1981/82 2 19 73 7 
1982/83 1 19 73 6 
1983/84 2 18 74 7 
1984/85 1 18 75 6 
1985/86 2 17 76 6 
1986/87 1 15 78 6 
Source: Industries Assistance Commission (1986) 
Data for the last two years are from ABS (1989) 
3.3.3 Trade Shares 
Table 3.5 compares the trade performance (in terms of export and import intensity) between 
1970 and 1983. The increase in export intensity is lowest for Australia (0.6 of a percent) and 
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greatest for Belgium (24.5 percent increase) over the period. Import intensity has increased by 
5.6 percent, which is lower than all other countries except Canada (1.3 percent increase) and 
Japan (1.1 percent increase). 
3.3.4 Summary Statistics from the Data Set of the Study 
Here, the summary of the profit, concentration (both CR4 and H-index) and conjecture 
variables from the sample data set are given in next four tables (Table 3.6 to 3.9). The detailed 
explanations (including the statistics) of the profit, concentration and conjecture variables 
along with other variables used in the study are given in Chapter 6. 6 
Table 3.6 presents the number of industries in each profit class for 1977/78 and 
1984/85. 7 Among all industries, in 1977/78, around 67 percent of industries emu profits were 
above 18 percent. The same figure is only 7 percent for 1984/85. The percentage of industries 
with higher rates of return are much greater in 1977/78 compared to 1984/85. Figure 3.3 
(which represents the data from Table 3.6) compares the profit shares within some size classes 
for 102 manufacturing industries used in the study between 1977/78 and 1984/85. 
Table 3.7 presents the number of industries in each concentration (CR4) class for 
1977/78 and 1984/85. 8 Among all industries, in 1977/78, 71 percent of industries have CR4 
values 40 or above. The same figure is 52 percent for 1984/85. Industries are highly 
concentrated in 1977/78 compared to 1984/85 for the industry sample. Figure 3.4 (which 
represents the data from Table 3.7) compares the concentration index (CR4) within some size 
classes for 102 manufacturing industries used in the study between 1977/78 and 1984/85. 
6 The detail discussion is in Chapter 6 (section 6.2) and Appendix IA and LB. 
7 Profit is value added less intermediate expenses less wages and salaries out of sales. 
8 Four-firm concentration is sales accounted by the top four firms over total industry sales. 
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Table 3.5: Export and Import Intensity of Manufacturing Sector 
1970/72 1976/78 1981/83 
Export Intensity Import Intensity Export Intensity Import Intensity Export Intensity Import Intensity 
Australia 16.5 21.0 18.0 25.4 17.1 26.6 
Belgium 63.3 59.6 71.7 69.9 97.8 94.3 
Canada 27.0 27.5 28.5 31.0 28.5 28.8 
France 17.8 16.4 23.1 20.8 26.5 25.4 
Germany 26.8 20.0 36.3 27.4 42.1 33.8 
Italy 20.4 16.2 32.5 24.8 37.5 30.6 
Japan 10.6 4.2 13.4 4.7 14.8 5.3 
U.K. 18.3 16.3 25.9 24.6 23.9 25.7 
U.S.A. 5.6 6.0 7.6 8.1 8.7 9.8 
Source: OECD (1987) 
Notes: Export Intensity is Exports as a percentage of production 
Import Intensity is Imports as a percentage of apparent consumption 
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Table 3.6: Comparison of Profit Share (Sales) between 1977/78 and 1984/85 
Share of Profits 1977/78 
(Number of Industries) 
1984/85 
(Number of Industries) 
0-0.06 1 0 
0.06-0.12 2 50 
0.12-0.18 31 44 
0.18-0.24 57 7 
0.24 and above 11 1 
Total 102 102 
Figure 3.3: 	Comparison of Profit Share (Sales) between 1977/78 and 1984/85 
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Table 3.7: 	Comparison of Four-Firm Concentration Ratio between 1977/78 and 1984/85 
Class 1977/78 
(Number of Industries) 
1984/85 
(Number of Industries) 
0-20 5 35 
20-40 _ 25 14 
40-60 22 16 
60-80 33 20 
80-100 17 17 
Total 1 102 102 
Figure 3.4: 	Comparison of Four-Firm Concentration Ratio between 1977/78 and 1984/85 
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Table 3.8: 	Comparison of the Herfindahl-index between 1977/78 and 1984/85 
Class 1977/78 
(Number of Industries) 
1984/85 
(Number of Industries) 
0-0.02 6 8 
0.02-0.04 10 11 
0.04-0.06 20 18 
0.06-0.08 8 10 
0.08-0.10 7 8 
0.10 and above 51 47 
Total 1 102 102 
Figure 3.5: 	Comparison of the Herfindahl-index between 1977/78 and 1984/85 
0 1984-85 
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Table 3.8 presents the number of industries in each concentration (represented by H-
index) class for 1977/78 and 1984/85. 9 Among all industries, in 1977/78, 50 percent of 
industries have H-index values 0.10 or above. The same figure is 46.7 percent for 1984/85. 
Figure 3.5 (which represents the data from Table 3.8) compares the concentration index (H- 
9 Herfindahl index is sum of squared shares of each firm, an index of market structure. 
46 
Chapter 3 : An Overview of the Australian Manufacturing Sector 
index) within some size classes for 102 manufacturing industries used in the study between 
1977/78 and 1984/85. 
Table 3.9 presents the number of industries with conjectures values within three classes 
for 1984/85. 10 Among all industries, that of 65.6 percent industries have conjectures values lie 
between -1 and 0, for 22.5 percent of industries conjectures values are greater than 0 but less 
than 1 and for 11.7 percent of industries conjectures values are greater than 1. 
Table 3.9: Conjectures Values, 1984/85 
Class 	 Number of Industries 	 Average 
-15_CONJO 67 -0.581 
1:2CON.J1 23 0.483 
CONJ>1 12 4.366 
Total 102 
3.3.5 Manufacturing Sector: Some Recent Figures and Expectations 
Although the study includes the data from 1977/78 to 1984/85, inclusion of some current 
statistics might be helpful to get an overview of the present situation in manufacturing. 
Table 3.10 shows the profit before income tax for the manufacturing sector over the 
period between 1990/91 and 1992/93. Food, beverages and tobacco is the highest profitable 
industry, while transport equipment faced a net operating loss in 1990/91 but a subsequent 
improvement occurred in 1992/93. Profit before income tax has increased by 38 percent 
between 1991/92 and 1992/93, following a rise of 17 percent from 1990/91 (source: Company 
Profits, Australia, 5651.0). 
Table 3.11 presents statistics of employment for manufacturing for 1991/92. For the 
largest four firms, employment was highest for basic metal product, followed by non-metallic 
mineral product and lowest for wood, wood product and furniture and other machinery and 
equipment. 
Recently, there have been efforts to improve international competitiveness by 
rationalising industries through micro economic reform (policies leading to reduce unit costs in 
1° Conjectures values is derived from firm profit and share data, the detail is in chapter 6. 
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major sectors of the economy), including reductions in the tariff rates. As discussed in section 
3.2.2, major industrial policies are framed to improve competitiveness of the manufacturing 
with other sectors. Table 3.12 presents sectoral contributions to the economic activities for 
1994/95. In terms of production, employment, investment and capital-stock, the service sector 
is still leading the economy followed by manufacturing. The manufacturing sector has the 
highest R & D provision (55.7 percent) compared to other sectors. 
The ACCl/ Westpac survey of industrial trends provides short-term expectations for 
the manufacturing sector. According to a survey in March 1996, there is an increase in 
business confidence among manufacturers. According to the ABS Australian business 
medium-term expectations survey (March quarter 1997 compared with the March quarter 
1996), sales, capital expenditure and profits have improved and will be higher for the above 
period." A summary of expectations for March 1996 through March 1997 is given in Table 
3.13. 
3.4 Conclusions 
This chapter presents an overview of the Australian manufacturing sector and its relation with 
the economy. In this respect, the performance of manufacturing from the 1970s is considered. 
Prior to 1973/74, growth in the manufacturing sector was generally satisfactory except for 
some industries, most notably textiles, clothing and footwear. Since then output and 
employment shares have declined for all industries, except for food, beverages and tobacco 
industry. 
The major characteristics of the manufacturing sector are a high level of concentration, 
a protected and small domestic market with small scale production. The development of a 
more competitive manufacturing sector will increase trade (with the rest of the world), real 
income and the standard of living of the Australian economy. Structural characteristics are 
important in explaining performance of the manufacturing sector. This is done in this study 
with the help of oligopoly models. In Chapter 4, a theoretical discussion leading to specifying 
the profit model is given. 
11 B1E, Australian Industry Trends, May 1996. 
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Table 3.10: Manufacturing Sector: Profit before Income Tax by Industry ($ million) 
Industry Division 1990/91 1991/92 1992/93 
Food, beverages and tobacco 1,543 1,706 2,159 
Textiles, Clothing and footwear 176 268 259 
Paper, paper products, printing 
and publishing 
263 756 1,026 
Chemical, petroleum and coal 
products 
711 686 1,011 
Basic metal products 705 140 513 
Transport equipment -209 58 541 
Fabricated metal products and 
other machinery and equipment 
603 1,016 1,024 
Other manufacturing(a) 1,164 1,157 1,437 
Total manufacturing 4,956 5,788 7,970 
Note: (a) Includes Wood, wood products and furniture; Non-metallic mineral products; and Miscellaneous manufacturing 
Adapted from Yearbook Australia, vol. 77, 1995, table 18.16 
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Table 3.11 Employment by Industries, 1991/92 
Enterprise groups ranked by turnover 	 I 
Largest 4 5 - 8 9 - 12 13 - 16 Remainder 
Industry Subdivision '000 Ratio '000 Ratio '000 Ratio '000 Ratio '000 Ratio 
Food, beverages and tobacco 19.4 0.12 16.9 0.10 10.8 0.07 10.3 0.06 108.6 0.65 
Textiles 3.9 0.15 1.8 0.07 1.9 0.07 1.4 0.06 17.2 0.66 
Clothing and footwear 8.1 0.16 1.7 0.03 2.6 0.05 0.8 0.02 36.6 0.73 
Wood, wood products and 
furniture 
6.6 0.09 2.2 0.03 2.1 0.03 1.2 0.02 59.5 0.83 
Paper, paper products, printing 
and publishing 
22.7 0.23 6.9 0.07 4.9 0.05 3.7 0.04 62.0 0.62 
Chemical, petroleum and coal 
products 
7.7 0.15 2.9 0.06 3.4 0.07 3.5 0.07 33.0 0.65 
Non-metallic mineral products 15.2 0.41 4.7 0.12 1.6 0.04 1.8 0.05 14.2 0.38 
Basic metal products 28.2 0.45 8.6 0.14 5.9 0.10 2.7 0.04 16.7 0.27 
Fabricated metal products 6.4 0.07 6.1 0.07 3.0 0.03 2.3 0.03 71.0 0.80 
Transport equipment 20.4 0.25 11.4 0.14 6.9 0.08 5.5 0.07 37.3 0.46 
Other machinery and equipment 9.8 0.09 8.5 0.07 4.0 0.03 3.2 0.03 88.8 0.78 
Miscellaneous manufacturing 8.1 0.14 4.6 0.08 1.4 0.02 1.3 0.02 42.8 0.74 
Total manufacturing 45.7 0.05 33.4 0.04 30.9 0.03 20.8 0.02 776.3 0.86 
Notes : Adapted from Yearbook Australia, vol. 77, 1995, Table 18.19 
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Table 3.12: Sector Contributions to Australian Economic Activity: 1994/95 (percentage share in bracket) 
Sector Production(a) 
$ million 
Employment 
'000 persons 
Investment(b) 
$ million 
Capital-stock(b) 
$ million 
R & D(c) 
$ million 
Agriculture 13 292 404 na 30 096 na 
(3.2) (5.0) (7.8) 
Mining 18 017 86 6665 51 473 309 
(4.3) (1.1) (19.4) (13.4) (10.2) 
Manufacturing 65 886 1116 9856 79151 1687 
(15.9) (13.8) (28.7) (20.6) (55.7) 
Services 280 343 6452 17 815 222 805 1032 
(67.5) (80.1) (51.8) (58.1) (34.1) 
Total 415 024 8058 34 366 383 525 3028 
Adapted from the BIE, Australian Industry Trends, May 1996 Issue (Table 3, pp 79) 
Source: ABS Catalogue Number 5206.0 8114.0, 5625.0 and 5221.0 
Notes: a) Constant 1989-90 prices b) data related to private new-capital-expenditure survey excludes agriculture. c) Agriculture due to collection difficulties, also such 
enterprises are believed to have low R&D activity 
Table 3.13: Manufacturing expectations, expected aggr6gate change, March quarter 1997 compared with March quarter 1996, percent 
Sub-Division Capital Expenditure Employment (full-time equivalent) Sales Profits 
Food, beverages and tobacco -5.4 0.5 3.5 11.7 
Textiles, clothing, footwear and leather 0.3 -0.4 3.4 na 
Wood and paper products 5.5 0.5 3.5 12.2 
Printing, publishing and recorded media na -0.2 2.7 -1.5 
Petroleum, coal, chemicals and associated products -0.1 -0.2 2.9 8.3 
Non-metallic mineral products na -0.8 1.7 6.1 
Metal products 17.5 -0.6 2.1 -2.8 
Machinery and equipment 10.5 0.6 3.7 22.3 
Other Manufacturing 16.8 1.9 6.5 na 
Total manufacturing 10.1 0.2 3.2 10.2 
Adapted from the BIE, Australian Industry Trends, May 1996 ( Table 6, pp 40). 
Source: Unpublished data from ABS Catalogue No. 5250.0 
Note: na denotes not available 
CHAPTER 4 
SPECIFICATIONS OF PROFIT MODELS 
4.1 Introduction 
In industrial organisation, concentration is an important element in explaining profits. In 
empirical studies, a positive relationship is established between concentration (an index of 
structure) and profitability (an index of performance). However, concentration is not the 
whole story of monopoly power, a refilled model (based on theory rather than literature 
survey) including the various aspects of market structure and conduct is needed to explain 
profits.' 
In section 4.2, following Cowling and Waterson (1976), firstly, short-run 
equilibrium profit models based on oligopoly theory are specified in detail. Here, all possible 
versions of the profit model are developed. In section 4.3 dynamic versions of the profit 
model are developed, considering deviation of profits from an equilibrium level. In this 
respect, how profits adjust towards the short-run equilibrium level is considered assuming 
constant partial adjustment. Finally, some concluding remarks are added in section 4.4. 
4.2 Various Versions of Short-run Profit Model 
Specification of structure-conduct-performance relationships is often largely ad hoc. This 
study derives structure-performance relationships from a well known theoretical model of 
oligopoly. Following Cowling-Waterson (1976), a purely domestic oligopoly market is 
assumed with identical firms in equilibrium. Extensions of the simple model include firms of 
unequal sizes, heterogeneous products and international competition. 
There are numerous structure-conduct-performance studies for various countries, therefore providing a 
summary table would not be practical, a brief summary of the Australian studies is in Chapter 2, Table 2.2. 
For a review of overseas literature see Weiss (1974) and Scherer and Ross (1990). 
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4.2.1 Profit Models for the Domestic Economy 
Assuming a domestic economy with no foreign competition then the following profit models 
can be developed. 
4.2.1.1 	Firms Are of Equal Size Producing Homogenous Products 
There are N firms of equal size producing homogeneous goods in the industry. There is no 
possibility of entry and foreign competition. Input prices are given and outputs are sold to 
price-takers. Market price is given by the inverse demand function, p = f(Q), and industry 
output is Q = Eiqi, where qi is the output of the ith firm. Cost conditions are the same for all 
firms and all firms make the same conjectural variations. 
The profit equation of the ith firm is 
= p qi - C(qi) - F 	 (4.1) 
where ni is profit, p is the price, qi is output, C is variable cost and F is fixed cost. The first-
order condition for profit maximisation is 
dir 
	 = p + qi P(Q) 
dQ  MC(q) =0 
dq dq 
(4.2) 
dQ  
dq i 	dQ r  I = 	 1 + ivi, with iv as the ith firm's conjectural variations that 
dq i 	dq i 	dq i 
measures the change of output of remaining firms (Q r) with respect to a change in the firm's 
output, and MCi is the marginal cost. Aggregating equation (4.2) over N identical firms, 
after rearrangement we have 
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(p PCM=  — MC) .(14-xii)/Nc 	 (4.3) 
where e is the absolute value of the industry price elasticity of demand. Therefore, the 
industry price-cost margin is inversely related to the firm numbers and to the industry price 
elasticity of demand (c), as well as directly related to the common conjectural variations 
term (w). 
4.2.1.2 	Firms Are of Different Size Producing Homogenous Products 
Here, a purely domestic oligopoly is considered. Firms are selling homogenous products 
and have conjecturess about the quantity responses from their rivals. Following similar steps 
as above from firms' profit expression, (viz, taking the weighted average of firms' margin 
over N firms), the average industry profit-maximising condition can be expressed as 
PCM
(p — MC) = (1+—vf)HIE = (4.4) 
where, PCM is the industry price-cost margin (a measure of profitability), and ty = 
E S: (ty )/ H is the weighted average measure of conjectural variations for the industry, S, 
is the ith firm's share of industry output, and H is the Herfindahl index (a measure of 
concentration, equal to the sum of squared market shares over all firms in the industry). 2 
For equal sized firms, H = 1/N, with N equal to the number of firms, but generally 
H varies between zero and one. Taking the logarithms of both sides of equation (4.4) gives 
the following log-linear expression for the price-cost margin in equilibrium 
log (PCM) = log (1+ —tv) + log(H) - log(e) 	 (4.5) 
2 Detailed in Chapter 6, section 6.2.3. 
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4.2.1.3 	Firms Are of Different Size Producing Heterogeneous Products 
Firms who are producing differentiated products may charge different prices. Here firms can 
decide either their price or output or a combination of both. Now the price function of the 
ith firm is 
Pi = fi(q1 ,(12 , --41n) 
	
(4.6) 
or alternatively, output is 
qi = 801 ,P2 , ---Pn) 
	
(4.7) 
In the above situation, maximisation of profit with respect to output does not 
contain any term dQ/dqi = 1-Fivi, as heterogeneous product can not be added to get industry 
output ie., in this case Q # Eqi 
Cubbin (1974) develops a model of oligopoly similar to that presented above, except 
considering maximum profit with respect to price. Profit for the ith firm is 
= piqi - C(q) 	 (4.8) 
where Ci includes both variable and fixed costs. At maximum profit, 
dr ; 	dqi 	dqi 
dp i dpi 	dpi 
(4.9) 
Here 
dqi 	E 	__(?_91 )( dPj j# —+ .( — 1 dpi 	dpi dpi 
(4.10) 
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The term —dp, = 41).- is the conjectural variations term, the effect of ith firm's price change on 
dp, 
j's behaviour. The weighted average conjectural variations anticipated by the ith firm can be 
expressed as 
(4.11) 
Substituting (4.11) and (4.10) into (4.9) gives 
	
(5qi 	64i qi + (pi - MCi)(— 	+11) 	–0 
pi °Pi 
(4.12) 
The relationship between firm's demand and industry demand is complex here. From the 
definitional form of (4.10) Cubbin derives 
Sqi 
-Efi =-(pi/qi)(E,01—) (4.13) 
where El is the industry elasticity of demand when others' price change is in the same 
amount (i.e. dpi/dpi = 1). Efi is the firm elasticity, which measures the response faced by 
firm i when others keep their price constant. Rearranging (4.12) to get the price-cost 
margin then substituting from (4.13), we get, 
(pi-MCi)/IN = [4EI+(l -4))E11] -1 
	
(4.14) 
Here, the price-cost margin depends on elasticities and the conjectural variations term. 
Substituting the value of Efi from (4.13) into (4.14) gives 
Oqi  (pi-MCi)/pi = [ EI-F(1-0)(pi/qi)(E
j#
i 	l 
spj 
(4.15) 
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dqi Assuming — is same for all j (ie. product i is equally affected by a change in the price of 
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its substitutes) and in equilibrium, pi = pi, then from (4.15) 
Sq' 	1 (pi-MCi)/pi =  
8Pi 
(4.16) 
 
or, (pi-MCi)/pi = [ Ei-F(1-0)(N-1)11iil1 
 
(4.17) 
The above relation shows that price-cost margin can be determined by industry elasticity of 
demand, firms' conjectures, by the number of firms in the industry and by the degree of 
product differentiation. In summary, both for homogeneous and differentiated products, 
industry structure (either number of firms or concentration index), industry elasticity of 
demand, firms' conjectures and the degree of product differentiation are the determinants of 
industry profit. A logarithmic first-order approximation of (4.17) yields the average industry 
profit equation as 
log (PCM) -[log(E) + log (1-4)) + log (N-1) + log (Ti)] 	 (4.18) 
where, ri is an approximate indicator of product differentiation for an industry'. 
In summary, for a closed economy, a profit model can be developed as a function of 
industry structure (either N or H-index), conjectures about rivals (in terms of quantity or 
price) with an additional factor (a measure of product differentiation) for the heterogeneous 
product industries. 
4.2.2 Models for an Open Economy 
Several researchers consider the influence of international factors in explaining industry 
profit. In this respect we will heavily draw upon Lyons (1981) and Jacquemin (1980) and 
3 Note, here the sign for (1-4)) is negative with profit, hence positive with 4) (price conjecture) 
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consider an oligopolistic industry of N firms producing homogeneous product competing 
with imports of the same homogeneous good. 
4.2.2.1 	A Model without Collusion 
In Jacquemin (1980), each firm believes that there will be no reaction from its domestic or 
foreign competitor for any change in the output. Maximising the profits (irk) function and 
after some rearrangement we get firms' profit as: 
where pd is domestic price 
Pd = g(qd+qm) is an inverse domestic demand function 
qd is domestic demand 
N 
qm is total imports, qd = 
mc, and F, are marginal costs and fixed costs respectively. 
Ed is domestic elasticity of demand 
Aggregating over N firms, industry average price-cost margin can be expressed as: 
PCM = (Hd/Ed)(1-m) 	 (4.20) 
where Hd is the domestic Herfindhal index 
m = qm / (qd+qm) is the import ratio 
This implies the following logarithmic relation: 
log(PCM) = log(H)- log (Ed) + log (1-m) 	 (4.21) 
cldi 
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4.2.2.2 A Profit Model with Collusion 
Lyons (1981) assumes both domestic and foreign firms may react to any change in output. 
For simplicity, only import intensity is considered as a foreign variable here.' Maximising 
profit, with some manipulations, the firm's price-cost margin is 
(p —MCi) 	(qdi/Eqd)(qd / (qd+qm) (1+Tdi+Tmi) 
	
(4.22) 
where tdi = 8(Ei#iqdj)/S1di, the ith firm's conjectures about its domestic rivals when it 
changes output and tmi = Sqm/Sqdi the ith firm's conjectures about its foreign rivals. 
Aggregating over N firms, the average industry price-cost margin can be expressed as: 
PCM = ((l-m)/Ed) Hd (1+Td+Tm) 	 (4.23) 
where Td = E (qdj) 2 tdi / E (qdj) 2 , is the weighted average of firms' conjectures due to 
responses from domestic rivals and T m = E (qdj)2 tmi/E (qdj)2 , is the weighted average of 
firms' conjectures due to responses from foreign rivals. Assuming firms' conjectures about 
its domestic and foreign rivals are equal, i.e. Td=T m=T (an index of conjectures) yields 
log(PCM) = log(H)- log(Ed)+ log(1-m)+ log (1+T) 	 (4.24) 
4.2.3 An Integrated Model for Empirical Analysis 
Summarising the above models, a final version of the profit equation for empirical analysis 
can be written as: 
4 The export ratio is generally very low for the data sample. 
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log(PCM) = Po+ P i log (H)+ 132log(ELAS0wn)+ 13310g(CONJ) + 134CPD + 13 5 log(IMP1) 
(4.25) 
where CONJ is a measure of conjectures among firms, CPD is a consumer-producers 
dummy (a proxy for product differentiation). ELASown is the estimate of the industry price 
elasticity of demand c and IMP1 is a measure of import share (m). The signs of coefficients 
are mostly derived from theory. The estimated coefficients P k , 133 are expected to be 
positive, while 132 134 and 135  are expected to be negative.' No prediction for the sign of 110 is 
generated by the theory. 
In addition, the PCM is not directly observable, assuming marginal cost is equal to average 
variable cost, this can be expressed as the gross profit margin on sales (GPMTO). GPMTO 
is used as the dependent variable for empirical purposes. In this connection, the capital-to-
sales ratio (INVS, a proxy variable for capital-intensity) is introduced into the estimating 
equation to account for the degree to which the gross profit margin misstates the price-cost 
margin. 6 , 7 The final version of the profit model for empirical analysis can be stated as' 
log(GPMTO) = Po+ 13 1 10g (H) + 132log(ELAS0wn)+ 113 log(CONJ) + 114CPD + 135 
log(IMP1) + 136  log(INVS)+ u 	 (4.26) 
where 136 is positive and u is disturbance term. 
Also for empirical purposes, the above equation will be used with a linear functional form: 
5 Industry elasticity of demand (ELAS 0 ) is measured here in absolute term, 132 is expected to be negative. 
In equation number (4.21) and (4.24) import variable is expressed as (1-m) and a positive sign is expected. 
For empirical purposes, only import share (m) is used, hence 135 is expected to be negative. 
6  INVS is investment to sales ratio, II•IVS is change in capital stock over a period. It is quite common to use 
this variable instead of capital. 
7  To incorporate the inter-industry differences in profitability due to differences in capital intensity a control 
variable is added (INVS), e.g. Comanor and Wilson (1974). Since highly capital intensive industrics arc 
expected to earn a higher rate of profits. A related derivation is given in Chapter 6, section 6.2.5. 
8 
 
Definitions and measures of all variables are in Chapter 6. 
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GPMTO = (3'o+ frH + (3 . 2ELAS0wn+ 0' 3 CONJ + 13'4CPD + 13'5 IMP1 + 13 ,6 INVS+ u' 
(4.26') 
The signs of the coefficients are expected to be the same as with equation (4.26). 
Equation (4.26) provides the final version of the short-run equilibrium model of 
profits and is estimated with all intermediate versions in Chapter 7 using data from 102 
Australian manufacturing industries. 
4.3 Disequilibrium Profit Model with Different Versions 
A criticism against cross-section studies of the relationship between concentration and 
profits is that most of them implicitly assume that the observed relationship represents 
complete adjustment to market conditions. These studies neglect the dynamic nature of the 
relationship, which may obscure the relationship between profits and concentration. 
4.3.1 Overview of the Prior Studies 
Brozen (1970) argues that a positive profit-concentration relationship is a disequilibrium 
phenomenon and that the differences between profits of high and low concentration 
industries vanish over time. However, Qualls (1974) finds that the profits-concentration 
relationship can be explained in terms of monopoly power of dominant firms with high 
barriers to entry even in the long run. Mueller (1977,1985) with firm level data also finds 
the persistence of profits above the long-run competitive level. 
Using U.S. panel data for the period between 1958 to 1981, Domowitz et.al (1986) 
explain the inter-temporal instability of the concentration-margins relationship by 
considering the influence of macro economic fluctuations. Cyclical effects are found to alter 
the magnitude of the differences between price-cost margins of concentrated and 
unconcentrated industries. 
Levy (1987) considers a dynamic profit model with panel data for U.S. 
manufacturing industries. An incomplete adjustment is considered when past profits differ 
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from future expected profits. The empirical results suggest that the adjustment process is 
relatively fast. 
Odagiri and Yamawalci (1986) estimate the long-run profit rates for the Japanese 
companies using the same methodology as Mueller. They conclude that the profit rate is 
more or less persistent. Considering a partial adjustment model, they conclude the 
■.■ 
convergence towards mean profit rate has been slow. 
Other studies with panel data, e.g. by Odagiri and Yamashita (1987) for Japanese, 
Neumann et.al  (1983) for German and Prince and Thurik (1994) for Dutch manufacturing 
industries deal with the persistence of profits and reach varying conclusions. A summary of 
the studies is given here in Table 4.1. 9 
4.3.2 Disequilibrium Profit Model with Different Specifications 
A standard partial adjustment model is adopted here. The direction of the change in profits 
is a function of actual profits relative to the short run equilibrium level (GPMTO * , equation 
number (4.26) or (4.26')). Unlike standard models, the equilibrium profits (GPMTO * ) is a 
function of the determinants explained in equation (4.26) or (4.26'). Any deviation of the 
actual level of profits from its equilibrium level results in an adjustment process that leads to 
changes in profits. An incomplete adjustment is allowed in each model. For empirical 
purposes, to compare with equilibrium results, we consider GPMTO t as the dependent 
variable, instead of AGPMT0 t , i.e. changes between two periods. 
Both linear and logarithmic functional forms, with a fixed rate of adjustment of profit is 
considered here. 
9  There is difference between these studies and ours. Most of these studies consider persistence of profit over 
a period based on long-run models. The following disequilibrium versions are based on short-run. 
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Table 4.1: Summary of the Existing Literature 
Researcher(s) Country Type of 
Study 
Period(s) Major Conclusions 
Brozen (1970) U.S. Industry 
level data 
1936-40, 
1953-57 
Profits-concentration 
relationship is a 
disequilibrium 
phenomena. 
Qualls (1974) U.S. Both 
industry and 
firm level 
1950-65 for 
industries and 
1951-1968 for 
firms 
Supports persistence of 
profits for high 
concentrated industries 
with barriers to entry. 
Neumann, Bobel 
and Haid (1983) 
Germany Company 
level data 
1965-77 Profit margins increase 
during upswings and 
decrease during 
recessions for highly 
concentrated industries. 
Mueller 	(1977, 
1983 and 1985) 
U.S. Panel data 
for firms 
24 years Even in the long run, 
profit does not approach 
the competitive level. 
Connolly and 
Schwartz (1985) 
U.S. Panel data 
for firms 
1963-82 Profit adjustment 
remains incomplete even 
after two decades. 
Odagiri and 
Yamawalci (1986) 
Japan Time series 
data for 
corporations 
1964-80 The normalised profit 
rate is persistent for the 
companies, as the 
convergence towards 
mean profits rate is 
weaker and volatile. 
Levy (1987) U.S. Four-digit 
panel data 
for 
industries 
1963,1967 and 
1972 
Adjustments to abnormal 
profits are relatively fast. 
Prince and Thurik 
(1994) 
Netherlands 3-digit panel 
data for 
industries 
1975-1986 Price-cost margins are 
less pro-cyclical in 
concentrated than in less 
concentrated industries. 
Note: Only Odagiri and Yamawalci (1986) and Levy (1987) consider the dynamic model of partial 
adjustment of profits. 
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4.3.2.1 Disequilibrium Profit Model with Linear Functional Form 
In this version, following the partial adjustment model, all variables are in linear functional 
form, with 
AGPMTOt = GPMT0t-GPMTOt_i = II: (GPMT0 t* -GPMTOt_t) 
or, 
GPMTOt = 1.1'GPMT0, * - ( l -1-t')GPMTOt_ i 	 (4.27') 
where AGPMTOt is the change in profits (in absolute terms) between two periods. [t' is the 
rate of adjustment and remains constant. p.' is between zero and one. GPMT0, * is 
equilibrium profit as represented by equation (4.26'). In estimation, GPMTO t is used as the 
dependent variable, so (l-W), the coefficient of GPMTO t_i, represents adjustment of profits 
for the full period and is expected to be positive. 
An alternative version used in the literature is considered below where change in 
profit is in relative terms. 
4.3.2.2 Disequilibrium Profit Model with Logarithmic Functional Form 
Relative change in GPMTO is considered between two periods as 
AG PMTO t = GPMT0 t/GPMTO t_t=(GPMTO, */GPMTO t_t)t 	 (4.27) 
where AGPMTO t is the change in profits (in relative term) between two periods. ii. is the 
rate of adjustment and remains constant. t.t is between zero and one. GPMT0 t* is 
equilibrium profit as represented by equation (4.26). In estimation, GPMTO t is used as the 
dependent variable. Therefore (l-g), the coefficient of GPMTO t_ t , represents adjustment of 
profits for the full period and is expected to be positive. 
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Taking logarithm of both sides yields,' 
log(GPMT0 t) - log(GPMTOt_i) = glog(GPMT0 t* ) - log(GPMTOt_i)] 
Or, 
log(GPMT0t) = glog(GPMT0 t* )-(1-1-t)log(GPMTOt_1) 	 (4.27.1) 
4.4 Conclusions 
In this chapter different versions of the equilibrium and disequilibrium profit models are 
specified. In this respect, firstly, an oligopoly framework is taken into account to derive the 
short-run equilibrium profit models. Secondly, disequilibrium versions of the profit models 
are presented. In Chapter 7, the findings from these models are presented. Two other core 
variables in the profit model are concentration and firms' conjectures. The next task is to 
specify a model of concentration and a model with firms' conjectures separately to explain 
the relationships among the structure, conduct and performance variables. This is done in the 
following chapter. 
I° This version is considered as the logarithmic functional form. It performs better in terms of signs and 
significance in estimating the short-run equilibrium profit model and is also derived theoretically from 
oligopolistic equilibrium. 
66 
CHAPTER 5 
SPECIFICATIONS OF CONCENTRATION AND 
CONJECTURES MODEL 
5.1 Introduction 
The analysis of the determinants of market structure is central to the study of market 
performance. Industry concentration is the most widely empirically studied among various 
elements of market structure. It is often viewed as the basic determinant of market power 
and, hence, the conduct and performance of firms. In this chapter, a short-run equilibrium 
concentration model (with different versions) is specified following the oligopoly theory. 
In the previous chapter, it is noted that the determination of price-cost margin (and 
hence price and output) in an oligopoly market structure depends on concentration, demand 
elasticity and a firm's conjectures about its rivals with other control variables. Along with 
concentration, firms' conjectures are explained separately with structural determinants. 
The chapter is organised as follows. Firstly, the concentration models are taken into 
account. Section 5.2 presents a literature survey of the determinants of levels and changes in 
concentration. Section 5.3 develops a short-run equilibrium concentration model (with 
different versions) following oligopoly theory, while section 5.4 contains the disequilibrium 
profit model (with different versions). 
Secondly, studies of firms' conjectures and related literature is discussed. Section 5.5 
contains a brief overview of traditional non-cooperative oligopoly models and recent game 
theory approaches (as an alternative approach to explain conjectures) to oligopoly. In this 
connection, major criticisms of the traditional approach are mentioned. A summary of 
empirical studies in the literature with an outline of the game theory is presented here. 
Section 5.6 develops a model explaining the industry conjectural variations with some 
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determinants used in the study. A summary with concluding remarks for both concentration 
and conjectures model is included in section 5.7. 
5.2 Determinants of Concentration: An Overview of the Literature 
Industry concentration refers to the number and size distribution of firms within an industry. 
Concentration influences market power and therefore expresses the oligopolistic nature of a 
market. Most studies in industrial organisation (I()) consider concentration (an index of 
market structure) as given and examine the effects of concentration on profitability (an index 
of market performance). An alternative argument is that concentration can not be treated as 
an exogenous variable, and can be explained with some variables. These determinants of 
concentration are used to explain inter-industry variation in concentration. 
5.2.1 Literature Survey on Determinants of the Level of Concentration 
A large number of cross-section studies in U.S., U.K. and Canada explain concentration with 
measures of entry barriers, innovation, merger and presence of unions. Detail of the literature 
can be found in Curry and George (1983). 
Ornstein, Weston and Intriligator (1973) explain concentration in U.S. manufacturing 
by the number of firms, relative industry size, advertising intensity, capital intensity, growth 
of value added and government expenditure to total output. Gupta (1983) explains 
concentration with single and simultaneous equation models for Canadian manufacturing 
industries. Economies of scale relative to industry size, absolute capital requirement entry 
barrier, advertising intensity, research and development intensity, effective rate of tariff 
protection, foreign ownership, multi-plant operations are considered as explanatory variables. 
Most of the above variables are found to be significant in his OLS results, while the results 
for his simultaneous model are different for a few variables. Other researchers using 
simultaneous equation systems explain concentration with other variables for various 
countries (see, Martin (1979), Jacquemin et.al . (1980), and Chou (1986)). 
68 
Chapter 5: Specifications of Concentration and Conjecture Model 
Ratnayake (1990) develops a concentration model for the Australian manufacturing 
industries. He considers economies of scale, capital intensity, advertising intensity, industry 
size, foreign ownership, export and import intensity and trade protection variables. His 
findings support the importance of trade variables (rather than the structural variables) in 
explaining the inter-industry differences in concentration. 
5.2.2 An Overview of the Literature of the Determinants of the Changes in 
Concentration 
Mueller and Hamm (1974), examine changes in the four-firm concentration ratio in U.S. 
manufacturing between 1947 and 1970. Besides initial concentration, industry growth rate, 
industry size, net firm entry and product differentiation are used as explanatory variables for 
concentration change. Their partial adjustment coefficient is 0.12 for a twelve-year period 
(considering a larger sample model for 1958 to 1970). They conclude that concentration 
increased significantly in consumer goods industries with a high degree of advertising outlay. 
Wright (1978) estimates a lagged concentration coefficient of 0.13 in U.S. 
manufacturing over the period 1947 to 1963. His dependent variable is the change in the 
concentration ratio, constructed by considering that the initial concentration ratio will vary 
between zero and unity. A product differentiation dummy, industry size, growth rate of sales 
and the initial concentration are used as explanatory variables. 
Jenny and Weber (1978) report a model identifying the factors behind concentration 
trends in the French manufacturing sector over the period 1961/69. As explanatory variables 
they consider initial concentration, various proxies for barriers (e.g. economies of scale, 
absolute capital cost requirements and product differentiation), industry growth rate and net 
firm entry. The estimated coefficient on the lagged concentration ratio is 0.02 (for their full 
sample model). Economies of scale and absolute capital requirements are identified as 
particularly important in explaining concentration change. Also, their analysis suggests that 
the deconcentration effect is significant for the industries with low barriers to entry and for 
those that initially have moderate concentration. 
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In a model similar to Mueller and Hamm (1974), Mueller and Rogers (1980) emphasise 
the effect of advertising in explaining the causes for changes in concentration over the period 
1947/72 for the U.S. manufacturing. Their estimated adjustment coefficient is 0.08 for 
1947/58 and 0.15 for 1958/72. 
Caves and Porter (1980) use U.S. manufacturing data over the period 1954/72 and 
suggest a model where changes in concentration are explained by lagged (or partially lagged) 
changes in variables, viz proxies for economies of plant size, cost disadvantages of small 
plants, net entry of establishments and diversification. They do not consider the adjustment 
effect directly in their model. They report the values of partial adjustments for the simple 
regressions of current concentration on a constant and lagged concentration for five-year 
intervals for the above periods. These are 0.029, 0.046, 0.054 and 0.067. For the full period 
it is 0.177. 
Hart and Clarke (1980) consider a model for the proportionate change in the five-firm 
concentration (in terms of employment instead of sales) for the U.K. manufacturing 
industries over the period 1958 to 1968. Logarithmic changes in the measures of plant size, 
industry size, the logarithm of the initial concentration, the ratio of plants to enterprises, 
mergers and advertising intensity are used in explaining changes in the logarithm of the 
concentration ratio (in terms of employment). The estimated coefficient of lagged 
concentration is 0.24. 
Levy (1985) considers changes in concentration for the U.S. manufacturing sector over 
the period 1962 to 1973. The change in the four-firm concentration ratio is used as the 
dependent variable. Explanatory variables include advertising intensity, minimum efficient 
scale, the lagged concentration ratio and the growth rate of sales for the industries. The 
estimated coefficient of lagged concentration ratio is between 0.30 and 0.43. 
In Australia, Dixon (1987b) develops a model with four-digit level data for the 
manufacturing industries over the period 1968/69 to 1982/83. The estimated coefficient of 
lagged concentration (four-firm) is 0.12. Initial concentration, advertising-sales ratio, growth 
rate and growth rate of value added are used as independent variables to explain changes in 
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the concentration ratio. A summary of studies with their estimated adjustment coefficients is 
given in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1: Estimated Adjustment Coefficient for Different Countries 
Researcher(s) Country Period No of 
Years 
Estimated Annual 
Adjustment Rate 
• Mueller and Hamm (1974) U.S. 1958-70 12 0.010 
Wright (1978) U.S. 1947-63 16 0.008 
Jenny and Weber (1978) France 1961-69 8 0.002 
Mueller and Rogers (1980) U.S. 1958-72 14 0.011 
Hart and Clarke (1980) U.K. 1958-68 10 0.027 
Caves and Porter (1980) U.S. 1954-72 16 0.011 
Levy (1985) U.S. 1962-73 11 0.031 
Geroski and Masson (1987) U.S. 1963-67 4 0.031 
Dixon (1987b) Australia 1968-82 14 0.009 
Note: Last column is calculated from the information given in the studies mentioned here, using the formula 
in Appendix 7.1 with concentration instead of profit. 
5.3 A Theoretical Framework for the Short-run Equilibrium Model of Concentration 
Starting from Cowling and Waterson (1976) model, Clarke and Davies (1982) develop a 
model of concentration, where concentration is determined by the industry elasticity of 
demand, a measure of variability in marginal costs between firms, conjectures between firms 
and the number of firms in the industry. Also, they emphasise both concentration and profits 
are determined simultaneously by demand and cost conditions (and the behaviour of market 
participants). 
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5.3.1 Equilibrium Models of Concentration 
Here three versions are developed, the first version directly follows from the Cowling-
Waterson model. The second version has a flavour of the Clarke-Davies model but with 
variable conjectures, which are endogenous in the model. For the third version, we add a 
product-differentiation variable to incorporate the heterogeneity of products. 
5.3.1.1 	Cowling-Waterson Version with Cournot Behaviour 
This model allows for cost differences across firms producing homogeneous product and 
assumes no collusion among firms. These are the assumptions for an asymmetric Cournot 
model. In this situation, the profit maximising condition can be expressed as 
= MCi 	 (5.1) 
Rearranging equation (5.1), we get, 
qi/Q = E (1-MC1/p) 
	
(5.2) 
Summing over N firms yields 
1 = NE - cEMci/p 	 (5.3) 
or, an expression for industry price (p) is 
p = E(NE- 1)- 1EMCi 	 (5.4) 
Squaring equation (5.2) and taking the sum over N firms yields 
72 
Chapter 5: Specifications of Concentration and Conjecture Model 
aii2/Q2 = E2 E(1_mcvp)2 = E2 (N_2xmcvp÷Emci2/p2) 	 (5.5) 
Substituting the value of p from equation (5.4) gives 
H = aq2/Q2=  _NE2 + 2E 4_ [1_No2y/Ac i2/(Emci)2 
	
(5.6) 
EMCi2/(EMCi) 2 can be called the Herfmdahl index of costs and may be expressed as 
(l+vc2)/N, vc is the coefficient of variation of marginal costs. Substituting this into equation 
(5.6) gives 
H = UN + (1- EN)2vc2/N 	 (5.7) 
Taking logarithms of both sides 
log H = log (1 + (1- EN) 2vc2) -log N 	 (5.8) 
A first-order approximation to the above relation is given by 
log H = 001 + 0 11 1°g N+ 021 1°g E + 031 log vc 	 (5.9) 
where OH, 021 are negative, 031 is positive. Therefore, according to this model, the number 
of firms, elasticity of industry demand and variability in marginal costs between firms 
determine the level of concentration. 
5.3.1.2 	Clake and Davies Version with Different Conjectures among Firms 
This model considers industries with cost differences across firms producing homogeneous 
products, allowing also for different conjectures among firms. In this case assuming that 
firms have different conjectural variations, and wi is defined as 
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dqj/qi = wi dqi/qi for all i#j 	 (5.10) 
Here, wi denotes the conjectural variations parameter and are not restricted to any particular 
oligopoly behaviour.' A lower value of wi implies rivals will not react proportionately. 'hi 
equal to -1, implies competitive behaviour, wi equal to 0 gives the Cournot case and at the 
other extreme, i.e. in perfect collusion, wi equal to (1-1/H). Depending on the value of wi, 
we may have an outcome ranging from competitive to monopoly solution for the industry. 
Varying wi, implicitly we assume conjectures are endogenous in the model. 
Aggregating over all firms we get the measure for an industry ty as follows: 2 
Ty= iS i2 (ty i )/H 	 (5.11) 
Adding this conjectural variations term to the log-linear approximation above, equilibrium 
concentration equation can be expressed as' 
log H A 	A = -02 + -12 log N+ 022log £ + 032 log vc+042 log ( 1 +0 (5.12) 
In this model concentration is also determined by the number of firms (N), elasticity (E), 
differences of costs between firms (vc) and the conjectures variable for the industry is 
(1+0. 4 The signs for the variables are as in the Clarke and Davies (1982) study, viz. 012 is 
indeterminate, 022 is negative and 032 , 042 are positive.' For empirical application, c is 
I The difference between this model and Clarke and Davies (1982) model is that different conjectures 
among firms are assumed, Clarke and Davies assume the same conjectures for all firms within an industry. 
2 Derivation is in Chapter 6. 
3  As with the profit model, this expression is not strictly derived from Clarke-Davies model, however, here 
there is a closer comparison. 
4 (14- V) is used as a measure of conjecture, instead of 1/1 in all models. When 	is negative, the 
logarithmic form of tif can not be considered. 
5 Estimates of elasticity are in absolute term, hence a negative relationship is expected. 
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ELASown ; reciprocal of vc i.e., cost disadvantage ratio and CONJ is used for (l+ pr) for 
both (5.9) and (5.12). 
5.3.1.3 Considering Heterogeneous Product the Final Version for Empirical Purposes 
Following the theoretical discussion on equilibrium models, an equilibrium concentration 
model can be stated as in equation (5.12). In terms of the estimates for empirical purposes, 
the number of firms (N) is called as NOF and the elasticity of demand (c) is ELAS own . 
Instead of the coefficient of variation of cost (vc), the cost-disadvantage ratio of smaller 
firms (CDR) is used.' Industry conjecture(s) is (1+') and is denoted as CONJ. Equation 
(5.12) provides the basic relationship for estimating the determinants of equilibrium 
concentration. To incorporate heterogeneity of products, a consumer-producer dummy 
(CPD) is included into the final version. A positive relationship is expected. Therefore, the 
final expression (for estimation purpose) of the equilibrium concentration model is 
log H = 003 + 013 log N+ 623 log ELAS own + 033 log CDR + 043 log CONJ + 053 CPD 
(5.13) 
As with the profit models, for empirical purposes, in Chapter 8, equations (5.9), 
(5.12) and (5.13) are estimated with the logarithmic functional form. Corresponding versions 
with a linear functional form are (5.9'), (5.12') and (5.13') as below 
log H= 0101+ 0'11 log N+ 0'21 log ELASown+ 0'31 log CDR 
	
(5.9') 
log H = 0 '02 + 0'12 log N+ 0'22log ELAS own + 0'32 log CDR+0'42 log ([+ ii) 	(5.12') 
6 Clarke and Davies consider cost advantages of large firms to measure the differences in costs among firms. 
We use reciprocal of this variable, viz, cost-disadvantage ratio (CDR) of small firms, hence a negative 
relationship is expected with concentration. 
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log H = 0'03 + 0'13 log N+ 0'23 log ELASown + 0'33 log CDR + 0'43 log CONJ + 8'53 
CPD (5.13') 
5.4 	Disequilibrium Versions of Concentration Model 
Disequilibrium versions of the concentration models are developed following similar 
argument to that used in the profit models in the previous chapter. The direction of the 
change in concentration is a function of actual concentration relative to the equilibrium level. 
Any deviation of the actual level of concentration from its equilibrium level results in an 
adjustment process that leads to changes in concentration. Like the profit model, to compare 
the findings of disequilibrium version with equilibrium model, the current concentration (H t) 
is used as the dependent variable, instead of (H t-H t_1). 
5.4.1 Disequilibrium Concentration Model with a Linear Functional Form 
A linear specification of the adjustment process as has been used in many previous studies is 
given by 
AH t= Ht-Ht_i = '(Flt *-Fit- I) 
	
(5.14') 
where AH t is the change in concentration (in absolute terms) between two periods. X' is the 
rate of adjustment and remains constant over industries. X' is between zero and one. H * is 
the equilibrium level of concentration and is represented by (5.9'), (5.12') or (5.13'). In 
estimation, H t is used as the dependent variable, so (1-A;), the coefficient of H t_ t, represents 
adjustment of concentration for the full period and is expected to be positive.' 
7 The difference between the assumption of previous studies and this study is important to note. Here a short 
run equilibrium model is considered with a partial adjustment of concentration towards equilibrium level. 
But other studies start from the long run equilibrium model and consider a partial adjustment of 
concentration towards long run equilibrium level. 
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Also as in the previous chapter, an alternative specification is considered. 
5.4.2 Disequilibrium Concentration Model with Logarithmic Functional Form 
Partial adjustment in a short-run equilibrium model with a logarithmic functional form can be 
expressed as, 
Ht/Ht_ I= (H,*/Ht_ )?'. 	 (5.14) 
Taking the logarithm of both sides, 
A log (Ht) = log (Ht) - log ( Ht_t) = X[(log H,*) - log (Ht_i)] 	 (5.14.1) 
where A log (Ht) is the change in concentration (in relative terms) between two periods. X is 
the rate of adjustment and remains constant over industries. X varies between zero and one. 
1-1 *  is the equilibrium level of concentration and is represented by equation (5.9), (5.12) or 
(5.13). In estimation, log (Ht) is used as the dependent variable, so (1-X) , the coefficient of 
log (Ht-1), represents the adjustment of concentration for the full period and is expected to 
be positive. 
In summary, both the equilibrium and disequilibrium concentration models are 
specified above. The empirical findings from these models are discussed in Chapter 8. In the 
following sections a model of conjectures is specified after some literature review. 
5.5 Oligopolistic Interdependence 
Despite considerable research, no theory has provided reliable predictions of price or output 
under oligopoly market structure. Each firm's action depends on the unknown reactions of 
the rivals and the complex interdependencies cause a problem in explaining rational 
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behaviour. Depending on the firm's conjectures about their rivals' action, industry price can 
lie anywhere between the competitive and the monopoly level. 
Bowley (1924), in his seminal work first introduces the concept of conjectural 
variations. The expected reaction of its rivals due to a change in the quantity (price) of firm i, 
as subjectively perceived by firm i, is called conjectural variations. In our model, we consider 
the conjectural variations either as an indicator of the firm's strategy, or as an indicator : of 
degree of collusion. In the following section mainly non-cooperative models of oligopoly are 
discussed. 
5.5.1 Non-cooperative Oligopoly Models and Conjectural Variations 
Oligopoly can produce any intermediate output between the competitive level and monopoly 
level depending on conjectural variations. Industry output will be lower with high profit if: i) 
rivals are expected to be more responsive to each firm's action or the firms' beliefs about 
the others' responsiveness are similar. 
The first, and still widely used, model of non-cooperative oligopoly behaviour is 
developed by Cournot (1838). The Cournot model assumes conjectural variations as zero. 
Each firm assumes away the response from its rivals in setting its own output. In a single-
period model, a firm assumes rivals' outputs are predetermined and maximises profit. 
The Bertrand (1883) model considers price (instead of quantity as per Cournot) as 
the decision variable in his non-cooperative model. Each firm assumes that rivals will not 
respond to its price changes. In the Stackelberg (1934) model, the leader firm maximises 
profit assuming Cournot behaviour from its followers. 
In the dominant firm or price leadership model, a single firm or a group of firms (the 
leader) choose their price and other firms (the followers) consider price as given and act as 
competitive firms. The dominant firm (or group) takes into account its impact on both 
market price and the quantity of output supplied by the fringe firms in choosing its output 
level. This model assumes that all fringe firms are price-takers. This implies all fringe firms 
act as if they have conjectural variations for output changes equal to -1. 
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For a single firm, all three models yield the monopoly solution and for an indefinitely 
large number of firms Cournot and Stackelberg equilibrium approach a competitive solution. 
Also, the Bertrand equilibrium with homogenous product always provides a competitive 
solution (as long as there are at least two firms with unlimited capacity). With heterogeneous 
product, it differs from competitive equilibrium and the number of firms in the industry 
affects prices. 
Friedman (1983) criticising static or 'one-shot' conjectural variations models, reports 
that the firms maximise one-period profits rather than discounted stream of profits over a 
given planning horizon. Conjectural variations can at best be described as a static 
approximation to the real-time action and reaction that arises in a dynamic framework. 
Conjectural variations are generally ad hoc and inconsistent with rational behaviour 
of firms when they are out of equilibrium. Some researchers consider consistent (or rational) 
conjectural variations, i.e. the actual responses from rivals in the event of a change in 
quantity (price) decision by firm i (see Bresnahan (1981), Kamien and Schwartz (1983), 
Boyer and Moreaux (1983)). 
An association of firms that explicitly agree to coordinate its activities is called a 
cartel. If the cartel includes all firms in the industry, firms enjoy monopoly profits. The theory 
of cartels is based on cooperative oligopoly (see Stigler (1964) for detail). 
5.5.2 	Game Theory 
The exposition of game theory (a rigorous tool) to explain the oligopolistic interactions has 
occurred in the last few decades. Game theory deals with players with linked pay-offs and 
their choices are conditional on rivals' choices. 
5.5.2.1 	Static Games and Empirical Studies 
Here players are firms, each firm tries to maximise their single-period profits (payoff). Most 
of the studies in this area deal with a specific industry rather than cross-sections. This is more 
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appropriate for a homogeneous products, where prices are observable and can be compared 
directly. A brief discussion of the studies is presented here. 
Iwata (1974) derives and estimates the cost and demand functions for three firms 
(Asahi, Nippon and Central) of the Japanese flat-glass industry.' He estimates conjectural 
variations for the window glass and polished plate glass industry separately. For window 
glass, the first two firms' conjectural variations lies between Cournot and perfectly collusive 
model, while for the polished plate glass a different pattern is found.' The conjectures, 
demand, and cost function parameters are used to measure the monopoly power of the 
industry. 
Gollop and Roberts (1979) test for equality of conjectural variations for firms' various 
size classes within the U.S. coffee-roasting industry with 160 firms. Their model is based on 
the necessary conditions for producer equilibrium, which includes the firms' conjectural 
variations as unknown parameters. Within such simultaneous systems, the estimated 
conjectural variations are interpreted as the conjectures the firm must have held, in order for 
its observed input and output choice to have been the result of a profit-maximisation 
decision. The production model is based on the trans-log production function and marginal 
productivity conditions, with the market demand elasticity as an exogenous estimate. 
Using the same data as the Gollop and Roberts study, Roberts (1984) first uses the 
shadow-profit function to develop his model. This is based on the variable profit function and 
related output supply and factor demand equations to analyse short-run pricing behaviour of 
firms in an oligopoly market. Parametric tests are applied for: i) Cournot behaviour, 
dominant firm behaviour, and iii) price-taking behaviour. The hypothesis of Cournot and 
dominant firm behaviour are rejected, while the hypothesis of price-taking behaviour can not 
be rejected except for two firms. 
Appelbaum (1982) first introduces the use of dual cost function approach to model 
non-competitive markets. Employing a simultaneous equation system to measure the 
8 Two popular specifications in empirics of static models are first-order approach (based on first order 
maximisation condition and demand functions) and dual approach (based on shadow-profit functions, input 
and output-demand equations and output supplies). For further discussion see Slade (1992). 
9 lwata (1974) argues that this is due to higher international competition for the polished plate glass. The 
greater competition reduces conjectural variations towards competitive level. 
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intensity of competition in industries she considers input demand, supply and market demand 
equations. The empirical results are based on aggregate data of an industry. This requires the 
assumption of constant and equal marginal costs for all firms. Table 5.2 provides an overview 
of some studies in this area indicating the industry studied, whether products are 
homogeneous or differentiated and whether firms make quantity or price as choice variable. 
Table 5.2: Empirical Studies Based on Static Games and Focus Variable 
Researcher(s), Year Industry Type of 
Product 
Choice 
Variable 
Iwata (1974) Flat glass Homogenous Quantity 
Gollop and Roberts (1979) Coffee roasting Homogenous Quantity 
Appelbaum (1982) Several Homogenous Quantity 
Roberts (1984) Coffee roasting Homogenous Quantity 
Slade (1986) Retail gasoline Differentiated Price 
Bresnahan (1987) Automobiles Differentiated Price 
Gasmi, Laffont and Vuong (1992) Soft drinks Differentiated Price 
5.5.2.2 	Dynamic Games and Empirical Studies 
Static models can be described as useful summary statistics of the outcomes of oligopolistic 
interdependencies. The complex strategic behaviours are captured in the dynamic models. 
Most dynamic models are based on repeated or state-space analysis.' Kalai and 
Stanford (1983) reconcile the conjectural variations and repeated game theory showing that 
various conjectures are "credible" in the equilibrium. Docicner (1992) relates dynamic 
1° Dynamic games has little relation with this work. The discussion on literature is given here in brief. 
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oligopolistic competition with static conjectural variations equilibrium. Using a differential 
game model with infinite horizon and adjustment costs, he concludes that the static 
conjectural variations models approximate long-run dynamic interactions." 
5.6 Determinants of Conjectures Considered for the Model 
Unlike profit and concentration models, we are unable to specify a model of conjectures with 
determinants which are derived theoretically from oligopoly models: 2 In the following 
paragraphs some structural determinants are specified which can explain conjectures. 
The major hypothesis in oligopoly models is that high concentration induces 
collusion." If a few large firms dominate the industry and if they coordinate their activities, 
they can change price (or output) neglecting the actions of others. This is supported by 
Stigler (1964), where a positive relationship is established between Herfindahl index and 
collusion among firms in terms of a formal or informal cartel. Therefore, a positive 
relationship is expected between H and CONJ. 
According to Shepherd (1990), stable industry conditions help tacit collusion to be 
more effective. Stability and certainty in the market help the firms to anticipate rivals' 
conduct more accurately. A positive relationship can be expected between STABLE and 
CONJ.' 
In a boom period, with strong demand growth in sales, firms can easily cheat without 
fear of detection, hence collusion is less likely to be effective. On the other hand, with weak 
growth, firms will avoid cheating due to the possibility of loss in sales, which enhances the 
possibility of collusive outcome. A negative relationship is expected between GROW and 
CONJ. 
11 For more discussion on dynamic oligopoly theory see Shubik (1982), Driskill and McCafferty (1989), 
Maslcin and Tirole (1987) and following references. 
12 To my knowledge, there is no study that develops such a model. 
13 High values of conjectures implies collusion. These two terms are used in the study synonymously. 
14 Here, one important point to note, the STABLE variable measures the stability of concentration between 
two periods. Also in disequilibrium versions of concentration, the change in concentration between two 
periods is considered. In some sense, this is bit overlapping. 
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For homogeneous products, prices are same for all firms. It is hard to cheat for firms 
with single price. Therefore collusion is more stable. On the other hand, firms with 
heterogeneous product have more difficulty agreeing on collusive behaviour. Hence a 
negative association is expected between CPD and CONJ. 
Collusion and imports are related in opposite direction assuming both domestic and 
foreign firms have constant marginal cost of production and foreign firms are price takers. 
Also it is assumed that the import price (including transportation costs and tariff) lies in 
between non-collusion and the joint-profit maximisation prices (both may occur without 
trade). This implies that the payoffs from collusion among the domestic firms are reduced 
compared to a situation without a competitive pressure from abroad. A negative relationship 
is expected between IMP1 and CONJ.' 
In summary, the model of conjectures can be expressed as follows: 
log (CONJ) = ico + iqlog (H) + ic2 STABLE +ic3 GROW + KLICPD + 1(5 log (IMP 1) 
(5.15) 
where i<0 can take any value; xl, ic2 are positive; and 1(3, iczt 1(5 are negative. For empirical 
purposes, as with profit and concentration models, a linear functional form is considered 
below for empirical purpose in Chapter 8. 
CONJ = x'0 + x'11-1 + x'2 STABLE +ic'3 GROW + x4CPD + k'5IMP1 	 (5.15') 
Signs of coefficients are same as (5.15). 
15 This argument is taken from Stalhammar (1991). 
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5.7 Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, firstly, short-run equilibrium concentration models (based on oligopoly 
theory) are specified. In this respect, the whole range of variables used in previous studies are 
not considered.' Secondly, allowing partial adjustment of concentration towards equilibrium, 
disequilibrium versions of concentration models are developed!' 
Next to develop a model of conjectures, traditional oligopoly models are reviewed 
briefly and an outline of game theory models (as an alternative approach to explain 
conjectural variations) is presented with some empirical studies. A conjectures model is 
specified in terms of some structural determinants." 
This is only a first step to the Australian literature to explain conjectures with some 
industry structural variables. It is noted early that conjectural models have defects, e.g. these 
are static models and can not be used for multi-period. In this respect, a dynamic game 
model with more relevant variables could be more appropriate to explain conjectures. 
However, a conjectures model is developed here, which is consistent (in terms of variables 
and theory) and can fit in with the rest of the analysis (i.e. within profit and concentration 
model). 
16  In the equilibrium model, N is treated as exogenous, but in most studies in this area N is treated as 
endogenous and determined with concentration. 
17  A deviation from short-run equilibrium is considered here. In other studies, deviation from long-run 
(steady state) equilibrium is considered instead of short-run. 
18  Important point to note here, is that this model can not be derived mathematically. To my knowledge, 
there is no study in this respect. A study by Rosenbaum and Manns (1994) develops a similar model 
following Cowling-Waterson study. Similar type of arguments are followed here. 
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CHAPTER 6 
VARIABLES WITH MEASURES, DATA BASE AND 
ESTIMATION TECHNIQUES 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter begins with a discussion of variables and their measurement. Section 6.2 provides 
the measures of variables, while the description of data base is given in section 6.3. A detailed 
description of data sources with measures in Appendix I. In section 6.4, the econometric 
procedures used in estimation and the diagnostic tests applied are explained in detail. Finally, 
some conclusions are added in section 6.5. 
6.2 Measures of Variables 
In this section, the variables are defined with measures. For some variables, alternative 
measures contained in the literature will also be covered. 
6.2.1 The Profitability Measures 
The alternative measures of profitability commonly used in the empirical literature are: the 
accounting rate of return on capital ( in terms of assets or equity) and the rate of return on 
sales (the gross profit margin). 
The first measure of profitability is the accounting rate of return on capital (in terms of 
assets and equity). There is no consensus among the writers who suggest a capital based 
measure of profitability. Hall and Weiss (1967) prefer the return on equity arguing that: 
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Capital structure is an element of input mix. Either profit maximisation or sales 
maximisation would require some optimal rate of borrowing, which differs from industry to 
industry depending on such things as stability and growth prospects. As a result, rates of return 
on assets should differ between industries even in perfectly competitive long-run equilibrium, 
but rates of return on equity should tend toward equality between industries (1967, p 321). 
Other researchers favour rates of return on assets rather than equity. Stigler suggests, 
The main limitation [of the equity approach]... is that it leaves the characteristics of the 
capital lenders unexplained.... We argue that the essential symmetry in the theory of inter-
industry allocation of loan funds and equity funds supports the view that they should be 
combined in calculating the rate of return (1963, p 123). 
Apart from the lack of consensusness among researchers, the accounting rate of return 
as a measure of performance has some limitations. Firstly, depreciation methods are different 
among firms and industries, affecting the calculated rate of return. Secondly, Fisher and 
McGowan (1983) have pointed out accounting procedures include certain activities, such as 
research and development expenditures and advertising, as current expenses rather than capital 
expenditures. They suggest the internal rate of return as a valid measure of economic profit, as 
it is equalised by the competitive process over time. Benston (1987) also argues that 
economists lack 'idiosyncratic knowledge' necessary to interpret accounting data. Also 
researchers (mostly for U.K. studies) have used gross profit margin as a measure of the price-
cost margin. In practice, marginal cost is often difficult to obtain, and is estimated from 
average variable costs. With this restrictive assumption, empirical studies use PCM = (P-
AVCi)/P as a measure of performance 
The data to find an accounting rate of return are not available at the four-digit industry 
level. Also, the Cowling-Waterson type model suggests PCM as a measure of profits on sales 
rather than profits on capital. Therefore profits on sales is considered as a measure of 
performance. Alternative measures of PCM that will be considered here are i) the percentage 
gross returns on sales (GPMTO) for the industry and the percentage gross returns on value 
added (GPMVA). 
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Gross profit is equal to turnover plus changes in stock minus purchases and selected 
expenses, rent and leasing expenses and wages and salaries. Information regarding each of 
these components is available at the ASIC four-digit level from the ABS (catalogue no 
8113.0). 
6.2.2 Popular Concentration Measures 
Here popular concentration measures used in literature, viz, the seller concentration ratio, the 
Herfindahl index, the Hannah and Kay index and the entropy index are discussed. 
6.2.2.1 	The Seller Concentration Ratio 
The numerical index used most widely by industrial organisation and antitrust specialists is the 
d-firm concentration ratio, defined as the combined market share of the largest d firms in the 
industry. Market share can be measured in terms of any economic variable such as 
employment, total assets or value added. Sales or turnover is the most popular choice in 
empirical studies to date. The d-firm concentration ratio is calculated as 
CRd= si + s2 +...+ sd 	 (6.1) 
where s is the share of each firm (in terms of turnover, employment etc). The choice of d is 
arbitrary, mostly determined by the government agency responsible for collecting data. For 
equal-sized firms, the d-firm concentration ratio is d/n. The minimum value is equal to zero and 
maximum value is equal to one. One major limitation of this index is that it represents a single 
point on the cumulative concentration curve, therefore neglecting information outside the 
largest d firms. This violates 'the principle of transfer' suggested by Hannah and Kay (1977). 
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6.2.2.2 	The Herfindahl Index (1950) 
An alternative summary measure of industry structure is the Herfindahl (H-index) defined as 
the sum of squared values of shares of all firms (n) 
H-index = Esi2 
	
(6.2) 
For equal sized firms H=1/n, the lower limit is zero and upper limit is one. The squaring of 
shares implies more weight to the shares of large firms. It satisfies all properties suggested by 
Hannah and Kay (1977). It has a continuous distribution and combines aspects of both number 
and size distribution of firms. Our theoretical oligopoly model suggests the H-index as a 
measure of concentration rather than any other index. 
6.2.2.3 	The Hannah and Kay Index 
Hannah and Kay (1977) suggest a one-parameter class of numbers equivalent indices 
n 0 HK=( Esi  ) (1-0)  
i==1 
(6.3) 
where 0 >0, 01 
In the case, where 0 =2, HK represents the Herfindahl numbers equivalent. This index is 
referred to as the 'numbers equivalent' index. High values of 0 imply greater weights to the 
largest firms in the distribution and lower values emphasise the presence of smaller firms. Thus, 
when 9 =0, HK=N, so that only numbers matter, while as 0 —>., HK tends to the reciprocal 
of the largest firm's share. In summary, for a given value of 0 , HK indicates the number of 
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firms with equal sizes which would record the same level of concentration. Therefore, HK is an 
inverse measure of concentration. 
6.2.2.4 	The Entropy Index 
Entropy (E), is a term in physics and used as a measure of the unavailable energy in a closed 
thermodynamic system. In market share terms, it uses the same information as the H-index but 
in a complicated form. The most simple first-order entropy is defined as 
log (E) = —
1 
 log(1/ ) 	 (6.4) 
i= 
With equal sized firms, si=1/N for all i and E=-N(1/N)log(1/N)=log N, if firms are very 
unequal in size, E will tend to zero. Therefore, E is related to both dimensions of 
concentration. Low values of E represent high concentration. An advantage of this measure is 
that for the analysis of concentration with distinct sub-groups of firms, it can be decomposed 
into components for within and between sub-groups. 
6.2.2.5 	Comparing Concentration Indices 
Some economists argue that although measures of concentration differ widely, most of the 
more respectable indices, e.g. concentration-ratio, H and E, provide similar results in empirical 
studies. These concentration indices are highly correlated and they yield similar ranking of 
industries. However, some authors reject this argument, showing different concentration 
measures yield different results. Various criteria have been suggested in literature on which to 
base the choice of concentration measure. Davies (1979) suggests that different concentration 
indices can be compared by investigating the shape of 'iso-concentration curves'. Hannah and 
Kay (1977) present a list of axioms that a concentration measure should satisfy. Sometimes 
researchers have to rely on the availability of data. The Herfuidahl index is considered in the 
main part of analysis as it is theoretically derived from our models. For comparison, the four-
firm concentration ratio is also used in some of the empirical testings. 
89 
Chapter 6: Variables With Measures, Data Base And Estimation Techniques 
The H-index from the grouped data is found with the following steps. The mean share 
per firm in each group is calculated before squaring this figure and multiplying by the number 
of firms (usually four) in each group. Summing these values over all groups in an industry gives 
the industry Herfindahl index, H. This tends to give a smaller value of the H index than is found 
by taking separate shares for each firm. 
The four-firm concentration ratio (CR4) = turnover of top four firms/total turnover 
6.2.3 Conjectural Variations Term or Conjectures (CONJ) 
In oligopoly theory, conjectures are an important element in a firm's decision process. There is 
no unique theory or formula in this respect. Studies the focus on some particular markets (eg, 
banking sector, airlines) attempt to infer conjectures by leaving a free parameter which can be 
interpreted as conjectures. In this study we follow a simple approach. Here an indirect estimate 
of conjectures variable is derived from the Cowling and Waterson (1976) model, by 
manipulating the profit maximising condition. This is described below. 
Manipulation of profit-maximisation condition in equation (4.2) yields 
( P- MCi )JP= — qi dP d() _ 	
dPdQ d l)  
P dQ dq i 	p dQik dq, Q ==
-s i (1-1-xviye (6.5) 
where 	is the conjectural variations variable and measures the expected change of output of 
remaining firms with respect to a change in the ith firm's output, and si is the share of the ith 
firm in industry output. This implies that 
vi = - (PCMiE/si) - 1 	 (6.6) 
Elasticity of demand (E) is measured in absolute value, therefore wi = (PCMielsi) - 1. 
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The data are in terms of four-enterprise groups, so an implicit assumption in finding 
industry conjectures here is that all firms within a given four-enterprise-group have the same 
share and conjectures. Aggregating (6.6) over all firms in an industry, an average conjectures 
measure for each industry can be expressed as follows: 
= 	(y/ ) / H =Esi2RPCMielsi) - 11/H 	 (6.7) 
i.1 
The difference between this measure of conjectures and that of other studies is that here an 
industry instead of a firm, is considered as a unit. For this cross-industry study, an industry 
measure is more appropriate than using a firm measure. 
The estimates of conjectures are not restricted for this study to any specific type, which 
implies they correspond to any behavioural mode with values of ly varying between -1 and 
IV IS -1 when firms assume their output has no effect on market output as with perfect 
competition, it is zero for the case of Cournot oligopoly and is (1/H - 1) for the case of implicit 
collusion. For our analysis we use (1+ yt ). CONJ as the estimate of conjectures. 
Some limitations of this conjectures variable are worth mentioning at this point: 
Firstly, the average industry conjectures measure is derived from three factors: 
i) PCMi( firms' price-cost margin) 
ii)c (elasticity of demand) 
si or H (firm's share or concentration) 
To measure conjectures, a representative firm's profit is considered from each four-enterprise 
group. There could be spurious relationship between the conjectures measure and industry 
price-cost margin. as any error terms in these variables (viz, industry price-cost margin, 
concentration and conjectures) mightl be correlated by construction. 
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The nature of the data and applied econometric techniques used in the study should be 
considered in interpreting the likely impact of any spurious relationship on the findings.' Firstly 
an indirect measure of conjectures is derived here using the most disaggregated data at the 
four-digit ASIC class level available for four-enterprise group. This data set is rich in the sense 
as the enterprise (firm) size grouping is done at the level of four-enterprise group for all firms 
within an industry. So it is possible to incorporate the interaction among the firms (within 
four-enterprise group) in an 'industry. Calculations based on equation 6.6 may be correlated 
with errors in right-hand-side variables. Yet, the average value from equation 6.7 may be 
unrelated to errors in the average values of the right-hand-side variables. 
Secondly, we conduct an indirect test for spurious relationships due to correlation of 
the variables. In chapter 9, a simultaneous equation technique is used to test the same models. 
Estimating the models with the simultaneous technique formally takes care the problem of 
spurious relation among variables. The simultaneous equation estimation techniques are 
described in detail in the later part of this chapter (section 6.4.1.4). This is related to a major 
criticism dealt in literature viz, examining simultaneity bias in explaining the structure-conduct-
performance variables. The findings (Table 9.1, Chapter 9) in that chapter supports that there 
is simultaneity bias in the profit equation in explaining the structure-performance relationship, 
where this simultaneity bias reflects correlated errors in the variables. 
6.2.4 Own Price Elasticity (ELASown) 
The estimates of own price elasticity (c) of demand are obtained from the ORANI data base. 
These estimates correspond to the Australian input-output table and can be more aggregated 
than the ASIC four digit level (which is the level for the other variables in this study)? 
'Alternatively, considering conjectures measure for a different year (say 1977/78) in the regressions may show 
the differences between the regression results. We tried at some stage without much success. Here it is hard to 
conclude that the differences in findings are due to either removal of the spurious relationship or a weak 
relationship in the value of the 'true' conjecture variable over the periods. 
2 The elasticity estimates are taken from Blampied (1985). The ORANI data base is based on 100+ 
commodities, which correspond to the official ABS input-output tables. Estimation of household elasticities 
was done at the level of 15 commodities These values arc then mapped more or less mechanically to the level 
of 100+ commodities. This is reported in Tulpule and Powell (1978). Any errors in the elasticity measures due 
to excessive aggregation will also affect the value of the conjectural variations variable as calculated from 6.6. 
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6.2.5 Capital-Intensity (INVS) 
The census measure of the price-cost margin (the gross profit margin, GPM) includes fixed 
capital costs and returns on capital, so that it may be biased toward capital-intensive industries. 
To include the differences in capital-intensity among industries, a measure of the capital-output 
ratio is added as an explanatory variable for the price-cost margins. The relationship between 
the gross-margin (GPM) and the capital-sales ratio (K/S) using a CES production function can 
be expressed using the following derivation: 
The CES production function with constant returns to scale is 
Q= [aiKP + a2LP] 1 /P, p<1 	 (6.8) 
where Q is output, K and L are capital and labor input respectively, al and a2 are capital and 
labor coefficient and p is the elasticity of substitution. 
For minimum cost, 
w 	r MC = 	. 	 (6.9) 
Now, 
dW af--= a2(Q11-) 1-P 
	
(6.10) 
and 
dIQ / aK= al(Q/K)I -P 	 (6.11) 
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therefore, 
w/r = aQ / aL/aQ / aK, 	 (6.12) 
and 
wUrK = a2(Q/L) -P/ ai(Q/K) -P 
	
(6.13) 
and 
rK/wL = ai(Q/K)-P / a2(Q/L)-P= ai(Q/L)P/ a2(KJQ)P 	 (6.14) 
Therefore, the relationship between marginal and average variable costs here is 
MC = AVC( 1+ a1la2(KJL)P) 	 (6.15) 
(6.16) 
Again, 
AVC = wUQ 	 (6.17) 
Therefore, 
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P – MC rK P – MC , K , GPM = 	+ = 	 
P 	PQ 	P 	PQ 
(6.18) 
In the absence of proper data, the average of investment on sales over seven year period 
(1977/78 to 1984/85) is considered as a proxy for capital-sales ratio.' 
6.2.6 Import Intensity 
In this study, the structural measures (both four-firm concentration ratio and Herfindahl index) 
are not adjusted for trade. Therefore, a variable for foreign competition is included explicitly to 
incorporate the openness of the Australian economy. The variable generally used in empirical 
studies to measure the degree of foreign competition is import intensity. This can be measured 
in two ways: 
1) IMP1 = — , imports as a ratio of domestic sales 	 (6.19) 
where M (imports) = the f.o.b. value of imports for home consumption 
X (exports) = the f.o.b. value of exports 
S (domestic Sales) = TO (industry turnover) +M-X 
2) IMP2 = 	, imports as a ratio of industry turnover (local production) plus imports 
TO + M 
(6.20) 
3 See LAC (1995). 
95 
Chapter 6: Variables With Measures, Data Base And Estimation Techniques 
The first measure is preferred as in its denominator domestic sales is used to express 
the share of imports rather than industry turnover. For empirical analysis, we consider both 
measures of import competition. The empirical findings do not differ materially as between 
these two measures. Marginally better fits are obtained using IMP1 (which is preferred 
theoretically) measure, so these results will be reported. 
6.2.7 Product-Differentiation (CPD) 
In absence of advertising data, a consumer-producer dummy (CPD) is used as a proxy for 
product differentiation. If the proportion of final demand to intermediate demand is greater 
than unity, then the industry is classified as a consumer goods industry. Otherwise it is 
classified as a producer goods industry. CPD is zero for producer goods and one for consumer 
goods industries. 
6.2.8 Stability in Concentration (STABLE) 
A dummy variable is considered to measure the stability of concentration over time, viz. 
STABLE =1 if I H84-H77 13.05, otherwise O. 
6.2.9 Growth in Sales (GROW) 
GROW represents the percentage change in turnover between 1977/78 and 1984/85 i.e. 
GROW=(TO of 1984/85-TO of 1977/78)/TO of 1977/78 	 (6.21) 
4 We consider 0.05 as dividing value as average of 1 H84-H77 1=0.047 
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A few additional variables are considered below which arel not be used in the oligopoly based 
models but will be used in the ad hoc versions of profit and concentration models in Chapters 7 
and 8. 
6.2.10 	Proxies for Entry Barriers 
Economies of scale (MES), cost-disadvantage ratio (CDR) and MESCDR (considers both 
economies of scale and cost disadvantage of small firms) are considered as proxies for barriers 
in ad hoc versions. 
6.2.10.1 	Economies of Scale (MES) 
Scale economy barriers will be greater, the larger is the proportion of industry output supplied 
by a MES firm. In the Australian manufacturing sector, most of the firms are of sub-optimal 
size. To avoid this problem, Phillips calculates MES as the reasonably efficient scale (RES). In 
the study, this measure is considered as the proxy for economies of scale. 
To land RES, the mid point is determined by calculating the cumulative total of value 
added for the various employment size classes, and identifying the size class containing the 
50th percentile of industry value added. The value added of this class is then divided by the 
number of enterprise groups in the class to provide an estimate of the proportion of industry 
output supplied by a reasonably efficient firm. 
6.2.10.2 	Cost Disadvantage Ratio (CDR) 
Cost disadvantage barriers for potential entrants may arise due to a) the control of supply of 
vital raw material by established firms, b) lower prices of raw materials due to bulk buying by 
large established firms, c) efficient management for established large firms. d) the imposition of 
a risk premium by financial markets to small new firms due to the possibility of failure to repay 
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loans. CDR is measured as the average value added per worker in the rest of the firms over the 
average value added per worker in the large firms.' 
6.2.11 Export Intensity (EXP) 
Export-intensity (EXP) is used for the ad hoc version, and measured as exports over domestic 
sales, i.e. EXP = XIS, where 
X (exports) = the f.o.b. value of exports 
S is domestic sales 
6.2.12 Effective Rate of Protection (EFFECT) 
In empirical studies, alternative measures of protection have been used, viz, a) nominal rate of 
protection and b) effective rate of protection. Caves (1976) suggests the effective rate measure 
is more appropriate as it takes into account factors of production and inflation. The effective 
rate (E1-1-, ECT) is used rather than nominal rate as the former considers both final product and 
inputs, so is more pertinent to a study of structure-performance relationships (see Hitiris 
(1978)). Data for E1-1-ECT are available from the Industries Assistance Commission (IAC) at 
the four-digit level.' 
6.3 Data Base and Industry Sample 
In Australia, the Australian Bureau of Statistics (hereafter, ABS) follows the Australian 
Standard Industrial Classification (ASIC). 7 In the manufacturing sector (C-Division) in the 
ASIC, there are 12 two-digit subdivisions, 41 three-digit groups, and 173 four-digit classes.' 
5 Dixon (1987a) uses the reciprocal of this measure as the cost advantage ratio in the concentration equation. 
6 For an explanation of their method of calculations, see IAC, Annual Report, 1986/87 
7 For a detailed description see Australian Standard Industrial Classification, Volume 1, 1983, Catalogue No 
1201.0. 
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The database for most of the variables of the study has been supplied on magnetic tape 
by the Australian Bureau of Statistics for the manufacturing enterprises classified by industry at 
the ASIC four-digit level for the 1977/78 and 1984/85 financial years. 
There are some limitations to the data set, which should be mentioned. Firstly, single 
establishment enterprises which employed less than four persons (including working 
proprietors) are excluded. It is argued that they contribute an insignificant portion for the totals 
for turnover, employment, wages and salaries, etc. for the manufacturing sector as a whole. 
However, although their contribution to totals may not be large, they represent a significant 
portion of the total number of firms. The truncated size distributions may in some cases give a 
distorted picture of industry structure. It should be remembered that the statistical analyses in 
this study do not consider small enterprises. 
Secondly, to preserve confidentiality the ABS supplied all information in the magnetic 
tape not in terms of individual enterprise but for four enterprise group. For the purpose of the 
study, the totals for each data item have been divided by the number of enterprise (usually four) 
wherever it is needed. 
The data items which are available from the magnetic tape (Catalogue number 8113.0) 
are turnover (TO), opening stocks (OS), closing stocks (OC), purchases and selected expenses 
(P&E), rent and leasing expenses (R&L), depreciation on land and buildings (DLB), 
depreciation on other assets (mainly plant and equipment (DPE)), net capital expenditure on 
land and building (KLB), net capital expenditure on plant and equipment (KPE), wages and 
salaries paid (W&S), employment of males (EM), employment of females (EF). 9 
The development of an appropriate database required use of other sources for some of 
the variables. Missing data and concordance problems among the different sources of data 
8Theoretically meaningful industries implies the grouping of firms producing outputs among whom high cross 
elasticities of demand or supply exists. It is important to note that industry classification sometime excludes 
some substitutable products and includes products unrelated in demand. The effect of aggregation bias on the 
structure-conduct-performance relationships is considered in Chapter 7, section 7.3.4. 
9 Here the description of the data series is given in detail because this is an unpublished series and will be used 
for most of the variables. For other sources see Appendix IA. 
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reduces the number of industries in the sample to 102. Description of industries is given in 
Appendix H. 
Appendix IA describes the sources and measures of variables used in the study and a 
table with descriptive statistics of all variables is presented in Appendix TB. 
6.4 Statistical Estimation Techniques and Diagnostic Tests 
In the following section, the discussion on estimation techniques and diagnostic tests used in 
this study is covered. 
6.4.1 Simultaneity 
In most cases the ordinary least squares (OLS) method is used to estimate the models. 
However, the existence of simultaneity among structural variables is examined for the models. 
There are several econometric techniques in the literature to examine simultaneous equation 
systems. To clarify, the single and simultaneous equation systems are discussed briefly 
indicating the difference between estimation methods. In the following section, the differences 
between single and simultaneous equation approaches are discussed 
6.4.1.1 The Single Equation Model. 
In a linear multiple regression model 
Yi = ao + aiXi i+a2X2i+... + a nXni + ui 	 (6.22) 
where Yi is dependent variable, Xi's are independent variables, ao is the intercept, ai's are slope 
coefficients and ui is the disturbance term. 
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The crucial assumption is that the variables are independent of the disturbance term. 
Here, Xi's determine Yi. There is a one way relationship between the Xi's and Yi and no 
feedback effect exists. The OLS estimators produce unbiased and efficient estimates of the 
parameters, subject to the errors in equation (6.22) being identically and independently 
distributed random errors. 
6.4.1.2 	The Simultaneous Equations Model 
The following functional relationships can be considered as an example of a simple 
simultaneous equation model with two equations 
Y1 1= al ° +al 1Y21 b1IX1i+b12X2i+ b13X31+u11 
	 (6.23) 
and 
"2F- a20 a21Yli b21X11+ b22X2i÷ u2i 
	 (6.24) 
where, Y's are the endogenous variables; X's are the exogenous variables; ai's, bi's are the 
structural parameters and ui's are disturbance terms. 
In a simultaneous equation model, there are two types of variables, endogenous and 
exogenous. Endogenous variables (Y's) are determined by the simultaneous interaction of the 
relations in the model, and the exogenous (or predetermined) variables (X' s) are determined 
outside the model. Here there is interdependence between Y2i and Y1 1. The exogenous 
variables are assumed to be uncorrelated with the residuals ui's, but some correlation exists 
between the endogenous variables and the residuals. In this simultaneous equation system, the 
OLS estimator (based on a single equation approach) results in biased and inconsistent 
estimates of the structural parameters. 
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6.4.1.3 	Identification Problem 
It is not always possible to estimate the parameters of the structural equation from the reduced 
form. The problem whether the parameters of the structural equation can be found from the 
reduced form is called the identification problem. Once a structural equation system has been 
specified, the next step is to find whether the parameters are identified or not. After 
considering the identification problem, the next step is to choose a suitable estimation 
technique. The choice of estimation technique is quite important if there is more than one way 
to estimate the parameters given the reduced form. An equation is unidentified if there is no 
way of estimating all the structural parameters from the reduced form. An equation is 
identified if it is possible to find values of parameters from the reduced form of the system of 
equations. An equation is exactly identified if a unique parameter value exists and over 
identified if more than one value is obtained for the same parameter. It is quite possible, within 
a system of equations, that some equations are identified while some others are not. 
A necessary condition (Order Condition) for identification for an equation is that the 
number of all variables excluded from the equation be greater than or equal to the number of 
endogenous variables in the model less one. According to Gujarati (1995) 
'In a model of m simultaneous equations in order for an equation to be identified, the number 
of predetermined variables excluded from the equation must not be less than the number of 
endogenous variables included in that equation less 1, i.e. (1995, p 665). 
The sufficient condition (Rank Condition) for identification is that in a system of 
equations, any equation is identified if and only if it is possible to construct at least one non-
zero determinant of order (the number of equations in the system less one) from that particular 
equation!' According to Gujarati (1995) 
In a model containing M equations in M endogenous variables, an equation is identified if and 
only if at least one non-zero determinant of order (M-1)(M-1) can be constructed from the 
1°  The rank and order condition for the profit, concentration and conjecture model are checked in Chapter 9. 
102 
Chapter 6: Variables With Measures, Data Base And Estimation Techniques 
coefficients of the variables (both endogenous and predetermined) excluded from that 
particular equation, but included in the other equations of the model' (1995, p 667). 
6.4.1.4 	Estimation Techniques for the Simultaneous Equations Model 
There are two different methods of estimation for simultaneous equation models, viz, single 
equation methods (alternatively called limited estimation technique) and simultaneous 
(multiple) equation methods. 
In the single equation method, each equation is estimated separately considering 
information about the restrictions on the coefficient of that particular equation. The restrictions 
on the coefficients of the other equation are not considered. Commonly used single equation 
methods are instrumental variable technique (IV), two-stage least squares (2SLS), indirect 
least squares (ILS) and limited information maximum likelihood (LIML). 
In multiple equation methods, all equations are considered simultaneously. Commonly 
used methods are full-information maximum likelihood method (FIML) and three-stage least 
squares (3SLS). 
Two-stage least squares provides an estimation procedure to obtain the values of the 
structural parameters and is used frequently in an over identified system." It uses the 
information available from the specification of a system of equations to obtain a unique 
estimate of each structural parameter. In the 2SLS, the exogenous variables, uncorrelated with 
the residuals are substituted for the endogenous variables. Estimates of the structural 
parameters are consistent.' 
An estimation procedure, frequently used in empirical studies is three stage least 
squares, a method applicable to all equations of a system and gives estimates of all parameters 
11 Both for exactly and over identified system, the 2SLS and the IV technique yield equivalent parameter 
estimates for proof see Johnston (1972) section 13.2. 
12 Intuitively, the first stage of the 2SLS creates an instrument, and the second stage involves a variant of the 
IV estimation. 
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simultaneously. In 3SLS estimation, each equation is estimated with 2SLS. In the first stage, 
the reduced-form of the system is estimated. The fitted values of the endogenous variables are 
used to obtain 2SLS estimates for all equations in the system. Once the 2SLS parameters have 
been calculated, the residuals of each equation are used to estimate the cross-section variances 
and covariances. In the third stage, generalised least-squares parameter estimates are obtained. 
The 3SLS procedure can be shown to yield more efficient parameter estimates than 2SLS as it 
considers cross-equation correlation. For the 3SLS method, both the variables and their 
mathematical form are important in each equation. The random term of each equation should 
be serially independent and the random variables of the various relations of the system are 
contemporaneously dependent. If the random variables of the various relations are 
independent, the 3SLS reduces to 2SLS. Thus if one is not sure regarding the accuracy of the 
specification of the model and if it seems that the u's (random variables) are not serially 
interdependent, then it is preferable to use 2SLS instead of 3SLS for estimating the parameters 
of a simultaneous equation system. 
From the above discussion, it is clear that the estimation methods are different for the 
two approaches (viz, the single and the multiple equation approach). In practice, single 
equation methods are widely used particularly the IV, 2SLS techniques. The 2SLS and 3SLS 
techniques are used in the empirical analysis. 
6.4.2 Diagnostic Tests Used in the Models 
For any classical linear regression model (CLRM) like equation (6.22) the OLS estimators are 
best linear unbiased estimators (BLUE) with the following assumptions 
a) Zero mean value of disturbance ui 
i.e. E(u1) = 0, for all i. 
Violation of this restriction yields biased estimates of the constant term. 
b) Constant variance of ui 
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i.e. var(ui) = o2, for all i. 
Violation of this restriction implies heteroscadasticity in disturbances, so that estimates are not 
efficient. 
c) The regression model is correctly specified. Violation leads to biased estimates if 
omitted variables are correlated with included explanatory variables. 
d) No perfect multicollinearity exists among the explanatory variables. Violation means 
the data matrix is singular and no estimates can be calculated. 
e) Zero covariance between ui and Xi, i.e. Xi is nonstochastic. 
i.e. cov(ui,Xi) = 0 
Violation of this restriction causes simultaneity problem." 
0 
	
No autocorrelation between the disturbances. 
i.e. cov(u . u.) = 0, for i#j 
In the analysis, the presence of heteroscadasticity, specification error (if any) and the 
possibility of multicollinearity will be checked for the final version of each model, a brief 
theoretical discussion of these issues would be useful. The violation of restriction (e) is 
examined separately in Chapter 9. Autocorrelation is not relevant to cross-sectional analysis. 
6.4.2.1 	Heteroscedasticity 
An important assumption of the CLRM is that the variance of each disturbance term ui is 
constant. The problem of heteroscedasticity is common for cross sectional studies. In cross 
sectional data, heteroscedasticity can exist due to variation in size. In the presence of 
heteroscedasticity, parameter estimates are unbiased but no longer efficient (i.e., with minimum 
variance). In the heteroscedastic situation, what is clearly required is a method of weighting the 
13 Note violation of c) may lead to cOv(ui,ui) #0. 
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observations according to their relative importance regarding the information they convey 
about the true relationship. 
It is clearly important to detect the presence of heteroscedasticity to get efficient 
estimates of the parameters. There are several diagnostic tests available e.g. Goldfeld and 
Quandt (1972), Breusch-Pagan- Godfrey (1979 and 1978), Park (1966) and White (1980). The 
Goldfeld and Quandt test imposes a formal structure on the nature of heteroscedasticity and 
requires reordering the observations with respect to the variable that supposedly caused, 
heteroscalasticity. Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test is sensitive to the normality assumption. In the 
final version of each model, White's heteroscedasticy test is performed (as Shazam 7.0 
computer program considers this test). 
In a linear multiple regression model: 
Yi = ao + a Xii+a2X20-. a3X3i + ui 	 (6.25) 
The White test proceeds as follows: 
a) The residuals u, of regression (6.25) are obtained 
b) An auxiliary regression is considered regressing u 1 2 on the original value of regressors, 
squared values of regressors and the cross product (s) of regressors. i.e. 
Ui2=KO+K 1 X I ii-K2X2 i-FK3X3i-I-1(4X2 I  j+K5X22i+1(6X23i+K7X iX2i+x8X1iX3i+K9X2iX3i+vi 
(6.26) 
c) The x2 statistic is obtained as n*R2 (where n is sample size and R2 is obtained from the 
auxiliary regression). Null hypothesis is there is no heteroscedasticity 
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and n*R2— xdf2 asy 
where the degrees of freedom are the number of regressors in the auxiliary equation except 
constant term, i.e. in our example the degrees of freedom are 9. If the value obtained from test 
statistics is greater than critical value, the null hypothesis should be rejected, and there is 
heteroscedasticity. 
6.4.2.2 	The Rarnsey's Regression Specification Error Test (RESET) 
The proper functional form of a model is also important in estimating consistent parameters. 
Economic theory may provide predictions for the signs of the estimated parameters, but often 
does not provide a specific functional form of a model. Here, a widely used test, viz. RESET 
test by Ramsey (1969) is considered to identify specification error in the model." 
Suppose the original model is 
Yi = a I-FEakXki+ui 	 (6.27) 
Step 1: 	Obtain the estimated Y, i.e. Y (tiat) 
Step 2: 	Rerun (6.27) with the powers of predicted values of the original regression as 
additional regressors. 
Yi al-FIakXki+ Ebi(Y 1 )1+ui 	 (6.28) 
usually, j=2. ..r,. The null hypothesis, i.e. there is no specification error, i.e. b2=...=b r=0 is 
tested using F-test: 
where F---= 
(1 — R2NEW ) / (n — number of parameters in the new model ) 
14 A good summary of specification tests can be found McAleer (1986). 
( R NEW — RLD / number of newregreeors 
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Step 3: 	If the computed FF(x,p,q , where p=number of new regressors, q=n-number of 
parameters in the new model, then the conclusion can be drawn that the model is mis-specified. 
6.4.2.3 	Multicollinearity 
Observations on economic variables are not generated under controlled experiments like 
physical science. As a result, there is always some general interrelation between the 
explanatory variables. An important assumption of the CLRM is that no exact or perfect 
relationships exist between explanatory variables. For practical purposes, multicollinearity as 
less than perfect is considered, i.e. explanatory variables are highly collinear. In this situation 
OLS estimates have larger standard errors and low t-ratios, so that they can not be estimated 
with great precision. Since multicollinearity is a sample phenomenon, there is no formal 
method of testing its strength (see Kmenta (1986, pp 431)). 
i) Examining Partial Correlations 
Farrar and Glauber (1967) use partial correlation coefficients. However, this method is 
criticised by O'Hagan and McCabe (1975). 
ii) Auxiliary Regressions, Klien's Rule of Thumb 
According to Klein (1962) test, regress each independent variable against all other independent 
variables. These are called auxiliary regressions. Find the R 21 for each auxiliary regressions. 
Compare R2 i with the R2 of the original regression, i.e. Y on X's. If R2 i is greater than R2 , 
multicollinearity exists. 
6.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter measures of variables with a description of the data base are presented. Also the 
estimation techniques with econometric tests applied in the analysis are described. The next 
task is to present the empirical findings from the profits, concentration and conjectures models. 
This is done in Chapter 7 and 8. In the next chapter, fmdings from the profit models (with 
different versions) are explained. 
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THE PROFIT MODELS: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
7.1 Introduction 
The theoretical derivation of profit models is presented in Chapter 4. In this chapter the 
findings from estimating these profit models are considered. First, findings from the short-run 
equilibrium profit model are considered with different versions. In this respect, section 7.2 
compares the findings between the linear and logarithmic functional forms. In section 7.3, the 
importance of major criticisms against the structure-conduct-performance studies are examined 
with the logarithmic version of the profit model. Section 7.4 firstly, examines how the profit-
concentration relationship may differ between consumer and producer goods industries. 
Secondly, the findings from the final version of the profit model are compared with an ad hoc 
version (both are in the logarithmic functional form). 
In section 7.5, findings from the disequilibrium model (in both the linear and 
logarithmic functional form) are considered. Here, the annual rate of adjustment of profit 
(towards its equilibrium) is calculated for the seven-year period. Finally, section 7.6 adds some 
concluding remarks. 
7.2 Empirical Results of the Short-run Equilibrium Profit Model 
To compare the findings, the equilibrium profit model is estimated in two functional forms: i) 
all variables are in linear form and all variables except CPD are in logarithm form. The 
equation numbers from Chapter 4 are noted in the discussion. In Table 7.1, column 1 and 2 
show the results of the profit model with linear (equation 4.26') and logarithmic (equation 
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4.26) functional form, respectively. All variables have the expected sign, except CPD which is 
insignificant in both cases.' 
Table 7.1: Results of the Profit Model, 1984/85 
Independent 
Variables 
Linear Functional Form 
(Equation Number 4.26') 
Logarithmic Functional Form 
(Equation Number 4.26) 
H 0.053 0.266a 
(0.82) (2.95) 
ELASown -0.020c -0.330a 
(1.57) (3.46) 
CONJ 0.003a 0.286a 
(3.78) (3.16) 
CPD -0.004 -0.018 
(0.68) (1.04) 
IMP1 -0.004 -0.015 
(0.32) (1.22) 
1NVS 0.767a 0.073b 
(4.33) (1.84) 
Intercept 0.108 -0.590 
R2(adjusted) 0.195 0.362 
F-Ratio 4.82a 10.55a 
RESET(3)(d) 0.457 5.78a 
Note: Gross margin on sales (GPMTO) as the dependent variable. 
For Column 2. except CPI) all variables are in logarithmic functional form. 
Figures in parentheses are White's heteroscedastic consistent t-ratios. 
F value at (6, 95) degrees of freedom is 2.96 at the 0.01 level for F-test. 
a Indicates coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level using a one-tailed t-test. 
b Indicates coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level using a one-tailed t-test. 
c Indicates coefficient is significant at the 0.1 level using a one-tailed t-test. 
(d) Ramsey's regression specification test statistic follows F distribution where critical F is F0.01,3,92= 3 .95 - 
The coefficient of H-index is positive in both cases, but significant at the one percent level only 
with the logarithmic functional form profit model. ELAS own is significant at the ten percent 
level for the linear functional form and at the one percent level for the logarithmic functional 
form with expected negative sign. The coefficient of CONJ is positive and significant at the 
one percent level in both cases. IMP1 is negative and insignificant.' INVS is positive and 
Phillips (1978) also finds an insignificant negative relationship between price-cost margins and CPD for the 
sales based measure of profit (1978, pp309). 
2 Ratnayke (1990) findings also emphases that trade variables are insignificant in explaining profits of 
Australian manufacturing industries, possibly due to the lack of international integration. 
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significant at the one percent level for the linear functional form model and significant at the 
five percent level for the logarithmic functional form model. The logarithmic functional form is 
used for further analysis in section 7.3 and section 7•4• 3 
The standard diagnostic tests are performed for the profit model for both the linear and 
logarithmic functional form. From Table 7.1, we can conclude that standard RESET 
specification test rejects the null hypothesis that there is no specification error in the model for 
the logarithmic specification.' The multicollinearity problem has been checked using the 
auxiliary equation approach, discussed in section 6.4.2.3. There is no evidence of 
multicollinearity in general. Also Tables 7.2 and 7.3 provide the correlation matrix of the 
variables for the linear (equation 4.26') and logarithmic (equation 4.26) functional form model, 
respectively. 
Table 7.2: Correlation Matrix of Variables for the Profit Model in Linear Functional Form 
Variables GPMTO H ELASown CPD IMP1 CONJ INVS 
GPMTO 1.000 
H 0.190 1.000 
ELASown -0.064 -0.052 1.000 
CPD -0.124 -0.169 -0.002 1.000 
IMP I -0.136 - 0.026 0.264 0.084 1.000 
CONJ 0.122 -0.235 0.430 -0.009 0.138 1.000 
INVS 0.446 0.339 -0.016 -0.107 -0.226 -0.034 1.000 
3 Also the logarithmic functional form is preferred theoretically. 
4 Although the RESET test for the logarithmic specification of the disequilibrium version is not significant and 
shows no specification error in the model, see Table 7.11. 
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Table 7.3: Correlation Matrix of Variables for the Profit Model in Logarithmic Functional 
Form 
Variables GPMTO H ELASown CPD IMP1 CONJ INVS 
GPMTO 1.000 
H 0.164 1.000 
ELASown -0.066 -0.056 1.000 
CPD -0.154 -0.135 -0.053 1.000 
IMP1 -0.133 0.018 0.192 0.052 1.000 
CONJ 0.090 -0.601 0.719 0.012 0.147 1.000 
INVS 0.408 0.342 -0.009 -0.139 -0.309 -0.069 1.000 
Note: Except CPD all variables are in logarithmic functional form. 
7.3 	Testing the Major Criticisms against the Structure-Conduct- 
Performance Studies 
In Chapter 2, the major criticisms against the existing structure-conduct-performance literature 
are discussed, and it is noted that conceptual problems and statistical error may obscure 
relationships among the structure-conduct-performance variables. Estimates of the profit 
model with the logarithmic functional form between the gross margin and the variables on the 
R.H.S. of equation (4.26) obtained through application of the ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression are unbiased and efficient only if strict assumptions hold for a disturbance term 
added to the R.H.S. These assumptions can be invalidated by any of the following problems: 
i) the omission of relevant explanatory variables, 
ii) measurement errors 
aggregation bias in data set 
iv) simultaneous causality' 
v) mis-specification due to the functional form of the modeP 
5 Simultaneous causality is considered in Chapter 9. 
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These possible problems are examined below with the data. 
7.3.1 Problem Due to the Omission of Relevant Explanatory Variables 
The results in Table 7.4 show the estimated effects of explanatory variables on the gross profit 
margin on sales (GPMTO). The logarithmic functional form profit model is taken into account. 
Results are presented with five separate regressions, so that the effect of omitting relevant 
variables from the regression analysis can be examined. 
In regression 1 of Table 7.4, only H is considered as an explanatory variable. H is 
positive and significant at the five percent level and the adjusted R2 is 0.017. Regression 2 
presents results for the Cowling-Waterson model with Cournot behaviour, i.e. when CONJ---.0, 
PCM=WELAS own ,a special case of equation (4.4). The coefficients of H and ELASown are 
with proper signs, while only H is significant at the five percent level. The adjusted R 2 is 
0.010. In regression 3, the results of the simple profit model are shown, which is represented 
by equation (4.4). All variables are with expected signs and significant at the one percent 
levels. The adjusted R 2 is 0.326. In regression 4, the results of the profit model with 
heterogeneous products are shown, which is represented in equation (4.18). Except CPD, all 
variables are with expected signs and significant at the one percent level. The adjusted R 2 is 
0.343. Finally, regression 5 represents the final version of profit model represented in equation 
(4.26). Except CPD (which is insignificant again), all other variables have the expected sign. H, 
ELASown and CONJ are significant at the one percent level, while INVS is significant at the 
five percent level. The adjusted R 2 is 0.362. 
The results in Table 7.4 suggest that the omission of relevant explanatory variables is 
important to the specification and testing of the structure-conduct-performance relationships in 
Australian manufacturing. The magnitude and statistical significance of the 
°This is discussed in previous section. 
113 
Table 7.4: Results of the Effects of Adding Relevant Explanatory Variables on Profit-Concentration Relationship, 1984/85 
Equation 
Number 
Intercept H ELASown CONJ CPD INIP1 INVS R2(adjusted 
) 
F-ratio 
1. -0.845 0.055b - - - - - 0.017 - 
(1.79) 
2. -0.856 0.054b -0.020 - - - - 0.010 -  
(1.74) (0.59) 
i 
3. -0.661 0.314a -0.368a 0.317a - - - 0.326 - 
(3.60) (3.92) (3.53) 
4. -0.649 0.310a -0.373a 0.321a -0.023c - - 0.343 - 
(3.37) (3.74) (3.33) (1.33) 
5. -0.590 0.266a -0.330a 0.286a -0.018 -0.015 0•073b 0.362 10.55(d) 
(2.95) (3.46) (3.16) (1.04) (1.22) (1.84) 
Note : 	as the dependent variable.  
Except CPD, all variables are in logarithmic functional form. 
Figures in parentheses are White's heteroscedastic consistent t-ratios. 
a Indicates coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level using a one-tailed t-test. 
b Indicates coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level using a one-tailed t-test. 
c Indicates coefficient is significant at the 0.10 level using a one -tailed t -test. 
(d) F (6, 95) is 2.96 at the 0.01 level. 
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estimated coefficient of the concentration variable depends on the set of included variables. 
The magnitude and t-ratio of concentration in explaining profit variation across industries is 
greatest for the simple model, regression 3, that is based directly on the Cowling and Waterson 
(1976) analysis with different conjecturess. 
A weakness with the results for the Cowling and Waterson analysis is that the 
estimated coefficients are each significantly different from the expected unitary value. The 
estimated coefficients in regression 3 of Table 7.4 are each substantially less than the unitary 
value predicted by the Cowling and Waterson (1976) analysis. Further the value of the adjusted 
R2 is low. While the adjusted R2 value increases with the addition of explanatory variables 
suggested by extensions to the simple model, it is still only 0.362 suggesting the possibility of 
further omitted variables. Further extension of the model seems warranted to capture 
additional influences on industry-level profitability. 
7.3.2 Measurement Error 
Cross-section studies also fail to be persuasive due to the measurement error. 
Measurement error in explanatory variables has been well recognised in the structure-conduct-
performance studies as a potential source of downward bias in estimates. Due to limited data 
availability, there is not much scope to measure all explanatory variables differently. However, 
the effect of measurement errors in key variables is examined with the profit and model. The 
equation (4.26). is re-estimated with alternative measures of profit and concentration 
separately. 
7.3.2.1 Alternative Measures of Profits 
Conyon and Machin (1991) suggest that measurement error in the dependent variable may lead 
to downward bias in the estimated effect of concentration on profitability.' They find that, with 
7 Phillips (1978) also finds different profit-concentration relationships using alternative measures of profits for 
Australian manufacturing, discussed in Chapter 2. 
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U.K. manufacturing data, a positive relationship exists between concentration and profitability 
when the profit margin is deflated by value added, instead of sales.' 
The two columns of Table 7.5 show the results using the ratio of gross profits to sales 
(GPMTO) and gross profits to value added (GPMVA) as the dependent variable. All variables 
have the same sign as the profit model with GPMTO as the measure of profits. CPD is still 
opposite to the expected sign and insignificant. The significance level of ELAS own and CONJ 
coefficients is lower and INVS coefficient becomes insignificant. Also IMP1 is now significant 
at the one percent level. 
Table 7.5: Results of the Profit Model with Alternative Measures of Profits, 1984/85 
Dependent 
Variable 
GPMTO GPMVA 
H 0.266a 0.217a 
(2.95) (2.72) 
ELASown -0.330a -0.174b 
(3.46) (2.12) 
CONJ 0.286a 0.130b 
(3.16) (1.73) 
CPD -0.018 -0.005 
(1.04) (0.27) 
IMP1 -0.015 -0.043a 
(1.22) (3.06) 
INVS 0.073b 0.008 
(1.84) (0.15) 
Intercept -0.590 -0.326 
R2(adjusted) 0.362 0.186 
Note: All variables except CPD are in logarithmic functional form and results are for 
equation (4.26). 
Figures in parentheses are White's heteroscedastic consistent t-ratios. 
a Indicates coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level using a one-tailed t-test. 
b Indicates coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level using a one-tailed t-test. 
8 Profits on sales does not take proper account of differences in the degree of vertical integration across 
industries. 
116 
Chapter 7: The Profit Models: Empirical Findings 
The adjusted R2 decreases to 0.186 using GPMVA as the measure of profitability 
from 0.362 using GPMTO as the profit measure. The results are stronger with GPMTO as the 
dependent variable. However, the results for the GPMVA measure more closely fit the 
predictions of the oligopoly model. The IMP1 variable is significant with predicted negative 
coefficient with the GPMVA measure. The findings support the importance of the choice of 
profit measure in explaining the profit-concentration relationship in Australian manufacturing. 
	
7.3.2.2 	Alternative Measures of Concentration 
Although theoretically, the H-index is a proper measure of concentration for the hypothesised 
profit model, here the four-firm concentration ratio (CR4) is used as an alternative 
concentration index. In Table 7.6 column 1 and 2 shows the regression results using H-index 
and CR4 respectively, as alternative measures of concentration. The concentration coefficient 
is still positive, but looses its significance with CR4 measure. ELAS own, CONJ and INVS are 
with expected signs in both cases. The coefficients of ELAS own, CONJ are significant at the 
one percent level for both measures, while INVS coefficient has increased its significance at 
the one percent (from the five percent) level with the CR4 measure. IMP1 coefficient is with 
positive sign but still insignificant (like using H-index measure) with CR4 measure. R 2 
(adjusted) is also higher 0.362 when H-index is considered compared to 0.200 with CR4. The 
findings again reflect the importance of measurement errors in explaining the SCP 
relationships. Most importantly, concentration is no longer a significant factor in explaining 
profits when CR4 is used as an index of structure instead of H-index. 
7.3.2.3 	Problem Due to the Aggregation Bias in Data Set 
An implicit assumption of various structure-profitability hypotheses is that the industries are 
economically meaningful. Although the data set is at the ASIC four-digit level, the most dis- 
aggregated level available for the Australian industries, the industry classification 
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Table 7.6: Results of the Profit Model with Alternative Measures of Concentration, 1984/85 
Column 1 Column 2 
H 0.266a - 
(2.95) 
CR4 - 0.010 
(1.10) 
ELASown -0.330a -0.118a 
(3.46) (2.76) 
CONJ 0.286a 0.091a 
(3.16) (3.91) 
CPD -0.018 -0.024 
(1.04) (1.15) 
IMP1 -0.015 0.005 
(1.22) (0.38) 
INVS 0.073b 0.178a 
(1.84) (4.11) 
Intercept -0.590 -0.633 
R2(adjusted) 0.362 0.200 
Note: GPMTO as the dependent variable 
Except CPD, all variables are in logarithmic form. 
Figures in parentheses are White's heteroscedastic consistent t-ratios. 
a Indicates coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level using a one-tailed t-test. 
b Indicates coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level using a one-tailed t-test. 
may not represent the boundaries of economically meaningful markets.' Also, the Cowling-
Waterson type oligopoly equilibrium models assume each firm operates at its expected market 
share. But in reality, actual share deviates from expected share. Bloch (1994), with Canadian 
data, suggests limiting samples to industries with low values of coefficient of variation of firm 
size, which can be used as a proxy measure of both aggregation and disequilibrium (for 
derivation see Bloch (1994, pp 77-81)). 
Following Bloch (1981,1994) the coefficient of variation of firm size is used as a 
measure of market aggregation.' In order to investigate the relationship among profitability, 
9 The four-digit data could be far from ideal as these assume industries are serving in the national market only. 
In reality, for many products there exists a regional market rather than a national one. 
1° The squared coefficient of variation of firm size is calculated using the formula: Vx = [N 2(N-1)][H-1/N]; 
where Vx is coefficient of variation of firm size, N is number of firms and H is industry Herfindahl index. 
Dividing the full sample of 58 industries into four groups according to their lowest value of variance of relative 
firm size Bloch (1981) finds the effect of concentration on profitability is strongly significant for the sub sample 
where the variance of relative firm size is lowest. Bloch (1994) ranks the industries with various sub samples 
and shows the results for the smallest sub samples are least affected by aggregation bias (Table 2, pp 80). 
118 
Chapter 7: The Profit Models: Empirical Findings 
concentration and other variables, the model is re-estimated with 102 industries where 
industries are ranked according to the lowest value of the coefficient of variation of firm size 
and divided into four sub samples of approximately equal size. Table 7.7 presents the results of 
full sample and four sub samples (Class I to IV). 
Both profit measures, viz. GPMTO and GPMVA are used here. The results show the 
effect of the coefficient of variation of firm size on profit-concentration relationship. For both 
profit measures, concentration coefficients and corresponding t-ratios are largest for the sub 
sample with lowest value of coefficient of variation of firm size. The estimated coefficient of 
concentration for the GPMTO regression in the sub sample with lowest coefficient of variation 
of firm size is more than three times as large as the corresponding coefficient for the full 
sample. Also for the GPMVA regression in the sub sample with lowest coefficient of variation 
of firm size, the estimated coefficient of concentration is nearly three times as large as the 
corresponding coefficient for the full sample. On the other hand, for both profit measures, 
concentration coefficients and corresponding t-ratios are lowest for the sub sample with 
highest value of coefficient of variation of firm size. For all sub samples, significant explanatory 
variables (except CPD) have coefficients that are correctly signed and similar to the results of 
full sample. 
It is important to note that the magnitudes of coefficients for the lowest variance sub 
sample confirm exactly to Cowling-Waterson model. As using joint test for coefficients we 
found F statistic = 0.196 (using GPMTO as the dependent variable) and 3.44 (using GPMVA 
as the dependent variable. In both cases we cannot reject the hypothesis as F0.01,3 . 18 = 5.09 is 
the critical value. Therefore the prediction that H and CONJ coefficients are equal to 1 and 
ELASowN equal to -1 cannot be rejected. 
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Table 7.7: Regression Results with the Sub Samples of Industries with 
Lowest Coefficient of Variation of Firm size, 1984/85 
Dependent 
Variable  
Intercept H ELASown CONJ CPD IIVIP1 INVS R2 
(adjusted) 
No. of 
Industries 
Full Sample of Industries 
GPMTO -0.590 0.266a 
(2.95) 
-0.330a 
(3.46) 
0.286a 
(3.16) 
-0.018 
(1.04) 
-0.015 
(1.22) 
0•073b 
(1.84) 
0.362 102 
GPMVA -0.326 0.217a 
(2.72) 
-0.174b 
(2.12) 
0.130b 
( 1 . 73 ) 
-0.005 
(0.27) 
-0.043a 
(3.06) 
0.008 
(0.15) 
0.186 102 
Class I : Sub Sample with Lowest Coefficient of a Variation of Firm Size 
GPMTO -0.065 0.938a 
(7.96) 
-0.913a 
(6.05) 
0.940a 
(7.56) 
-0.087a 
(2.89) 
0.007 
(0.28) 
-0.038 
(0.61) 
0.669 25 
GPMVA 0.029 0.600a 
(4.69) 
-0.496a 
(2.64) 
0.517a 
(3.21) 
-0.069b 
(2.14) 
-0.094a 
(3.54) 
-0.020 
(0.19) 
0.450 25 
Class II: Sub Sample with Next to Lowest Coefficient of a Variation of Firm Size 
GPMTO -0.850 0.172a 
(2.74) 
-0.336a 
(3.99) 
0.235a 
(4 . 38 ) 
-0.002 
(0.08) 
-0.059b 
(1.80) 
0.020 
(0.29) 
0.365 25 
GPMVA -0.489 0.194b 
(2.48) 
-0.118 
(1.21) 
0.085c 
(1.42) 
0.016 
(133) 
-0.052c 
(1.66) 
-0.082 
(1.09) 
-0.004 25 
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Table 7.7: Regression Results with log-linear Model for the Sub Samples of Industries with 
Lowest Coefficient of Variation of Firm size, 1984/85 (Contd.) 
Dependent 
Variable 
Intercept H ELASown CONJ CPD INIP1 INVS R2 
(adjusted) 
No. of 
Industries 
Class III: Sub Sample with Next to Highest Coefficient of a Variation of Firm Size 
GPMTO -0.365 0.295a -0.380a 0.335a -0.041c 0.017 0.169a 0.448 26 
(2.73) (2.70) (3.02) (L30) (1.07) (2.66) 
GPMVA -0.078 0.342a -0.314a 0.244a 0.027 -0.016c 0.108c 0.344 26 
(4.67) (3.60) (4.05) (1.08) (1.28) (1.34) 
Class IV: Sub Sample with Next to Highest Coefficient of a Variation of Firm Size 
GPMTO -0.803 0.124c -0.298a 0.172b -0.046a 0.008 0.030 0.387 26 
(1.50) (4.38) (2.27) (2.57) (0.59) (0.56) 
GPMVA -0.527 0.051 -0.151 0.023 -0.017 -0.016 0.007 -0.093 26 
(0.19) (0.90) (0.09) (0.49) (0.37) (0.08) 
Note: Figures in parentheses are White's heteroscedastic consistent t-ratios. 
Except CPD, all variables are in logarithmic form. 
a Indicates coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level using a one-tailed t-test. 
b Indicates coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level using a one-tailed t-test. 
c Indicates coefficient is significant at the 0.10 level using a one-tailed t-test. 
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In summary, the findings are more or less consistent with the Canadian study and 
establishes the possibility of misstatement in explaining the profit-concentration relationships 
due to the presence of aggregation bias." 
7.4 Structure-Performance Relationships: Other Considerations 
In this section, firstly the differences in structure-performance relationship (if any) are 
examined between consumer and producer goods industries within the sample. Then, the 
findings from the profit model of equation (4.26) are compared with the findings from an ad 
hoc version. 
7.4.1 Presence of Consumer/Producer Goods Industries 
Product differentiation could be an important source of margin differences among industries. 
The degree of product differentiation is measured in terms of cross price elasticity of demand 
for competing products. Producer goods are less differentiated, so their markets are 
characterised by greater knowledge and buying power from the buyers: 2 Therefore, a narrower 
range of price discretion can be expected from sellers, compared to the consumer goods 
market with the same level of concentration." 
In Table 7.8 industries are divided into consumer and producer goods. Repeating the 
regression analysis for the full sample and for these two groups of industries in logarithmic 
functional form findings are explained here. The regression coefficient and t-ratio for 
concentration is higher for consumer than for producer goods industries. The value of adjusted 
R2 is 0.540, which is much higher for the consumer goods industries compared to the producer 
goods industries: 4 
11 For Australia. Round (1980a) considers this issue in a different way. He estimates the same profit equation 
with three-digit and four-digit data, and finds that the more disaggregated four-digit data weakens the 
concentration-profit relationship. 
12 Advertising is a major source of product differentiation. Advertising as an entry barrier affects the consumer 
goods industries more than producer goods industries. In the profit model, product differentiation is introduced 
as a demand characteristic affecting margins rather than as a source of entry barrier. 
13 Differentiated product makes seller's demand curve less elastic, therefore provides a seller some degree of 
discretion with respect to pricing policies. 
14 The finding supports Phillips (1978) who finds the effect of concentration on margins is strongest and most 
significant for consumer goods industries at the four-digit level AS IC data. 
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Table 7.8: Results of the Profit Model with Consumers and Producers Goods Industries, 1984/85, 
GPMTO as the Dependent Variable 
Industry Group, 
No. of Industries 
Intercept H ELASown CONJ IMP1 INVS R2 
(adjusted) 
Average 
Margins 
Average 
Concentration 
All Industries (102) -0.845 0•055 0 - - - - 0.017 0.127 0.092 
(1.79) 
-0.591 0.271a -0.330a 0.288a -0.015c 0.076b 0.362 
(3.05) (3.40) (3.24) (1.28) (1.93) 
Consumer Goods -0.831 0•078c - - - - 0.029 0.123 0.082 
Industries (52) (1.59) 
-0.408 0.494a -0.557a 0.508a -0.015 0.073b 0.540 
(5.55) (6.13) (6.05) (0.81) (1.88) 
Producer Goods -0.868 0.020 - - - - -0.016 0.132 0.102 
Industries (50) (0.51) 
-0.764 0.205a -0.2'73a 0.223a -0.027c 0.005 0.230 
(2.90) (2.73) (3.23) (1.41) (0.08) 
Note: Figures in parentheses are White's heteroscedastic consistent t-ratios. 
Except CPD, all variables are in logarithmic functional form. 
a Indicates coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level using a one-tailed t-test. 
b Indicates coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level using a one-tailed t-test. 
c Indicates coefficient is significant at the 0.10 level using a one-tailed t-test. 
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7.4.2 Comparison of the Profit Model with an ad hoc Version 
To compare the findings from the oligopoly equilibrium profit model, an alternative version is 
considered from the standard literature: 5 Table 7.9, compares the findings from the 
hypothesised profit model (given in equation 4.26) with an ad hoc version (given in equation 
7.1 below). The ad hoc version considered is 
GPMTO = f (H, INVS, CPD, GROW, MESCDR, EXP, IMP I) 	 (7.1) 
The reasons for including H, INVS, CPD and IMP1 into the profit equation are as 
described before. The coefficients for H, INVS and CPD should be positive while the expected 
coefficient for IMP1 is negative.' The effect of growth in sales (GROW) on the profit margins 
on sales is ambiguous: 7 Profit margins should be higher with high barriers to entry. MESCDR 
is used as a proxy for entry barriers, which incorporates economies of scale in production as 
well as cost disadvantage of the smaller firms. Finally, export intensity (EXP) is included into 
the equation, the coefficient could be positive or negative (see Lyons (1981)). 
The regressions are estimated in the logarithmic functional form with same sample for 
1984/85 and GPMTO is used as the dependent variable. In Table 7.9, the findings from the 
hypothesised profit model based on oligopoly theory (equation (4.26)) are compared with the 
findings from the ad hoc version (equation (7.1)) in column 1 and 2 respectively. For the ad 
hoc version, the coefficient of H is no longer significant. Only INVS coefficient has improved 
its significance level from five to one percent. GROW is significant at the five percent level. 
MESCDR and EXP coefficients are insignificant. IMP1 variable is still insignificant, but with 
opposite sign. Also the adjusted R 2 is 0.144 for the ad hoc version compared to 0.362 for the 
hypothesised profit model based on oligopoly theory. The comparison of the findings from 
15 This is termed as an ad hoc version as this is not derived directly from theory. 
16  EL ASown and CONJ are not included as these variables are not considered in most of the studies. 
17 Growth in sales (GROW) increases demand or decreases costs or both. Decrease in costs will increase 
margins directly, while increase in demand will do the same via an increase in product prices or improving 
capacity utilisation. However, in oligopolistic industries, higher growth may induce firms to increase market 
shares by reducing prices. This will cause a negative relationship as suggested by Caves (1972). 
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these two models suggests that the oligopoly based profit model given in equation (4.26) is 
superior in explaining the structure-conduct-performance relationships for Australian 
manufacturing industries.' 8 
Table 7.9: Comparison of the Findings from the Oligopoly Based Profit Model with an ad hoc 
Version 
Oligopoly Based Model 
(Equation (4.26)) 
An ad hoc Version (Equation (7.1)) 
H 0.266a 0.012 
(2.95) (0.42) 
ELASown -0.330a - 
(3.46) 
CONJ 0.286a - 
(3.16) 
INVS 0.073b 0.158a 
(1.84) (3.45) 
CPD -0.018 -0.014 
(1.04) (0.67) 
GROW -0.002b 
(1.73) 
MESCDR 0.005 
(0.35) 
EXP - -0.024 
(1.25) 
IMP! -0.015 0.009 
(1.22) (0.52) 
Intercept -0.590 -0.639 
R2(adjusted) 0.362 0.144 
Note: Except CPD, all variables are in logarithmic functional form. 
Figures in parentheses are White's heteroscedastic consistent t-ratios. 
a Indicates coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level using a one-tailed t-test. 
b Indicates coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level using a one-tailed t-test. 
7.5 Findings from Disequilibrium Profit Models 
In following section, we consider the findings from estimating disequilibrium profit models for 
the linear functional form, and logarithmic functional form respectively. 
18 The ad hoc version may not be a complete model, researchers have used various explanatory variables in the 
literature. Here only some standard variables from literature are taken into account. 
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7.5.1 Linear Functional Form 
Both the linear and logarithmic functional forms (equation (4.27') and (4.27.1), respectively) 
are considered, where the adjustment coefficient of profit towards equilibrium is constant over 
time. For both versions, a regression for a the profit model without dynamic adjustment is 
provided in column 1 of the corresponding tables. Table 7.10 compares the findings from the 
disequilibrium model with equilibrium version when both are in linear form. In the equilibrium 
version, i.e. column 1 or equation (4.26'), the estimated H and IMP1 coefficients are 
insignificant with expected signs. CONJ and INVS are significant at the one percent level and 
ELASown is significant at the ten percent level with expected signs. CPD is insignificant and 
with opposite sign. The adjusted R 2 is 0.195. 
Column 2 describes the results of the disequilibrium model (equation (4.27')) when IX is 
constant. Here GPMT084 is considered as the dependent variable, so that the results can be 
compared with the equilibrium model and with other studies that do not employ a dynamic 
adjustment model of profits. The coefficient of the lagged gross profit margin in this regression 
provides an estimate of (1-if). This coefficient of lagged margin in Table 7.10 is significantly 
greater than zero and less than one at the five percent significance level using a one-tailed t 
test. Apart from H (which is still insignificant and with opposite sign), all coefficients are with 
similar signs as in the corresponding equilibrium model. R2 (adjusted) is 0.252, nearly 6.0 
percent higher than the equilibrium model (column 1). Also the RESET test shows, like 
equilibrium model, there is no specification error in the disequilibrium model. The implied 
estimate of the annual speed of adjustment of profits is about 19.7 percent.' The formula for 
the calculation of annual adjustment of profit is given in Appendix III. 
' 91t is not possible to compare directly the adjustment coefficient of profit with overseas studies, as none of 
these try to find this value. Also our model is based on short-run model, which is different from others. 
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Table 7.10: Findings from the Equilibrium Model is Compared with the Disequilibrium Version 
k Column 1 
(Equation Number 4.26') 
Column 2 
(Equation Number 4.27') 
GPMT077 - 0.215b 
(1.91) 
H 0.053 -0.012 
(0.82) (0.22) 
ELASown -0.020c -0.021c 
(1.57) (1.60) 
CONJ 0.003a 0.003a 
(3.78) (4.25) 
CPD -0.004 -0.002 
(0.68) (0.41) 
IMP! -0.004 -0.007 
(0.32) (0.58) 
INVS 0.767a 0.778a 
(4.33) (4.40) 
Intercept 0.108 0.072 
R2(adjusted) 0.195 0.252 
F-ratio 4.82* 5.90* 
RESET (3)d 0.457 1.730 
Note: Both models are in linear functional form 
GPMT084 is used as the dependent variable 
All variables are without logs. 
Figures in parentheses are White's heteroscedastic consistent t-ratios. 
a Indicates coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level using a one-tailed t-test. 
b Indicates coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level using a one-tailed t-test. 
c Indicates coefficient is significant at the 0.10 level using a one-tailed t-test. 
*F value at (6,95) degrees of freedom is 2.96 at the 0.01 level for F-test. 
d Ramsey's regression specification test follows F distribution where critical F is F0 .013 , 91=3.95. 
7.5.2 Logarithmic Functional Form 
Table 7.11 compares the equilibrium and disequilibrium results when both models are in 
logarithmic functional form (equation (4.26) and (4.27.1) respectively). Column 1 describes the 
findings of equilibrium model. All variables except CPD are with expected signs. H, 
ELASown, CONJ are significant at the one percent level and INVS is significant at the five 
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percent level. Results are more or less the same for the disequilibrium version ( i.e. equation 
(4.27.1) and shown in column 2), only IMP1 is also significant here at the ten percent level 
with expected sign. The coefficient of lagged margin is again significantly greater than zero and 
less than one at the five percent significance level using a one-tailed t test. R 2 (adjusted) is 
0.400, nearly four percent higher than the equilibrium model. Contrary to the equilibrium 
model, RESET test here shows no specification error in the disequilibrium model. The implied 
estimate of the annual speed of adjustment of profits is about 11.2 percent. The formula for the 
calculation of annual adjustment of profit is given in Appendix IV. 
It is interesting to note the effect that introducing a dynamic specification of profit 
adjustment has on the estimated coefficients of the equilibrium profits relationship. The 
magnitude of the estimated coefficients should be altered to reflect the fact that they now 
provide estimates ofi.t times the original coefficients, but the sign of the coefficients would not 
be expected to change unless at least one of the profits model is rnis-specified. In this respect, 
the disequilibrium model in the logarithmic functional form performs best. Here, all variables 
except CPD are with expected signs and same as the equilibrium model. Also except CPD, all 
variables are significant at least at the ten percent level. 
7.6 Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, firstly, the structure-conduct-performance relationships are estimated with a 
short-run equilibrium profit model derived from oligopoly theory with different versions. The 
profit model with the logarithmic functional form is used to examine major criticisms directed 
at profit-concentration studies. The results provide some support for each of the criticisms. 
In particular, the results support the view that the omission of explanatory variables 
may result in a biased relationship between concentration and profitability. The choice of the 
measure of profitability used as the dependent variable also appears to be important. The profit 
model with GPMVA as the dependent variable performs better in terms of expected signs. 
Also when CR4 is used as an alternative measure of concentration instead of the H index, 
concentration appears to be insignificant (still positive) in explaining profit. 
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Table 7.11: Findings from the Equilibrium Model Compared with the Disequilibrium 
Version 
Column 1 
(Equation Number 4.26) 
Column 2 
(Equation Number 4.27.1) 
GPMTO-77 - 0.217b 
(1.95) 
H 0.266a 0.258a 
(2.95) (2.94) 
ELASown -0.330a -0.101a 
(3.46) (3.85) 
CONJ 0.286a 0.288a 
(3.16) (3.26) 
CPD -0.018 -0.014 
(1.04) (0.86) 
IMP! -0.015 -0.018c 
(1.22) (1.55) 
INVS 0.073b 0•060b 
(1.84) (1.67) 
Intercept -0.590 -0.470 
R2(adjusted) 0.362 0.400 
F-Ratio 10.55 * 12.60* 
RESET(3)d 5•78a 2.61 
Note: Both models are in logarithmic functional form 
GPMT084 is used as the dependent variable 
Except CPD, all variables are measured in logarithmic functional form. 
Figures in parentheses are White's heteroscedastic consistent t-ratios. 
a Indicates coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level using a one-tailed t-test. 
b Indicates coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level using a one-tailed t-test. 
c Indicates coefficient is significant at the 0.10 level using a one-tailed t-test. 
*F value at (6,95) degrees of freedom is 2.96 at the 0.01 level for F-test. 
d Ramsey's regression specification test follows F distribution where critical F is F0 .01 , 3 ,91=3.95. 
Secondly, some other issues, viz, the presence of aggregation bias and the presence of 
consumer-producer goods in explaining profit-concentration relationship are considered. The 
findings more or less support the view that the presence of aggregation bias weakens the 
structure-conduct-performance relationships. Also the profit-concentration relationship is 
found to be stronger for consumer goods industries rather than producer goods industries. The 
results from the oligopoly based model is compared with an ad hoc version of profit model, 
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and the comparison establishes that the oligopoly based profit model is superior than the ad 
hoc version in terms of explanatory power and significance level. 
Finally, a reduced form disequifibrium model is considered with both linear and 
logarithmic functional form, where adjustment of profits is assumed to be constant over a 
seven year period for Australian manufacturing industries. Results are broadly consistent with 
other studies in this area. Most of the signs are similar to the non-dynamic model. Initial profits 
are found to be significant with positive effect on profits with both versions of disequilibrium 
model." The disequilibrium profit model in logarithmic functional form performs better in 
terms of signs and significance level. The expected annual rate of adjustment of profit is 11.2 
percent. In the next chapter, the empirical findings from the concentration and industry 
conjectures models are discussed separately. 
2°  A variable adjustment model of disequilibrium profit model is considered, where adjustment of profits 
depends on some barriers to entry. The dynamic aspects of the variable adjustment model are not found to be 
prominent. Hence detailed results are not presented here. In this respect, longitudinal data is desirable. The 
lack of systematic longitudinal data for Australian manufacturing does not allow us to perform to perform a 
study of the persistence of profits like Mueller (1977,1983,1985), Cubbin and Geroski (1987) and others. 
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THE CONCENTRATION AND CONJECTURES MODELS: 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter contains the empirical findings from different versions of concentration and 
conjectures models. The theoretical discussion is presented in Chapter 5. First, the findings 
from concentration models is considered. Section 8.2 presents the findings from the short-run 
equilibrium concentration model with different versions. Both logarithmic and linear 
functional forms are considered here. In section 8.3, the findings from the equilibrium 
concentration model are compared with an ad hoc version (variables taken from standard 
literature). Section 8.4 considers the findings from the disequilibrium model with both the 
linear and logarithmic specifications. 
Next, the findings from conjectures models are presented in section 8.5. Finally, 
conclusions from both concentration and conjectures models are added in section 8.6. 
8.2 Empirical Findings from Concentration Model with Different 
Versions 
Here the findings from the three versions of equilibrium concentration models in Chapter 5 
are discussed. These are Cowling-Waterson version with Cournot behaviour, equation (5.9') 
and (5.9), Clarke-Davies version with different conjectures, equation (5.12') and (5.12), and 
the final version with heterogeneous product, equation (5.13') and (5.13). Both linear and 
logarithmic functional forms are estimated in each case. 
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8.2.1 The Results of Short-run Equilibrium Concentration Models 
Table 8.1 presents the findings from equilibrium model in both linear and logarithmic 
functional form.' In each case, results are given with three regressions. Equation (5.9'), 
(5.12') and (5.13') are for Cowling-Waterson version with Cournot behaviour, Clarke-Davies 
version with different conjecturess and a heterogenous product version, respectively, with 
linear functional form. Similarly, equation (5.9), (5.12) and (5.13) represent Cowling-
Waterson version with Coumot behaviour, Clarke-Davies version with different conjectures 
and a heterogeneous product version, respectively, with logarithmic functional form. 
	
8.2.1.1 	Linear Functional Form 
For the linear functional form, in the Cowling-Waterson version with Cournot behaviour 
(5.9'), all variables have expected signs but only NOF is significant at the one percent level, 
with an adjusted R2 as 0.119. For Clarke-Davies version (5.12'), except CONJ, all variables 
are with expected signs. Again, only NOF is significant at the one percent level and with 
negative sign. Adjusted R2 is 0.132. For the final version (5.13') with heterogeneous product, 
findings are same as Clarke-Davies version in terms of signs and significance levels, CPD is 
insignificant and opposite to the expected sign. Adjusted R 2 is 0.132 and same as Clake-
Davies version. 
8.2.1.2 	Logarithmic Functional Form 
For the logarithmic functional form, in Cowling-Waterson version with Cournot behaviour 
(5.9), all variables have with expected signs. NOF and CDR are significant at the one percent 
level and ELASown is significant at the five percent level. The regression has an adjusted R 2 
of 0.526. For Clarke-Davies version (5.12), NOF and CDR still have the 
Like the profit model, logarithmic functional form is more justified as discussed in Chapter 5. However, 
here both linear and logarithmic functional form are considered to keep parity with profit and conjecture 
models. 
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Table 8.1: Results of Equilibrium Concentration Model with Different Versions, 1984/85 
- 	-__ --- 
Model Type 	 Equation 	Intercept 	NOF 	ELAS0 	CDR 	CONJ 	CPD 	R2 	F-ratio 
Number (adjusted) . 
Model l' (Linear Functional 
Form) 
I 
Cowling-Waterson Version (5.9') 0.118 -0.00009a -0.020 -0.024 - - 0.119 8.394a 
with Cournot Behaviour (4.36) (0.98) (0.62) 
Clarke-Davies Version (5.12') 0.115 -0.00008a -0.002 -0.025 -0.004 - 0.132 6.500a 
(3.30) (0.11) (0.69) (0.74) 
A Version with Heterogenous (5.13') 0.119 -0.00008a -0.001 -0.022 -0.004 -0.011 0.132 5.143a 
Product* (3.14) (0.07) (0.58) (0.79) (1.13) 
Model 1 (Logarithmic 
Functional Form) 
Cowling-Waterson Version (5.9) -0.583 -0.450a -0.133b -0.171a - - 0.526 58.108a 
with Cournot Behaviour (8.60) (1.80) (3.78) 
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Table 8.1: Results of Equilibrium Concentration Model with Different Versions, 1984/85 (contd.) 
Model Type Equation 
Number 
Intercept NOF ELASown CDR CONJ CPD R2 
(adjusted) 
F-ratio 
Clarke-Davies Version (5.12) -0.660 -0.237a 
(3.01) 
0.556a 
(3.70) 
-0.086a 
(2.52) 
-0.575a 
(3.96) 
- 0.748 102.310 
a 
A Version with Heterogenous 
Product* 
(5.13) -0.660 -0.243a 
(3.07) 
0.552- 
(3.67) 
-0.088a 
(2.55) 
-0.571a 
(3.93) 
0.017 
(0.58) 
0.747 76.372a 
Note: H84 as the dependent variable 
The equation number for each version in bracket follows from the discussion of text in Chapter 5. 
For the logarithmic functional form except CPD, all variables are in logarithmic form 
Figures in parentheses are White's heteroscedastic consistent t-ratios. 
a Indicates coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level using a one-tailed t-test. 
b Indicates coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level using a one-tailed t-test. 
F value at (3,98) degrees of freedom is 3.95 at the 0.01 level for F-test for the Cowling-Waterson version of both the linear and logarithmic functional form. 
F value at (4,97) degrees of freedom is 3.48 at the 0.01 level for F -test for the Clarke-Davies version of both the linear and logarithmic functional form. 
F value at (5,96) degrees of freedom is 3.17 at the 0.01 level for F-test for the final version i.e. considering heterogeneous product of both the linear 
and logarithmic functional form. 
*Ramsey's regression specification test statistic with power 3, i.e. RESET(3) =24.939, RESET(3)=1.930, respectively for the linear and logarthmic functional 
form model, follows F distribution where critical F is F0.01,3,93=3.95. 
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expected signs and significant at the one percent level but ELAS own and CONJ are 
significant at the one percent level, with opposite signs. Adjusted R2 is 0.748. For the fmal 
version (5.13) with heterogeneous product, findings are same as the Clarke-Davies version in 
terms of signs and significance levels, CPD is insignificant here with expected positive sign. 
The value of adjusted R2 is 0.747. 
A comparison of the three versions, (viz. Cowling-Waterson with Cournot behaviour, 
Clarke-Davies and the version with heterogeneous product) in both functional forms (linear 
and logarithmic), suggests that the Cowling-Waterson type with Cournot behaviour 
concentration model in logarithmic functional form, (equation 5.13), yields the best results in 
terms of signs and significance levels of variables. 
The standard diagnostic tests are performed for the final versions (i.e. 5.13' and 5.13) 
of concentration models with linear and logarithmic forms. Results are shown in Table 8.1. 
RESET test shows there is specification error for the linear functional form only. 
Table 8.2 and 8.3 show the correlation matrix of variables for the linear (equation 
5.13') and logarithmic version (equation 5.13), respectively. Also we check the 
multicollinearity with the auxiliary equation approach as discussed in Chapter 6, section 
6.4.2.3. Except for H and NOF and CONJ and ELASown, there are low correlation 
coefficients among variables. 
Table 8.2: Correlation Matrix of Variables for the Final Version of Concentration Model in 
Linear Functional Form 
Hg4 NOF ELASown CPD CDR CONJ 
H84 1.000 
NOF -0.363 1.000 
ELASown -0.052 -0.107 1.000 
CPD -0.169 0.211 -0.002 1.000 
CDR -0.017 -0.156 0.051 0.081 1.000 
CONJ -0.235 0.190 0.430 -0.009 -0.045 1.000 
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Table 8.3: Correlation Matrix of Variables the Concentration Model in Logarithmic 
Functional Form 
H84 NOF ELASown CPD CDR CONJ 
1184 1.000 
NOF -0.660 1.000 
ELASowo -0.056 -0.080 1.000 
CPD -0.135 0.290 -0.053 1.000 
CDR -0.017 -0.120 -0.030 0.068 1.000 
CONJ -0.606 0.316 0.717 0.015 0.110 1.000 
Note: All variables except CPD are in logarithmic form 
8.3 Comparison of the Findings of Equilibrium Models with an ad hoc 
Version 
To compare the findings from the oligopoly equilibrium concentration model, an alternative 
ad hoc version of concentration model is considered with variables suggested by the standard 
literature.' In Table 8.4, the findings from the equilibrium concentration model (for both 
linear and logarithmic functional forms) with the ad hoc version are reported. Equation 
(5.13') and (8.1') describe the equilibrium and an ad hoc version, respectively, in the linear 
functional form, while equation (5.13) and (8.1) describe the equilibrium and an ad hoc 
version, respectively, in the logarithmic functional form. 
The ad hoc versions of concentration equation are as follows: 
i) An ad hoc Version in Logarithmic Functional Form 
log H oto + al log INVS +c2 log MESCDR + a3 log EXP + a4 log IMP I + CPD (8.1) 
2 Again, like the ad hoc version of profit model, discussed in Chapter 7, section 7.4.3, the ad hoc version of 
the concentration model are also may not a complete one. Instead some standard variables are used from 
literature. 
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Table 8.4: Regression Results Comparing Oligopoly Based Equilibrium Concentration Model with an ad hoc Version, 
H84 as the Dependent Variable. 
Model Type Equilibrium Model ad hoc Model Equilibrium Model ad hoc Model 
Functional Form Linear Linear Logarithmic Logarithmic 
Equation Number (5.13') (8.1') (5.13) (8.1) 
NOF -0.00008a 
(3.14) 
- -0.243a 
(3.07) 
- 
ELAS0 -0.001 
(0.07) 
- 0.552a 
(3.67) 
- 
CDR -0.022 
(0.58) 
- -0.088a 
(2.55) 
- 
CONJ -0.004 
(0.79) 
- -0.571a 
(3.93) 
- 
CPD -0.011 
(1.13) 
-0.016c 
(1.49) 
0.017 
(0.58) 
-0.091c 
(1.52) 
Cha pter 8 : Th e C oncentration and  C onjectures M
odel s: E mpirica
l Findings 
Table 8.4: Regression Results Comparing Oligopoly Based Equilibrium Concentration Model with an ad hoc 
Version, H84 as the Dependent Variable. (contd.) 
Model Type Equilibrium Model ad hoc Model Equilibrium Model ad hoc Model 
INVS - 1.092a - 0.450a 
(3.09) (3.39) 
EXP - 0.012 - 0.124b 
(0.38) (1.98) 
LMP1 - 0.009 - -0.013 
(0.44) (0.29) 
MESCDR - 0.413c - 0.075b 
(1.34) (1.61) 
GR - 0.002a - - 
(2.50) 
EFFECT - 0.0001 - - 
(1.13) 
Intercept 0.119 0.049 -0.660 0.008 
R2 (adjusted) 0.132 0.158 0.747 0.160 
Note: For the logarithmic functional form except CPD, all variables are in logarithmic functional form 
Equation numbers are from Chapter 5 and this Chapter 
Figures in parentheses are White's heteroscedastic consistent t-ratios. 
a Indicates coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level using a one-tailed t-test. 
b Indicates coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level using a one-tailed t-test. 
c Indicates coefficient is significant at the 0.10 level using a one-tailed t-test. 
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ii) An ad hoc Version in Linear Functional Form' 
H = a'0 + a'1 INVS + a'2 MESCDR + a'3 EXP + a'zt IMP I + a'5 CPD + a'6 GROW +a'7 
EFFECT (8.1') 
Here, investment (or capital) intensity (INVS), is a proxy for capital requirement 
entry barrier and is expected to have a positive effect on concentration. MESCDR is 
considered which takes into account the minimum efficient size as well as cost disadvantages 
of small firms. The expected sign is ambiguous. The sign for the consumer-producer dummy 
(CPD), a proxy for advertising intensity, coefficient on concentration is positive as discussed 
earlier (see also Comanor and Wilson (1967) and (1974)). The effect of export intensity 
(EXP) on concentration is expected to be negative as an increase in export intensity increases 
the market size, hence reduces concentration. The effect of import intensity (IMP 1) on 
concentration is expected to be negative, as an increase in imports removes inefficient smaller 
firms, hence reduces concentration (see De Melo and Urata (1984)). The industry growth 
rate (GROW) has a positive effect on concentration in Martin (1979), but not in others (see 
Nelson (1960) and Shepherd (1964b). A trade protection barrier (EFFECT) is included and a 
negative sign is expected on concentration. An increase in tariff reduces foreign competition, 
so the number of domestic firms expands and concentration falls. 
For the linear functional form (equation 8.1') in the ad hoc version, INVS and GROW 
are significant at the one percent level, while MESCDR is significant at the ten percent level. 
CPD is with negative sign, i.e. opposite to expectation and significant at the ten percent level. 
Also EXP, IMP1 and E1-I-ECT have opposite to expected signs, but are insignificant. The 
adjusted R2  is 0.158 compared to 0.132 for the equilibrium model in equation (5.13'). 
For the ad hoc version with logarithmic functional form in equation (8. 1'), INVS and 
MESCDR are significant at the one and five percent level, respectively. CPD and EXP are 
opposite to the predicted signs. IMP1 has the expected negative sign but is insignificant. The 
adjusted R2  is 0.160 compared to 0.747 for the equilibrium model in equation (5.13). 
3  Growth (GROW) on sales and protection (EH-ECT) variables are added on R.H.S. only in the linear 
functional form. These two variables have negative values for a good number of industries hence no values 
can be calculated for the logarithmic functional form. 
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In summary, in terms of signs and significance level, neither of the ad hoc versions in 
Table 8.4 are very promising. 
8.4 Empirical Findings from the Disequilibrium Concentration Model 
Table 8.5 compares the results of the estimates from equilibrium (in terms of final versions) 
with disequilibrium model, when the speed of adjustment is constant across industries.' The 
first two columns, i.e. equation (5.13') and (5.14') present the results for equilibrium and dis-
equilibrium model respectively in linear functional form. Last two columns, i.e. equation 
(5.13) and (5.14.1) show the corresponding results for the equilibrium and disequilibrium 
model in logarithmic functional form. In all cases, H84 is used as the dependent variable. 
8.4.1 Linear Functional Form 
For the linear functional form, in Table 8.5, except CONJ and CPD (both are insignificant), 
all variables have expected signs in both the equilibrium and disequilibrium model, i.e. in 
equation (5.13') and (5.14'), respectively. Only NOF is significant at the one percent level for 
both models. For the disequilibrium model, initial concentration (H77) is significant at the 
one percent level with the expected positive sign. For disequilibrium model, the adjusted R 2 
is 0.208, seven percent higher than the equilibrium model and the estimated annual 
adjustment coefficient of concentration is 16.45 percent.' 
4  Most of the studies with changes in concentration, are based on a linear model assuming A constant 
adjustment coefficient. This neglects the possibility of variation in the speed of adjustment across industries. 
En this respect, both the speed of adjustment and the determinants of steady-state concentration should be 
examined (see Geroski and Masson (1987), Geroski, Masson and Shaanan (1987)). When the same sample 
is used to estimate a variable adjustment coefficient model in non-linear form, where some barriers to entry 
are considered as the determinants of adjustment factor, no major differences are found in results from the 
linear model results in Table 8.5. 
5 Exactly same formula is used for the calculation of annual adjustment coefficient for concentration as in 
Appendix III. Instead of the profit, concentration is used. 
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Table 8.5: Regression Results Comparing Equilibrium and Disequilibrium Concentration Models, 
H84 as the Dependent Variable. 
Model Type Equilibrium Model Disequilibrium Model Equilibrium Model Disequilibrium Model 
Functional Form Linear Linear Logarithmic Logarithmic 
Equation Number (5.13') (5.14') (5.13) (5.14.1) , 
H77 - 0.284a - 0.133b 
(2.87) (2.07) 
NOF -0.00008a -0.00006a -0.243a -0.223a 
(3.14) (2.99) (3.07) (3.18) 
ELASown -0.001 -0.004 0.552a 0.535a 
(0.07) (0.21) (3.67) (3.58) 
CDR -0.022 -0.011 -0.088a -0.080a 
(0.58) (0.32) (2.55) (2.84) 
CONJ -0.004 -0.003 -0.571a -0.547a 
(0.79) (0.77) (3.93) (3.78) 
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Table 8.5: Regression Results Comparing Equilibrium and Disequilibrium Concentration Models, 
H84 as the Dependent Variable (contd.) 
Model Type Equilibrium Model Disequilibrium Model Equilibrium Model Diseguilibrium Model 
Functional Form Linear Linear Logarithmic Logarithmic 
Equation Number (5.13') (5.14') (5.13) (5.1/.1) 
CPD -0.011 
(1.13) 
-0.009 
(0.96) 
0.017 
(0.58) 
0.015 
(0.51) 
Intercept 0.119 0.086 -0.660 -0.545 
R2 (adjusted) 0.132 0.208 0.747 0.758 
F-ratio 5.143* 6.570" 76.372* 65.381" 
RESET(3)d 24.939a 16.092a 1.930 9.045a 
Note: For the logarithmic functional form except CPD, all variables are in logarithmic form 
Equation Number follows from Chapter 5. 
Figures in parentheses are White's heteroscedastic consistent t-ratios. 
a Indicates coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level using a one -tailed t - test. 
b Indicates coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level using a one-tailed t-test. 
*F value at (5,96) degrees of freedom is 3.17 at the 0.01 level for F-test for the equilibrium version of both logarithmic and linear 
ftmctional forms. 
**F value at (6,95) degrees of freedom is 2.96 at the 0.01 level for F-test for the dis-equilibrium version of both logarithmic and linear 
functional forms. 
d For Ramsey's regression specification test statistic with power 3 critical F is F0 . 01 , 3 , 93=3.95 for the equilibrium version and 
F0 . 01 , 3 , 92 is also 3.95 for the disequilibrium model. 
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8.4.2 Logarithmic Functional Form 
For the logarithmic functional form, in Table 8.5, except ELAS own and CONJ (both are 
significant at the one percent level), all variables have expected signs in both equilibrium and 
disequilibrium model, i.e. in equation (5.13) and (5.14.1), respectively. NOF and CDR are 
. significant at the one percent level. CPD is insignificant in both models. Signs and 
significance levels for the disequilibrium version are similar to the equilibrium version. Initial 
concentration (H77) is significant for the dis-equilibrium model at the five percent level with 
expected positive sign. The adjusted R2 is only 0.01 percent higher for the disequilibrium 
model and the estimated annual adjustment coefficient of concentration is 12.35 percent.' 
RESET test in Table 8.5 rejects the null hypothesis that there is no specification error 
for the disequilibrium version of concentration model for both the linear and logarithmic 
forms. 
In summary, disequilibrium versions of the concentration model do not perform better 
in terms of signs and significance compared to the equilibrium versions. But initial 
concentration (H77) is significant in both versions of disequilibrium model. Adjusted R 2 is 
also higher in both versions of disequilibrium model corresponding to the equilibrium one. 
8.5 Empirical Findings of the Conjectures Model 
Before discussing the empirical findings for the conjectures model, first a brief discussion 
regarding the values of the estimates of CONJ variable is included here. The estimates of 
conjectural variation variable for 102 industries lie between -1 to 0.. 7 The negative values of 
the conjectures variable imply competitive behaviour, its value equal to zero corresponds to 
Cournot behaviour, while a conjectures variable equal to ((l-H)/H implies perfect collusion.' 
Table 8.6 describes the findings for the conjectural variation model. Both linear and 
6 Exactly the same formula is used for the calculation of annual adjustment coefficient for concentration as 
in Appendix IV. Instead of the profit, concentration is used. 
7 CONJ variable is not restricted here for any particular model, instead these estimates cover a range of all 
possible models, minimum value is -0.940 and the maximum is 15.420. 
8From equation (4.4) w = (1-H)/H implies PCM=1/e 
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logarithmic functional forms, i.e. equation (5.15') and (5.15), are considered here as there is 
no prior ground of supporting any particular functional form of this model. The first two 
columns are for the linear functional form and the last two columns are for the logarithmic 
functional form. In column 1 and 3, only the H index is considered as an independent 
variable. 
8.5.1 Linear Functional Form 
For the linear functional form, in column 1 of Table 8.6, H is found to be significant, but with 
a negative sign. Column 2 represents the full version of the conjectures model in equation 
(5.15') with linear functional form. The explanatory power is almost same as column 1, with 
only H as a control variable. The coefficients of STABLE, GROW and CPD variables are 
with expected signs and not significant even at the ten percent level. Also, the coefficients of 
H and IMP1 are significant at the one and five percent level, but opposite to the expected 
signs. Adjusted R2 are similar here for column 1 and 2. 
8.5.2 Logarithmic Functional Form 
For the logarithmic version, in column 3 of Table 8.6, again H is significant, but with a 
negative sign. Column 4 represents the full version of the conjectures model i.e. equation 
(5.15). It does not add much in terms of explanatory power compared with column 3, where 
H is used as the only control variable. Adjusted R 2 has increased from 0.355 to 0.370. 
Here,as with the linear functional form, the coefficients of STABLE, GROW and CPD 
variables have the expected signs but are not significant even at the ten percent level. The 
coefficients of H and IMP1 are significant at the one and five percent level, but opposite to 
the expected signs. 
The fmdings are more or less similar for both functional forms, except the model with 
the logarithmic functional form is superior in terms of explanatory power. The RESET test in 
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Table 8.6 rejects the null hypothesis that there is no specification error for the equilibrium 
conjectures model for both the linear and logarithmic forms. 
Table 8.6: Findings from the of Conjectures Model in the Linear and 
Logarithmic Functional Form, 1984/85. 
Functional 
Form 
Linear Linear Logarithmic Logarith 
mic 
H -8.329b -8.372b -0.876a -0.875a 
(1.82) (2.11) (7.52) (7.52) 
STABLE - 0.455 - 0.095 
(1.16) (1.16) 
GROW - -0.034 - -0.0002 
(0.56) (0.02) 
CPD - -0.233 - -0.081 
(0.73) (1.09) 
IMP1 - 0.977b 0.105b 
(1.75) (1.79) 
Intercept 1.008 0.528 -1.202 -1.116 
R2 (adjusted) 0.046 0.043 0.355 0.370 
F-ratio - 1.11 133.3* 
RESET(3)d - 17.034d - 21.107d 
Note: For the logarithmic functional form, all variables except dummies (i.e. CPD and STABLE) are in log 
forms. 
Figures in parentheses are White's heteroscedastic consistent t-ratios. 
a Indicates coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level using a one-tailed t-test. 
b Indicates coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level using a one-tailed t-test. 
* F value at (5,97) degrees of freedom is 3.17 at the 0.01 level. 
d Ramsey's regression specification test statistic follows F distribution where the critical F is km . 3 , 
93=3.95. 
More noticeable, is the negative effect of H on CONJ, which is contrary to the 
expectation.' Possible explanations for this perverse finding are : firstly, in the sample, there 
are 67 industries with CONJ between -1 and 0, 23 industries with CONJ between 0 and 1 
9  According to the market power argument of the positive profit-concentration relationship, concentration 
increases collusion which results in higher profit. This result is found in the profit model, see Chapter 4. 
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and for 12 industries CONJ values are greater than 1. '° Therefore, most industries in the 
sample follow competitive behaviour. In this situation, from the findings we can not establish 
a positive association between H and CONJ. The sign of the estimated coefficient of H could 
be due to the simultaneity or measurement error for these two variables (H and CONJ)." In 
case of the existence of simultaneous relationships between these two variables, the OLS 
technique may be improper for estimating such relationships.' 
8.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter, the empirical findings from both concentration and conjectures models are 
considered. First a summary of findings from the concentration models is presented. 
In this respect, both equilibrium and disequilibrium models of concentration (based on 
oligopoly) are considered. Firstly, some variables suggested by standard oligopoly 
equilibrium models are found to be significant in explaining concentration. In this respect, as 
with the profit model, there is evidence for the superiority of the logarithmic functional form 
to the linear one in terms of signs and significance levels of variables. Results are not always 
very strong in either case (in terms of significance and signs). The logarithmic functional form 
of the Cowling-Waterson type model with Cournot behaviour version of concentration model 
yields the best results in terms of signs and significance, while Clarke-Davies version with 
higher explanatory power. 
Secondly, the findings from the short-run equilibrium model (with both functional 
forms) are compared with the findings from the ad hoc versions. Here, for the ad hoc 
versions, some variables for barriers to entry appear to be significant in explaining 
1°  In Dixon and Gunther (1986) , out of 20 Australian manufacturing industries, 8 industries are found to 
have negative conjecture values for 1968/69, 1977/78 and for 1972/73 with 7 negative values. 
"It is important to note, a negative effect of CONJ on H is found in Chapter 8, section 8.2.1, which is also 
opposite to the predicted sign. CONJ estimates do not consider differentiated product and foreign 
competition. Also, it is based on average measures for each firm. Dixon and Gunther (1986) also find 
negative conjecture values and suggest one of the reason for getting negative values could be due to 
measurement error. 
12 This issue is considered in Chapter 9. 
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concentration. Also from the fmdings, the superiority of the oligopoly based concentration 
model can not be established compared to the ad hoc version. 
Thirdly, the estimated annual rate of adjustment of concentration towards its 
equilibrium level is 16.45 percent for the model with linear functional form and 12.35 percent 
for the model with logarithmic functional form over a seven year period. The estimates of the 
annual speed of adjustment for both linear and logarithmic functional forms are higher than 
the studies of the U.S., U.K. and other countries (shown in Table 5.1)." 
In summary, short-run concentration models are considered. Allowing for partial 
adjustment of concentration towards the equilibrium level, disequilibrium models are 
developed. In this respect, the whole range of variables used in previous studies are not 
considered here. Further work is warranted in this area with better measures of variables and 
considering a longer time period.' 
Now, the findings from the conjectures model are summarised below. The structural 
characteristics, viz, the level and stability of concentration, growth in sales, product 
heterogeneity and import intensity are considered as determinants of conjectures." 
Stable market condition, growth in sales and product heterogeneity have the expected 
signs, but are insignificant in explaining conjecturess (in both linear and logarithmic 
functional forms) with the sample of Australian manufacturing industries. Concentration and 
import intensity are significant for both linear and logarithmic functional forms, but have 
opposite to the predicted signs. In summary, the findings from the conjectures model are not 
very satisfactory. 
Noticeably, there is no literature in this respect for Australian manufacturing, so the 
findings from our models can not be compared directly. Also, most of the overseas literature 
in this area is based on case studies for a single industry. Each case study may be associated 
with thousands of observations, but is similar to a single data point in a cross-section 
13  The disequilibrium model here implies deviation from short-run equilibrium level of concentration, not 
from the long-run level. 
14 In this respect, firm level data is necessary to measure the CONJ variable more accurately. 
15  Some other factors, e.g. trade association between firms, low expectation of severe punishment etc can be 
found in literature. 
147 
Chapter 8: The Concentration and Conjectures Models: Empirical Findings 
analysis. This study is based on cross-industry data (and also CONJ variable for each industry 
is an average considering all firms together), so that it is not directly comparable.' 
As mentioned early, this is only a first step for the Australian literature to explain 
conjectures with some industry structural variables. Availability of the data at the firm level 
would allow the researchers to do case studies as overseas. In this respect, a dynamic version 
of conjectures would be more appropriate compared to the short-run equilibrium model in 
explaining conjectures. 
16  Most of the estimates of CONJ lies between -1 and 0 in the sample. Dividing the total firms in each 
industry into two groups: leader and followers and incorporating intra-industry competition or rivalry into 
the conjectures model may improve the results. Similar work has been done by Kwoka and Ravencraft 
(1986) with Cowling-Waterson model using the U.S. line of business data. With the four-enterprise data, it 
would be possible (though not accurately) to incorporate intra-industry effect into the model. However, the 
focus of the study is an inter-industry one, so industry structural variables are considered. 
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CHAPTER 9 
SIMULTANEITY PROBLEM IN THE STRUCTURE - 
CONDUCT - PERFORMANCE RELATIONSHIPS: 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS FROM THE MODELS 
9.1 Introduction 
Early studies of the profit-concentration relationship use a single-equation approach, 
assuming the existence of a unidirectional causality among structure-performance variables. 
A number of authors raise questions about the single-equation approach. According to them, 
a single-equation approach may result in biased and inconsistent estimates of the parameters. 
Other authors have suggested that the simultaneity bias is not so important and that the 
results of the single-equation studies are dependable. In Chapter 2, the literature regarding 
this debate is discussed. 
In this chapter, in section 9.2, the models are presented as a simultaneous equation 
systems. Two systems of equations are considered. The first system of equations consists of 
three equilibrium equations for profits, concentration and conjectures, while the second 
system of equations includes two disequilibrium equations for profit and concentration and 
the equilibrium equation for conjectures. Also, the identification, rank and order conditions 
are checked for each system of equations. Comparison of the findings using the OLS 
technique with the 2SLS and 3SLS techniques is given in section 9.3. Major changes in 
findings for each model are discussed in this respect. In section 9.4, conclusions are added. 
9.2 The System of Equations and Empirical Findings 
In the following section, we consider two systems of equations. 
Chapter 9: Simultaneity Problem 
9.2.1 System of Equations I 
A three-equation simultaneous system is considered, where the equations are the final 
versions of short-run equilibrium profit, concentration and conjectures model, i.e. equation 
numbers (4.26), (5.13) and (5.15), respectively.' Here profit is determined by concentration 
and conjectures. Conjectures influences concentration and also is determined by 
concentration. These three focus variables viz, profit, concentration and conjectures are 
simultaneously determined into the equilibrium system. All equations are considered in 
logarithmic functional forms.' 
log (GPMTO) = Do+ tlog (H) + 13210g(ELAS0w )+ P3 log(CONJ) + [34CPD + 
log(IMP1) +136 log(INVS) 	 (4.26) 
log H = 0 + 01 log NOF+ 02 log ELAS own + 03 log CDR + 04 log CONJ + 05 CPD 
(5.13) 
log (CONJ) = Ko + K1 log (H) + 1(2 STABLE +1(3 OR + K4CPD + K5log (IMP 1) (5.15) 
Here, GPMTO, H and CONJ are treated as endogenous variables. So OLS estimation 
may gives biased and inconsistent estimates of parameters. In the following section, the rank 
and order conditions for identification are checked for each equation. 3 
With above equilibrium models, system I is estimated with the OLS, 2SLS and 3SLS 
techniques and the findings are described in Table 9.1, 9.2 and 9.3 of section 9.3.3. 
Same equation numbers are followed from previous chapters for both systems. 
2 The results with linear functional form of the equilibrium version of profit, concentration and conjecture 
model are more or less similar to the logarithmic form in terms of signs. Also in most cases, the logarithmic 
functional form are preferred on theoretical ground. Thus, to check simultaneity only the logarithmic 
functional form of each model is considered. 
3 For estimation, an equation has to be just identified or over identified. This is discussed in Chapter 6. 
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9.2.2 System of Equations II 
Also a second system of equations (system II) is considered, including disequilibrium 
versions of the profit and concentration model with the equilibrium conjectures equation as 
follows: 
log (GPMTO) = 13'O+ fi'llog (H) +13 1210g (ELASown)+ 13'3 log (CONJ) + [3 14CPD + 
13'5 log(IMPI) + 13'6 log(INVS) + 0'7 GPMT077 	 (4.27.1) 
log H = 8 10 + O'l log N+ 0'2 log ELASown + 0'3 log CDR + 0'4 log CONJ + 0'5 CPD +0'7 
H77 	 (5.14.1) 
log (CONJ) = ico + ic'ilog (H) + x'2 STABLE +ic'3 OR + K'4CPD + ic'51og (IMP1) (5.15) 
Results of this system are reported in Table 9.1', 9.2' and 9.3' of section 9.3.3. 
9.2.3 Checking Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Identification of Each 
Equation 
The discussion on rank and order condition is covered in Chapter 6 in section 6.4.1.3. In 
system of equations I, there are 3 endogenous variables (M) with 3 equations. The total 
number of exogenous (predetermined) variables (K) in the system is 8. 
For the profit equation, number of endogenous variables (m) in this equation is 2. 
Number of exogenous variables in this equation (k) is 4. Here, K-k = 4 and m-1 = 1. So K-k 
> m-1 here and the rank of A matrix is 2 with non-zero determinant. Therefore, the profit 
equation is over identified. 
For the concentration equation, number of endogenous variables (m) in this equation 
is 1. Number of exogenous variables in this equation (k) is 4. Here, K-k = 4 and m-1 = 0. So 
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K-k > m-1 here and the rank of A matrix is 2 with non-zero determinant. Therefore, the 
concentration equation is over identified. 
For the conjectures equation, number of endogenous variables (m) in this equation is 
1. Number of exogenous variables in this equation (k) is 4. Here, K-k = 4 and m-1 = 0. So K-
k > m-1 here and the rank of A matrix is 2 with non-zero determinant. Therefore, the 
conjectures equation is over identified. 
Therefore, all three equilibrium models (in system of equation I) are over identified. 
The rank and order condition for the system of equations II (considering disequilibrium 
versions of the profit and concentration model with the equilibrium conjectures model) are 
also checked. Each equation is found to be over identified as with system I. 
In the following section, for empirical purposes, the 2SLS and 3SLS techniques are 
applied to estimate each equation. Then, the findings are compared with our previous 
findings based on the OLS technique. 
9.3 	Estimation and Empirical Findings 
Here, profit, concentration and conjectures equations are estimated separately. 
9.3.1 Profit Equation 
First we estimate the profit equation with the OLS and 3SLS techniques considering system 
of equation I and the same procedure is followed for system II. 
9.3.1.1 	Considering System of Equations 
Results of equilibrium profit model using the OLS, 2SLS and 3SLS techniques are reported 
in Table 9.1. Profits on sales (GPMTO) is used as the dependent variable. Only concentration 
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and conjectures variables are considered as endogenous variables, and the other variables are 
treated as exogenous.' 
Results for the regressions using the OLS, 2SLS and 3SLS techniques are given in 
Column 1, 2 and 3 of Table 9.1. For the 2SLS and 3SLS estimations, except CPD, the 
coefficients of all variables are with expected signs and same as the OLS findings. However, 
all variables lose their significance. Therefore, simultaneity bias seems quite prominent into 
the profit equation.' 
Table 9.1: Findings from the Equilibrium Profit Model Considering System I 
Column 1 Column 2 	I Column 3 
(OLS) (2SLS) (3SLS) 
H 0.266a 0.319 0.333 
(2.95) (1.06) (1.07) 
ELASown -0.330a -0.393 -0.400 
(3.46) (1.18) (1.16) 
CONJ 0.286a 0.346 0.361 
(3.16) (1.10) (1.12) 
CPD -0.018 -0.017 -0.016 
(1.04) (0.91) (0.85) 
IMP1 -0.015 -0.018 -0.019 
(1.22) (0.82) (0.83) 
INVS 0.073b 0.054 0.051 
(1.84) (0.47) (0.43) 
Intercept -0.590 -0.582 -0.573 
R2(adjusted) 0.362 - 
Note: Except CPD all variables are in logarithmic functional form, considering equation (4.26) 
Figures in parentheses are White's heteroscedastic consistent t-ratios. _ a Indicates coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level using a one-tailed t-test. 
b Indicates coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level using a one-tailed t-test. 
4 Product differentiation and import intensity could be treated as endogenous, but both variables are found to 
be insignificant in the models as in other Australian studies, see Phillips (1978) and Ratnayke (1990). 
5  In an earlier paper, Bhattacharya and Bloch (1997) find different results with 92 industries. Only 
concentration is treated as an endogenous variable, together with profits. 
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9.3.1.2 	Considering System of Equations II 
Results of the disequilibrium version of profit model using the OLS, 2SLS and 3SLS 
techniques are reported in Table 9.1'. Profits on sales (GPMT084) is used as the dependent 
variable. Again, only the concentration and conjectures variables are treated as endogenous 
variables, and the other variables are used as exogenous. 
Table 9.1': Findings from the Disequilibrium Profit Model Considering System H 
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 
(OLS) (2SLS) (3SLS) 
GPMT077 0.217b 0.219a -0.819 
(1.95) (2.75) (1.09) 
H 0.258a 0.299 0.360 
(2.94) (1.24) (0.74) 
ELASown -0.101a -0.387c -0.366 
(3.85) (1.41) (0.68) 
CONJ 0.288a 0.334c 0.350 
(3.26) (1.30) (0.69) 
CPD -0.014 -0.014 -0.029 
(0.86) (0.78) (0.91) 
IMP! -0.018c -0.020 -0.007 
(1.55) (1.07) (0.21) 
INVS 0.060b 0.046 0.101 
(1.67) (0.48) (0.50) 
Intercept -0.470 -0.463 -1.020 
R2(adjusted) 0.400 - 
Note: Considering equation (4.27.1) 
Except CPD all variables are in logarithmic functional form. 
Figures in parentheses are White's heterosceclastic consistent t-ratios. 
a Indicates coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level using a one-tailed t-test. 
b Indicates coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level using a one-tailed t-test. 
c Indicates coefficient is significant at the 0.10 level using a one-tailed t-test. 
Results for the regressions using the OLS, 2SLS and 3SLS techniques are given in 
Column 1, 2 and 3 of Table 9.1'. For the 2SLS estimation, except CPD, the coefficients of all 
variables are with expected signs and same as the OLS findings. However, some variables 
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lose significance. ELASown and CONJ are only significant at the ten percent level, and 
GPMT077 is significant at the one percent level. 
For the 3SLS estimation, all variables except GPMT077, CPD are with expected 
signs but are insignificant. 
In summary, a significant profit-concentration relationship can not be established 
using simultaneous equation techniques into the profit models. Signs are the same as with 
OLS findings both for Table 9.1 and 9.1' for most of the variables (except GPMT077 in the 
3SLS estimation of the disequilibrium profit model). But, with the 2SLS and 3SLS 
techniques, significance vanishes for most of the variables. It should be noted that there is not 
much change in the magnitude of the estimated coefficients in general. 
9.3.2 Concentration Equation 
First, the concentration equation is estimated with the OLS and 3SLS techniques considering 
system of equation I then, same procedure is followed for system H. 
9.3.2.1 	Considering System of Equations I 
Results for the equilibrium concentration model comparing using the OLS, 2SLS and 3SLS 
techniques are reported in Table 9.2. The Herfindahl index (H) is used as the dependent 
variable. Only conjectures is considered as an endogenous variable, and the other variables 
are treated as exogenous. 
Results of the regressions using the OLS, 2SLS and 3SLS techniques are given in 
column 1, 2 and 3, respectively, of Table 9.2. Most importantly, for the 2SLS and 3SLS 
estimations, the coefficients of all variables are with expected signs. NOF is significant at the 
one percent level for both 2SLS and 3SLS techniques. CDR is significant at the five and one 
percent levels for the 2SLS and 3SLS techniques, respectively. CPD is positive and 
significant at the ten percent level only with the 3SLS technique. For the OLS technique, 
ELASown and CONJ are with opposite to the expected signs and significant at the one 
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percent level. NOF, CDR and CPD are with expected signs, but only the first two variables 
are significant at the one percent level. 
For the equilibrium concentration equation, simultaneous techniques (i.e. the 2SLS 
and 3SLS techniques) yield better results than the OLS estimation in terms of signs for all 
variables. The values of the estimated coefficients for most of the variables are greater with 
simultaneous estimation. Thus, simultaneity bias is prominent into the concentration 
equation. 
9.3.2.2 	Considering System of Equations 11 
Results for the concentration model using disequilibrium version of profit and concentration 
model and using the OLS, 2SLS and 3SLS techniques are reported in Table 9.2'. The 
Herfindahl index (H84) is used as the dependent variable. Only conjectures is used as an 
endogenous variable, and the other variables are exogenous. 
In Table 9.2', results of the regressions using the OLS, 2SLS and 3SLS techniques 
are given in column 1, 2 and 3 respectively. Again, for the 2SLS and 3SLS estimations, the 
coefficients of all variables are with expected signs. NOF is significant at the one percent 
level for both 2SLS and 3SLS techniques. CDR is significant at the one and five percent 
levels for the 2SLS and 3SLS techniques, respectively. CPD is positive and significant at the 
ten percent level only with the 3SLS technique. H77 has the expected positive sign for both 
the 2SLS and 3SLS techniques, but is significant at the one percent level only with the 2SLS 
technique. For the OLS technique, ELAS own and CONJ are with opposite signs and 
significant at the one percent level. NOF, CDR and CPD are with expected signs, but only 
first two variables are significant at the one percent level. 
For the concentration equation of both for System I and II, the OLS results compare 
favourably with those from simultaneous techniques (i.e. the 2SLS and the 3SLS techniques), 
The 2SLS and 3SLS techniques perform better in terms of signs of coefficients (if not in 
terms of significance level always). For the 2SLS and 3SLS results, all variables are with 
expected signs as described in equation 5.13 and 5.14.1. In general, both for the equilibrium 
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and the disequilibrium model, simultaneity bias is prominent in the concentration equation 
and the simultaneous techniques produce results according to the expectations of oligopoly 
based model. 
9.3.3 The Conjectures Equation 
First the conjectures equation is estimated with the OLS and 3SLS techniques considering 
system I and the same procedure is followed for system H. 
Table 9.2: Findings from the Equilibrium Concentration Model Considering System I 
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 
(OLS) (2SLS) (3SLS) 
NOF -0.243a -0.661a -0.693a 
(3.07) (2.64) (2.69) 
ELASown 0.552a -0.729 -0.731 
(3.67) (0.97) (0.94) 
CDR -0.088a -0.244b -0.260a 
(2.55) (2.32) (2.40) 
CONJ -0.571a 0.499 0.581 
(3.93) (0.80) (0.91) 
CPD 0.017 0.109 0.119C 
(0.58) (1.24) (1.32) 
Intercept -0.660 -0.525 -0.475 
R2 (adjusted) 0.747 - - 
Note: Considering equation (5.13) 
Except CPD all variables are in logarithmic functional form. 
Figures in parentheses are White's heteroscedastic consistent t-ratios. 
a Indicates coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level using a one-tailed t-test. 
b Indicates coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level using a one-tailed t-test. 
c Indicates coefficient is significant at the 0.10 level using a one-tailed t-test. 
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Table 9.2': Findings from the Disequilibrium Concentration Model 
Considering System II 
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 
(OLS) (2SLS) (3SLS) 
H77 0.133b 0.231a 0.091 
(2.07) (2.39) (0.16) 
NOF -0.223a -0.456a -0.672a 
(3.18) (3.12) (2.36) 
ELASown 0.535a -0.238 -0.710 
(3.58) (0.51) (0.93) 
CDR -0.080a -0.167a -0.249b 
(2.84) (2.59) (2.10) 
CONJ -0.547a 0.106 0.578 
(3.78) (0.27) (0.91) 
CPD 0.015 0.069 0.117c 
(0.51) (1.17) (1.28) 
Intercept -0.545 -0.379 -0.393 
R2 (adjusted) 0.758 - - 
Note: Considering equation (5.14.1) 
Except CPD all variables are in logarithmic functional form. 
1-184 is used as the dependent variable 
Figures in parentheses are White's heteroscedastic consistent t-ratios. 
a Indicates coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level using a one-tailed t-test. 
b Indicates coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level using a one-tailed t-test. 
c Indicates coefficient is significant at the 0.10 level using a one-tailed t-test 
9.3.3.1 	Considering System of Equations 
Results of the equilibrium conjectures model using the OLS, 2SLS and 3SLS 
techniques are reported in Table 9.3. The conjectures variable (CONJ) is used as the 
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dependent variable. Only concentration is treated as an endogenous variable, and the other 
variables are exogenous. 
Results for the OLS, 2SLS and 3SLS regressions are given in column 1, 2 and 3 of 
Table 9.3. For the 2SLS and 3SLS estimations, the signs of coefficients and significance 
levels of all variables are same as the OLS results. For the OLS, 2SLS and 3SLS estimation 
techniques, the coefficients of STABLE, GROW and CPD variables are with expected signs 
but insignificant. The coefficients of H and IMP1 are significant, but with opposite to the 
expected signs. 
Table 9.3: Findings from the Equilibrium Conjectures Model Considering System I 
I 	Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 
(OLS) (2SLS) (3SLS) 
H -0.875a -0.871a -0.867a 
(7.52) (5.47) (5.28) 
STABLE 0.095 0.095 0.090 
(1.16) (1.20) (1.09) 
GROW -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.001 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.11) 
CPD -0.081 -0.081 -0.081 
(1.09) (1.05) (1.02) 
IMP1 0.105b 0.105b 0.099b 
(1.79) (2.07) (1.90) 
Intercept -1.116 -1.113 -1.108 
R2 (adjusted) 0.370 - - 
Note: Considering equation (5.15) 
STABLE, GROWand CPD are not in logarithmic functional form. 
Figures in parentheses are White's heteroscedastic consistent t-ratios. 
a Indicates coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level using a one-tailed t-test. 
b Indicates coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level using a one-tailed t-test. 
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at the one and five percent levels, respectively. Simultaneity bias is not very prominent in the 
conjectures equation. 
9.3.3.2 	Considering System of Equations 111 
Results of the conjectures model with the disequilibrium version of the profit and 
concentration models using the OLS, 2SLS and 3SLS techniques are reported in Table 9.3'. 
The conjectures variable (CONJ) is used as the dependent variable. Only concentration is 
treated as an endogenous variable, and the other variables are exogenous. 
Results for the OLS, 2SLS and 3SLS regressions are given in column I, 2 and 3 of 
Table 9.3'. For the 2SLS and 3SLS estimations, the signs of coefficients and significance 
levels of all variables are same as the OLS results. For the OLS, 2SLS and 3SLS estimation 
techniques, the coefficients of STABLE, GR and CPD variables are each with the expected 
sign, but insignificant. The coefficients of H and IMPI are significant, but with opposite to 
the expected signs and significant at the one and five percent levels, respectively. Here also 
simultaneity bias is not very prominent in the conjectures equation. 
Both for system i and II, the conjectures model yields similar results with all three 
estimation techniques (the OLS, 2SLS and 3SLS). None of the findings are not very 
satisfactory in terms of signs and significance levels. 
9.4 Conclusions 
There are strong a priori reasons to believe a simultaneity bias exists for some aspects of the 
SCP variables (see Chapter 2). This chapter has investigated the simultaneous nature of the 
relationships among profit, concentration and conjectures variable. In this respect, we 
consider two systems of equations are considered : i) system I consists of equilibrium models 
of profits, concentration and conjectures, system II consists of disequilibrium version of 
the profit and concentration model with the equilibrium conjectures model. All models are 
estimated in logarithmic form. The 2SLS and 3SLS techniques are used for simultaneous 
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estimation and the findings are compared with the OLS results for each equation. The major 
findings can be summarised here. 
Firstly, considering both system I and II, simultaneity is prominent for the profit 
models. The estimated coefficients are not much affected, but significance of the coefficients 
is generally lower with simultaneous estimation. Importantly, the positive relationship 
between concentration and profit is no longer significant with the 2SLS and 3SLS 
techniques. 
Table 9.3': Findings from the Equilibrium Conjectures Model Considering System II 
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 
(OLS) (2SLS) (3SLS) 
H -0.875a -0.858a -0.865a 
(7.52) (5.64) (5.25) 
STABLE 0.095 0.097 0.096 
(1.16) (1.21) (1.16) 
GROW -0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0007 
(0.02) (0.05) (0.07) 
CPD -0.081 -0.080 -0.081 
(1.09) (1.04) (1.01) 
IMP1 0.105b 0.105b 0.099b 
(1.79) (2.06) (1.89) 
Intercept -1.116 -1.09 -1.11 
R2 (adjusted) 0.370 - 
Note: Considering equation (5.15) 
STABLE, GROW and CPD are not in log form. 
Figures in parentheses are Whites heteroscedastic consistent t-ratios. 
a Indicates coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level using a one-tailed t-test. 
b Indicates coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level using a one-tailed t-test. 
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Secondly, considering both system I and II, simultaneity is prominent for the concentration 
model. In terms of signs, the 2SLS and 3SLS techniques perform better compared to the 
OLS technique. It should be noted, with the 2SLS and 3SLS techniques, the conjectures is 
positively related to concentration, according to the expectation of oligopoly models. 
Finally, considering both system I and II, simultaneity is not prominent for the 
conjectures model. In terms of --signs and significance, neither the OLS nor the 2SLS and 
3SLS techniques yield satisfactory results. 
162 
CHAPTER 10 
CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RECOMMENDATIONS 
10.1 Introduction 
The purpose of the study can be stated as twofold. First, some of the important aspects (viz. 
profits, concentration and conjectures of firms about their rivals) of the structure-conduct-
performance paradigm are examined. Single equation models are derived from an oligopoly 
framework and estimated in context of Australian manufacturing. In this respect, no attempt 
has been made to include the whole range of variables mentioned in the literature. Also, 
some major issues commonly raised in structure-conduct-performance studies are examined 
with the industry sample. The models for the three aspects of the paradigm (viz, profits, 
concentration and conjectures) are specified in Chapters 4 and 5. Findings are summarised in 
Chapter 7 and 8. Also simultaneous relationships are estimated among the variables. The 
results from the simultaneous models are compared with those from single equation models 
in Chapter 9. 
Secondly, for profit and concentration, a disequilibrium version is considered 
separately, where partial adjustment is allowed if profit (and concentration) deviates from its 
equilibrium level. In this respect, annual adjustment rates for profit (and concentration) are 
calculated from the model over a seven-year period. 
In this concluding chapter, an overall summary of major findings is presented with 
some policy implications. This is done in section 10.2. Finally, in section 10.3, the limitations 
of the study are indicated with possible future directions for research in this area. 
10.2 Summary of Major Findings and Policy Relevance 
Having reviewed the fundamental aspects of the structure-conduct-performance paradigm 
with an overview of Australian manufacturing sector, models are developed for a closer 
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examination of each of its three links. In this respect, an oligopoly framework is considered. 
The major findings from Chapter 7, 8 and 9 are summarised below. The second part of this 
section discusses the policy relevance of the findings. 
10.2.1 Summary of Major Findings 
The overall summary of findings from the profit, concentration and conjectures models are 
presented in order. 
The profit model is derived from an oligopoly framework, considering concentration, 
elasticity of demand, conjectures, product differentiation dummy, import intensity and 
capital intensity as the independent variables. For the short-run equilibrium profit model, a 
logarithmic functional form performs better in terms of significance level and explanatory 
power. Concentration is positive and significant at the one percent level with the logarithmic 
functional form, but is not significant with the linear functional form. Demand elasticity is 
with expected sign for the linear and logarithmic functional forms and is significant at the ten 
and one percent level, respectively. The conjectures variable is positive and significant at the 
one percent level in both functional forms. The product differentiation dummy is opposite to 
the expected sign with both linear and logarithmic functional form, but is not statistically 
significant. Import intensity is found to be insignificant with a negative sign in both linear 
and logarithmic functional forms. Capital-intensity also has the expected positive sign and is 
significant at the one and five percent level with the linear and logarithmic functional forms, 
respectively. 
In summary, except for the product differentiation dummy, the profit model 
(particularly, with logarithmic functional form) fits well with the oligopoly framework for 
the industries included in the study. On the basis of the findings, we can infer a positive (and 
significant only with the logarithmic functional form) profit-concentration relationship in the 
Australian manufacturing sector. Also important to note, the positive and significant effect 
of the conjectures variable on profit with both linear and logarithmic functional form. 
The findings from the profit model provide some support for the importance of major 
criticisms in explaining the structure-conduct-performance studies. First, the importance of 
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omitting the relevant explanatory variables is reflected in the fmdings. Overall explanatory 
power as well as the significance of concentration tends to increase when additional control 
variables are added into the profit equation. 
Second, the choice of the measure of both dependent and independent variables is 
found to be important in explaining the structure-conduct-performance studies. Firstly, with 
the gross margin on value added as the profit measure, the significance of demand elasticity 
and conjectures is reduced and capital-intensity is no longer significant. Also, only with this 
measure of profit, import-intensity is negative and significant at the one percent level. 
Secondly, when the four-firm concentration ratio is used instead of Herfmdahl-index, 
concentration is no longer significant in explaining profit although still with a positive sign. 
Third, the fmdings also suggest that aggregation bias may affect the structure-
performance relationship. Dividing the full sample into four groups according to the lowest 
value of coefficient of variation of firm size (an index of aggregation), the findings show that 
the profit-concentration relationship is strongest for the sub sample with lowest value of 
coefficient of variation of firm size. The estimated coefficients for this sub sample provide a 
close fit to the magnitudes predicted by the Cowling-Waterson type oligopoly model. 
Finally, there is some evidence that the presence of product differentiation may affect 
the structure-performance relationship. The profit-concentration relationship is found to be 
stronger for consumer goods industries compared to producer goods industries. 
To compare the results from the hypothesised profit model, an ad hoc version of the 
model is developed. The findings support the superiority of the theory-based profit model 
compared to the ad hoc version. Concentration is still positive, but insignificant, in 
explaining profit in the ad hoc version. 
Disequilibrium versions of the profit model, with both linear and logarithmic 
functional forms, are developed considering deviation of profit from its equilibrium level. A 
constant partial adjustment rate of profit is considered. The disequilibrium version with the 
logarithmic functional form performs better than the corresponding linear form. All 
variables, except the product differentiation dummy, are found to have expected signs and 
are significant at least at the ten percent level. The initial profit is significant with the 
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expected positive sign. The annual adjustment rate of profit is just over 11 percent (in the 
logarithmic specification). 
The overall results from the profit models show that the relationship between profits 
and concentration is positive (except the linear version of the disequilibrium model) and, in 
most of the cases, significant across the sample of manufacturing industries. The variables 
suggested by the oligopoly framework seem to be significant in explaining profit, except that 
the import variable is insignificant in explaining profits in most of the cases. 
The major findings from the concentration models are presented here. The 
concentration level as derived from oligopoly equilibrium is determined by number of firms, 
elasticity of demand, product differentiation dummy, cost disadvantage ratio and 
conjectures. For the equilibrium versions (viz. Cowling-Waterson version with Cournot 
behaviour, Clarke-Davies version with different conjectures among firms and a version with 
heterogeneous product), both the linear and logarithmic functional forms are considered. 
Conjectures and product differentiation dummy are always opposite to the expected signs. 
All other variables are with expected signs (except elasticity of demand in the logarithmic 
functional form for the Clarke-Davies version and the version with heterogeneous product). 
Among all cases, the logarithmic functional form of the Cowling-Waterson type model with 
Cournot behaviour yields the best results in terms of signs and significance. 
As with the profit model, disequilibrium versions of the concentration model are 
considered, with both linear and logarithmic functional forms. A constant partial adjustment 
rate of concentration is considered. Except for the elasticity of demand and conjectures 
(which are with opposite to the expected signs and significant), in terms of signs and 
significance, the disequilibrium version in the logarithmic functional form performs better. 
Initial concentration is significant with the expected positive sign. The estimated annual 
adjustment rate of concentration is just over 12 percent (following logarithmic specification). 
Unlike the profit model, concentration models do not always perform well in terms 
of signs and significance. In terms of functional specification, for the concentration model as 
with the profit model, the logarithmic functional form performs better compared to the linear 
one. 
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The findings from the equilibrium conjectures model are considered here. Both the 
linear and logarithmic functional form are used. Conjectures is determined by levels and 
stability of concentration, growth in sales, product differentiation and import intensity. 
Among these, only stable market condition, growth in sales and product differentiation have 
the expected signs, but they are each found to be insignificant in explaining conjectures for 
both linear and logarithmic functional forms. 
Finally, the models are used as a simultaneous equation system. Two systems of 
equations are considered. System I consists the equilibrium models of profit, concentration 
and conjectures. System II consists of disequilibrium versions of profit and concentration 
along with the equilibrium conjectures model. Each equation, viz, profit, concentration and 
conjectures is re-estimated with the 2SLS and 3SLS techniques within system I and II. In the 
profit equation, concentration and conjectures are treated as the endogenous variables. In 
the concentration equation, conjectures is treated as an endogenous variable. Finally, in the 
conjectures equation concentration is treated as an endogenous variable. The findings 
suggest that simultaneity bias is prominent for the profit and concentration models. 
In profit models, all variables (except the sign of initial profit with the 3SLS 
technique in system II) have the same signs as the OLS results. However, the significance 
level is reduced (or completely lost) for most of the variables. Most importantly, a significant 
positive relationship can not be established between concentration and profit using the 2SLS 
and 3SLS techniques. 
In concentration models, all signs are according to the expectation and significant for 
most of the variables with the 2SLS and 3SLS techniques compared to the OLS technique. 
It should be noted, with the 2SLS and 3SLS techniques, the conjectures and product 
differentiation dummy are positively related to concentration, which is according to the 
expectation of the oligopoly model. 
Simultaneity is not prominent for the conjectures model. In terms of signs and 
significance, neither the OLS nor the 2SLS and 3SLS techniques yield satisfactory results. 
In summary, there is some evidence of simultaneous relationships among the 
structure, conduct and performance variables in the study. 
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10.2.2 Policy Implications 
Most of the work in this study has theoretical relevance rather than policy application. This 
is because, the study establishes links among the structure, conduct and performance 
variables with the help of well-known oligopoly models and the findings help to understand 
the role of market processes. The following discussion tries to indicate some policy 
relevance from the major findings of the study. 
It is quite common in industrial organisation literature to find that the empirical 
findings from structure-conduct-performance studies have implications for competition 
policy. A strong positive relationship between concentration and profit tends to support 
vigorous antitrust policies. In Chapter 3, it was noted that different sorts of anti-competitive 
practices are quite common in Australia with high level of concentration in manufacturing. 
The study establishes, a positive (and strong in most cases) relationship between profit and 
concentration. Looking at the findings from the profit models, one could infer that there is 
some support for introducing antitrust policy.' 
Secondly, the findings from the profit model can not establish the importance of the 
import variable in the performance of manufacturing sector. Domestic structural and 
behavioural factors appear to be significant in explaining profit compared to the foreign 
variable. This suggests domestic restructuring may be more important than foreign trade 
policies to explain the competitiveness in manufacturing industries. 
Some of the structural and demand characteristics (e.g. number of firms, elasticity of 
demand and cost disadvantages of the small firms) are generally important in explaining 
concentration of industries. 
Both from the profit and concentration models, disequilibrium versions show that the 
adjustment process takes some time. 
Although in the conjecture model, a negative relationship is found between concentration and conjecture. 
We suspect there is some specification problem in the conjecture model. This is clear from the RESET test, 
which shows specification error both for the linear and logarithmic specifications. 
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10.3 Limitations and a Look at the Future 
This study is restricted in some aspects. Also, the approach and set of included variables are 
different than in most of the Australian literature. The following sections cover the 
limitations of the study with some indications of further work in this area. 
10.3.1 	Limitations of the Study 
The study employs an inter-industry, cross-section approach to examine the 
interrelationships among industry structure, conduct and performance variables based on 
oligopoly theory. Major limitations of the study are identified here. These are divided into 
two groups: i) limitations due to underlying assumptions of the models and limitations due 
to data unavailability. 
First, limitations due to underlying assumptions of the models are pointed out in the 
following paragraphs. 
The study includes variables suggested by Cowling-Waterson type studies, which 
aims at driving 'adhockery' out of the structure-conduct-performance studies. It is quite 
possible that some structural elements with potential explanatory power have not been 
included in the profit, concentration and conjectures equations. 
One major limitation (perhaps the more correct word is criticism) of the study is the 
nature of the hypothesised model, which is based on short-run static oligopoly theory. 
Examining short-run profits may reveal very little about the degree of competition in an 
industry, as for all market structures short-run profit can be either positive or negative. In 
fact, the Cowling-Waterson model is often criticised, along with the whole conjectural 
variations literature, as being an attempt to squeeze dynamic intuition into a static mode1. 2 
Any relationship uncovered using short-run profits is likely to be unstable over time. Long-
run dynamic analysis might be more appropriate. 
2  The critics may suggest developing a model of dynamic competition that explicitly considering entry or exit 
rather than a static one-period model. The argument is true, but does not match with the spirit of the thesis. 
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In defining conjectures of firms, conjectural variations models are considered. These 
models are arbitrary and multi-period versions are implausible (discussed in Chapter 7). 
Collusive outcomes are more common in markets which exist for an indefmite period rather 
than a short period of time. The specified short-run conjectures model may not be a proper 
one in explaining conjectures and hence profits and concentration (as these three variables 
are interlinked). 
Secondly, the lack of data for measuring variables is a major source of limitation in 
industrial organisation research in Australia. This has been emphasised by several researchers 
from time to time (see, Round (1976)and Phillips (1978)). The absence of data at the desired 
level of disaggregation is a major limitation, e.g. the estimates of the price elasticity of 
demand in the study are mostly more aggregated than the four-digit level (the aggregation 
level for the other variables in the study), as these are the only available estimates to date for 
the Australian manufacturing industries. In some cases, proxies are considered instead of 
relevant variables, e.g. there is doubt that a consumer-producer dummy can capture the 
degree of product differentiation accurately. Advertising is considered both as a source and 
symptom of product differentiation, some measure of advertising intensity might be more 
appropriate as a proxy for product differentiation. 
The measure of the conjectures variable is derived from firms' gross profit margins 
and shares of firms. In the absence of individual firm data, average values of four-enterprise 
groups are considered. Indirect estimates of conjectures might have spurious relations with 
profits and concentration. This is handled formally with the simultaneous equation 
techniques. Also when measuring conjectures, product heterogeneity and foreign 
competition are not taken into account.' 
Finally, it is noted early that one limitation of this study is that it employs cross-
sectional data for a single year for the equilibrium versions and for two periods (with a 
seven year lag from 1977/78 to 1984/85) for the disequilibrium versions. A short-run model 
can be affected with transitory changes. Longer time series data (at the industry and /or firm 
3  Stalhanunar (1991) considers these in measuring implicit collusion for the Swedish manufacturing 
industries. 
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level) are desirable to provide a stronger basis to evaluate market processes and structure-
conduct-performance relationships. 
10.3.2 Future Directions 
This study includes only three aspects of the structure-conduct-performance paradigm, viz. 
profits, concentration and conjectures, and employs only variables which are suggested by 
the Cowling-Waterson type model. One possibility for further work in this direction is to 
include trade equations (particularly, with import intensity, tariffs and foreign investment), 
considering the proper specification of these equations. 
In the study, naive assumptions are made about entry possibility, assuming the 
number of firms are fixed (or exogenous) in the industry. Entry theory has undergone 
substantial development recently. Subsequent work in this area may highlight the crucial role 
of entry to explain the competitive process (both in static and dynamic senses). 
The conduct of firms should be strongly considered in determining the industry 
structure-performance relationship. Sawyer (1981) argues that the paradigm emphasises the 
explanatory powers of industry structure rather than the nature of firms in the industry. In 
this respect, conduct variables should include intra-industry rivalry among an industry's 
leading firms. Also conjectures is nothing but the responses of other firms to a change in 
quantity (or price) by the individual firm. It would be worth looking at some determinants, 
e.g. physical and financial capacity of the rivals, legal framework of firms, to explain 
conjectures. 
Also in future studies, more extensive examination of the virtues and defects of the 
conjectures variables used in the study may contribute knowledge towards the literature.' 
Regressing gross profit margin against enterprise group within in each industry to identify 
the conjectures variables as an estimated parameter could be a possible way of tackling the 
4 In Chapter 6, while defining conjectures some limitations are mentioned already. I would like to indicate 
one more possible limitation. In finding conjectures we have used elasticity data (which are in most cases 
aggregated). Therefore finding the conjectures values at the four-digit level using the aggregated elasticity 
data may create substantial bias. We suspect this bias in the values of conjectures, as in most cases these 
values reflect competitive behaviour. Yet, collusive behaviour is quite common for the Australian 
manufacturing sector as is mentioned in Chapter 3. 
171 
Chapter 10: Conclusions and Further Recommendations 
spurious relation (if any) problem. This might be an alternative approach in addition to the 
current measure of conjectures (which is considered in this study) and a direction towards 
future research. 
Finally, one major defect that Phillips (1978) noted in his Ph.D. thesis nearly twenty 
years back still remains in Australian industrial organisation research. This is the limited 
availability of the Australian data specially at the firm level. In overseas literature, it is 
becoming increasingly common to use detailed data sets at the level of the firm or product 
line in analysing market processes. The availability of published data at the firm level for a 
reasonably large number of industries for a certain time period will greatly assist Australian 
research in this area. 
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APPENDIX IA: DATA SOURCES AND DEFINITION OF 
VARIABLES 
Variables 	Definition 	 Data Source 
GPMTO 'Value added minus intermediate expenses minus 	1 
wages' divided by sales. 
GPMVA 
	'Value added minus intermediate expenses minus 	1 
wages' divided by value added. 
GPMT077 	Same as GPMT084 using 1977/78 data. 	 1 
Herfindahl index of concentration in terms of sales I 
for 1984/85. 
H77 	Same as above with 1977/78 data 	 1 
CR4 	Industry sales accounted by the top 4 firms divided 	1 
by total industry sales for 1984/85 
CONJ 
	Formula described in Section 6.2.3, an implicit 	1 
measure of collusion, 1984/85 
ELASown 	Market price elasticity of demand, estimates are 	3 
taken from data source 3 
INVS 	The average of investment over sales for 1977 to 	5 
1985. 
IMP! 	Import divided by sales plus import minus exports 	5 
for 1984/85. 
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CPD 	 =0 for Producer Goods 	 2 
=1 for Consumer Goods 
STABLE 	=1 if the absolute value of the change in H-index 1 
between 1977 and 1984 is no more than 0.05 points. 
=0 otherwise. 
GROW 	Turnover of 1984 less turnover of 197T divided by 1 
turnover of 1977 
MES 
	
Described in Section 6.2.10.1, 1984/85. 	 1 
CDR 
	
'Average value added per worker for the rest of the 1 
firms over the average value added per worker for 
the large firms' for 1984/85. 
MESCDR 	MES over CDR 	 1 
EXP 
	 Export divided by sales for 1984/85. 	 5 
EFFECT 	Estimates of effective rates of protection, 1984/85. 	4 
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APPENDIX IB: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE 
VARIABLES USED IN THE STUDY 
Variables Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Maximum Minimum 
GPMTO 0.127 0.036 0.282 0.069 
GPMVA 0.335 0.095 0.638 0.153 
GPMT077 0.193 0.044 0.349 0.058 
H 0.092 0.058 0.263 0.007 
H77 0.101 0.060 0.242 0.011 
CR4 0.425 0.332 0.994 0.0002 
CONJ 0.219 2.089 15.421 -2.294 
ELASown 0.416 0.255 0.774 0.072 
INVS 0.029 0.018 0.116 -0.007 
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APPENDIX IB (contd.) 
Variables Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Maximum Minimum 
IMP1 0.245 0.235 0.865 0.0001 
GROW 2.244 4.115 21.582 -0.783 
MES 0.138 0.176 1.200 0.009 
CDR 0.076 0.061 0.240 0.008 
MESCDR 0.001 0.002 0.010 0.47x10-7 
EXP 0.145 0.137 0.368 0.003 
EFFECT 37.951 53.781 250.00 -18.000 
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APPENDIX II: DESCRIPTION OF THE INDUSTRIES 
INCLUDED IN THE STUDY 
ASIC DESCRIPTION 
2115 	Meat 
2116 	Poultry 
2117 	Bacon Ham & Smallgoods nec 
2131 	Fruit Products 
2132 	Vegetable Products 
2140 	Margarines Oils Fats nec 
2151 	Flour Mill Products 
2153 	Cereal Foods & Baking Mixes 
2161 	Bread 
2162 	Cakes & Pasteries 
2163 	Biscuits 
2171 	Raw Sugar 
2173 	Confectionary & Cocoa 
2174 	Processed Seafoods 
2175 	Prepared Animal & Bird Food 
2176 	Food Products nec 
2185 	Soft Drinks Cordials & Syrups 
2186 	Beer 
2188 Wine & Brandy 
2190 	Tobacco Products 
2343 	Man-Made Fibres & Yarns 
2344 Man-Made Fibre & Broadwovens 
2345 	Cotton Yarns & Broadwoven Fabrics 
2346 Worsted Yarns & Broadwoven Fabrics 
2347 Woolen Yarns 
2348 	Narrow Woven & Elastic Textiles 
2349 	Textile Furnishing 
2351 	Household Textiles 
2352 	Textile Floor Coverings 
2353 	Felt & Felt Products 
2354 	Canvas & Assoc Products 
2355 	Rope Cordage & Twine 
2441 	Hoisery 
2442 	Cardigans & Pullovers 
2451 	Mens Trousers Work Cloths etc 
2452 	Mens Suits & Coats 
2454 	Foundation Garments 
2456 	Headware & Clothing nec 
2460 	Footwear 
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APPENDIX II (contd.) 
ASIC DESCRIPTION  
2533 Veneers & Manufactured Wood Boards 
2535 	Wooden Structural Fittings & nec 
2536 	Wooden Containers 
2538 	Wood Products nec 
2542 	Matresses (Non-Rubber) 
2631 	Pulp Paper etc 
2635 	Paper Products nec 
2645 	Printing Services nec 
2753 	Synthetic Resins & Rubber 
2762 	Paints 
2763 	Pharm & Vet Products 
2764 	Pesticides 
2765 	Soap & Detergents 
2766 	Cosmetics & Toilet Preparations 
2767 	Inks 
2770 	Petrolium Refining 
2780 	Petroleum & Coal Product nec 
2850 	Glass & Glass Products 
2861 	Clay Bricks 
2862 	Refractories 
2863 	Ceramic Tiles & Pipes 
2864 Ceramic Goods nec 
2871 	Cement 
2884 	Non-Metalic Mineral Products 
2942 	Iron Castings 
2962 	Non-Fer Met nec Rolling etc 
3142 	Architectural Almin Products 
3151 	Metal Containers 
3161 	Cutlery & Hand Tools nec 
3163 	Nuts Bolts etc 
3165 	Non-Fer Gas & Water Fittings 
3166 	Boiler & Plate Work 
3167 	Metal Blinds & Awnings 
3232 	Motor Vehicle Bodies Caravans etc 
3233 	Motor Vehicle Instruments & Elect nec 
3242 	Boats 
3243 	Railway Locos & Rolling Stock 
3244 	Aircraft 
3245 	Transport Equipment nec 
3341 	Photo & Optical Goods 
3343 	Measuring Scientific etc Equipment 
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APPENDIX II (contd.) 
DESCRIPTION  
Radios TVs & Audio Equipments 
Electronic Equipment nec 
Refrigerators & Household Appliances 
Water Heating System 
Electric & Telephone Cables 
Electric Machine & Equipment nec 
Agricultural Machinery 
Construction Machinery 
Materials Handling Equipments 
Wood & Matal Working Machinery 
Pumps & Compressors 
Commercial Space Heating & Cooling Equipment 
Dies Saw Blades etc 
Industrial Machinery nec 
Leather & Fur Tanning etc 
Leather & Leather Sub nec 
Agricultural Machinery 
Rubber Products nec 
Signs & Advertising Displays 
Sporting Equipment 
Writing & Marking Equipment 
Manufacturing nec  
ASIC 
3351 
3352 
3353 
3354 
3355 
3357 
3361 
3362 
3363 
3364 
3365 
3366 
3367 
3369 
3451 
3452 
3461 
3462 
3484 
3485 
3486 
3487 
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APPENDIX III: CALCULATION OF THE ANNUAL 
ADJUSTMENT OF PROFIT FOR THE LINEAR MODEL 
Calculation of ,u(Annual Adjustment Rate of Profits) 
gt = gt_i +11(g*t —g 1 ) 
gt = ( 1— tibgt_t + lig; 
gt = lrt_2 + 141r: — gt_2) 
Irt=irt_2+1,4 1- 11)(g+t — nt-2 ) + stior: _ Irt-2) 
by analogy, 
7r, = 7r,_. +uf1+(1--/1.) +(1-41) 2 +...±(1--,th" lig: —Jr) 
n 
Ir t — gt-n = ii[E(1-11; i lig: — irt_o ) 
1=1 
as n --> 00 
	
t 	1 
7r —' = P[ lig: — gt—) =(Irt — gt--) 
Irt — Irt_n=Prt — gt-1 — [gt_n — gt—] 
/ t-■ 	/ i-1 	. 	 .c.,°' 	/ -1 	* 	 / n 	. 
ir t-n — Irt-o. = II [ L(l—p) ](irt—irt_00)=0—aj n [112,(1-1.1) ](gt—gt_...)= (t—,u) (gt-71",) 
i=n+1 	 1=1 
Ir t — 7r t_ n =Pr t —J—Pr t _ n —Ir t.o j=[1—(1— ii)n](nst —ir), 
if t —g t,=[1—(1—,115° ](7r*t —ir t _ n ) 
Let, X= 1— (1— ,thn 
ir t =X(7r*t —ir t _n ) + gt, 
ir 1 =X7r: + (1- X )7r,_ n 
or, 1- X = (1— /./)" 
,tt = 1- (1- X)"" 
Using the relationship above, (1-X)=0.215 and therefore ii= 1-(0.215) 117 =0.197 (about 
19.7 %). 
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Appendix IV: Calculation of Annual Adjustment Rate of 
Profits for the Logarithmic Model 
7r, 	= 	)( Irt-1 	IflI ) 
irt-n 	ir t 	71 t-2 	7tc-n 
* 
t- j 
	
= 7rt-n+1 ) LIU = 	n* ( nu ) 	when ir*, = 7r*,..1 for all j 
7r_ 	EL-fl 
Let X = nil, Taking logarithms yields 
log ir = nit log 7r * , + (1- X) log 
For Logarithmic model, using relationship above, (1- X) = 0.217 with X = 0.783 and therefore 
p. = X/n =0.783/7=0.112 (11.2%) 
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DATA SOURCES! 
1. Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), Integrated Economic Censuses, Enterprise 
Statistics, Data on Magnetic Tape, Australia, Catalogue No 8113.0, 1977/78,1984/85. 
2. ABS, Australian National Accounts: Input-Output Tables, Catalogue No 5209.0, 
1986/87. 
3 Blampied C.W., A Listing of the 1977118 Balanced ORANI Data Base with the Typical-
Year Agricultural Sector Implemented, Research Memorandum ORANI Database, May, 
1985. 
4. Industries Assistance Commission (IAC), Annual Report 1986/87. 
5. IAC (1995), Australian Manufacturing Industry and International Trade Data, 
1968/69 to 1992/93, Information Paper. 
The number for the data sources should be read for the data Appendix IA 
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